THE INTRODUCTION
Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is by the art
of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an
Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining
whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata
(Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an
artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so
many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole
Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating
that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created
that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which
is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the
Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the
Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body;
The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall
Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat of the Soveraignty,
every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the Nerves, that do
the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and Riches of all the particular
members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the Peoples Safety) its Businesse;
Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it,
are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord,
Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill War, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and
Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set
together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man, pronounced by
God in the Creation.
To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider
First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.
Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights and just
Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that Preserveth and
Dissolveth it.
Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.
Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That Wisedome
is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently whereunto, those
persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take
great delight to shew what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable
censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of
late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they
would take the pains; and that is, Nosce Teipsum, Read Thy Self: which was not
meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in
power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie
behaviour towards their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the
thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another,
whosoever looketh into himselfe, and considereth what he doth, when he does
Think, Opine, Reason, Hope, Feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby
read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the
like occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men,
Desire, Feare, Hope, &c; not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions,
which are the things Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the constitution
individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be
kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and
confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous
doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. And though by mens
actions wee do discover their designee sometimes; yet to do it without comparing
them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may
come to be altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part
deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is
himselfe a good or evill man.
But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him
onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole
Nation, must read in himselfe, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind;
which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science;
yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the
pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in
himselfe. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.
PART 1 OF MAN
CHAPTER I. OF SENSE
Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and
afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they are every one
a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Accident of a body
without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on the
Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working,
produceth diversity of Apparences.
The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is no
conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been
begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.
To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business
now in hand; and I have els-where written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to
fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this
place.
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the
organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or
mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation
of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to
the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or
endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour because Outward,
seemeth to be some matter without. And this Seeming, or Fancy, is that which men
call sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye, in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the
Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill, in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a
Savour; and to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and
such other qualities, as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called
Sensible, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of
the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us that are
pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth
nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that
dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light;
and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear,
produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action, For if those
Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they could
not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes by reflection, wee see
they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one place; the apparence, in
another. And though at some certain distance, the reall, and very object seem
invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing, the
image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but
originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the
motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto
ordained.
But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome,
grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine; and say, For
the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a Visible
Species(in English) a Visible Shew, Apparition, or Aspect, or a Being Seen; the
receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing. And for the cause of Hearing, that
the thing heard, sendeth forth an Audible Species, that is, an Audible Aspect,
or Audible Being Seen; which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the
cause of Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth
Intelligible Species, that is, an Intelligible Being Seen; which comming into
the Understanding, makes us Understand. I say not this, as disapproving the use
of Universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a
Common-wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would
be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.
CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION
That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye
still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in
motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the
reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily
assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by
themselves: and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and
lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its
own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein
that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that
the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and
to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing
appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation, (which is more
than man has) to things inanimate absurdly.
When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it)
eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by
degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water, though the wind cease,
the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in
that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees,
Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain
an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is
it, that Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the
same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy;
which signifies Apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another.
Imagination therefore is nothing but Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and
many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.
Memory
The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in
sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth
the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their vertue by which
they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many
stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies,
the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being
predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object
being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet
other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the
past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the
day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or
Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of
mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that the
distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a
distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without
distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so
also after great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee
lose( for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets; and of
Actions, many particular Circumstances. This Decaying Sense, when wee would
express the thing it self, (I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I
said before; But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is
fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are
but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience. Againe,
Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by
Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The former, (which is
the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is Simple
Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before.
The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a
horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth
the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as
when a man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often
to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound
imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind. There be also other
Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in
sense; As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun
before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent
upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the
Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no
particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens
discourse.
Dreams
The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams. And these also
(as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by parcells in
the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary
Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the
action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination; and
therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of
mans body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the Brayn, and
other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the
Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that
the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can
master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs be
more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence
it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to
distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider,
that in Dreames, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons,
Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of
coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often
observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my
waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not;
though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.
And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of
the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is,
that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the thought and Image of
some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the
inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) and that as Anger causeth heat in
some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of
the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an
Enemy. In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth
desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too
much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination
of some kindness shewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking
Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we
Dream, at another.
Apparitions Or Visions
The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking thoughts, is
then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easie to
happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and whose conscience is much
troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or
putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh
pains, and industriously layes himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and
exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We
read of Marcus Brutes, (one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar, and
was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Phillipi, the
night before he gave battell to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearfull apparition,
which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but considering the
circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream. For sitting
in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not
hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted
him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the
Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he could
have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision. And this is no
very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous,
and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are
subject to the like fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts
walking in Churchyards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the
knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious feare, to pass
disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies,
from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the
Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, nymphs, and the like;
and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and
Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their
witch craft is any reall power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the
false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their
purpose to do it if they can; their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than
to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them
has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit
the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of
Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall
Apparitions. But that he does it so often, as men need to feare such things,
more than they feare the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also
can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under
pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it
serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to
believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear
credible. If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it,
Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending
thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would
be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.
And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish such
doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what they
receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have
no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from the Will; and that Good
thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God; and evill thoughts by the
Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man, by God; and evill
ones by the Divell. Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and
deliver them to the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the
Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like
handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing
understood.
Understanding
The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued with the
faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally
call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will
understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and so will many other Beasts.
That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his
will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the
names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of
this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.
CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS
By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one
Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words)
Mentall Discourse.
When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not
altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought
succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not
formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one
Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses. The
reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those
made in the Sense: And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in
the sense, continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming
again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of
the matter moved, is such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way
any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the
same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it
comes to passe in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no
certainty what we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be
something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.
Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided
This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The first is
Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate
Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and
scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to
wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly
the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care
of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times,
but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any
man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the
mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one
thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could
seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman
Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the
warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The
Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that
again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and
thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of
time; for Thought is quick.
Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated
The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire, and designee.
For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and
permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong it is
sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of
some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the
thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we
come to some beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the
greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to
wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of
the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out,
Respice Finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you
would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.
Remembrance
The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect
imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to
Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all
the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine
what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen
any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the
nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as
are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when
it is governed by designee, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention,
which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of
some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause,
sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein
hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to
find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and
limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from
thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or
other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to
mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-Conning of our former
actions.
Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof his is
to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same
manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the
field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the alphabet, to start a
rime.
Prudence
Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh
of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing
like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil become of a
Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before; having this
order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the
Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence, or
Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture, through the
difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is
certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another;
by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him.
The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory
onely, but things To Come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction
of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are
Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but
not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event
answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the
foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose
will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy.
The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is
most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to
guesse by.
Signes
A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the
Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed,
before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the
Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has
most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time, and consequently is the most
prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business,
as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though
perhaps many young men think the contrary.
Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be
beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their
good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.
Conjecture Of The Time Past
As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the Experience of
time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken from other things (not
future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a
flourishing State hath first come into civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the
sights of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the
like courses have been there also. But his conjecture, has the same incertainty
almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onely upon
Experience.
There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in
him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man,
and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I
shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and
encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and
discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides
Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other
motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be
improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living
Creatures.
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception
of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite
magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no
Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of GOD
is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his
greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also
because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by
sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing
any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he
must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and
which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and
all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in
one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have, or can be
incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any
signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving
Schoolemen.
CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH
Originall Of Speech
The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of
Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of
Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was
Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable Invention for
continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed
into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as
proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue,
Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of
characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all
other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or Apellations, and their
Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past;
and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation;
without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society,
nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The
first author of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how to name such
creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in
this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the
experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them
in such manner by degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession
of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not
so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing
in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that
Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds,
Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall,
Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which
are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other
significant words of the School.
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was
again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was
stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being
hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must
needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from
them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in
tract of time grew every where more copious.
The Use Of Speech
The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into
Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two
commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of our Thoughts;
which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again
be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of
names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many
use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another,
what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare,
or have any other passion for, and for this use they are called Signes. Speciall
uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be
the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past
may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew
to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and
Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes,
that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and
delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or
ornament, innocently.
Abuses Of Speech
To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when men
register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their
words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never
conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words
metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and
thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their
will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for
seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and
some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him
with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it
is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.
The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes
and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the Connexion of them.
Names Proper & Common Universall
Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter, John,
This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man, Horse, Tree;
every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of divers
particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an Universall;
there being nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are
every one of them Individual and Singular.
One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some
quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing
onely; Universals recall any one of those many.
And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the
larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is of
larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the names Man
and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. But
here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in
Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together.
For all these words, Hee That In His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country,
make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.
By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification,
we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a
reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no
use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,)
if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are
the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the
three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand
by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former,
he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be
equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that
such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other
particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were
straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a
Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in
all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes,
Every Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles. And thus the
consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as a
Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and
delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which
was found true Here, and Now, to be true in All Times and Places.
But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as
in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of
numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe every stroak of the Clock,
and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes.
And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and
men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they
desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall
words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin
again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose
himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to add, and
substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without
words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of
Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof
are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.
When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as
thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man, He Is A Living
Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that the former name
Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is True; otherwise False.
For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of things. And where Speech in
not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee
expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither
case can a man be charged with Untruth.
Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember what every
name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els he will find
himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles,
the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it
hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the
significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call
Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.
By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true
Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct
them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himselfe. For the
errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds;
and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without
reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their
errours. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that
cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering whether those
little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour
visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere
themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that
entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at
the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they
came in. So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech;
which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions' lyes the
first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those
men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their
own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued
with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous
Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not
subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in
copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary.
Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently
wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs)
excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by
them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an
Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.
Subject To Names
Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an
account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one from
another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony Rationes,
and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account
call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed,
that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other
things. The Greeks have but one word Logos, for both Speech and Reason; not that
they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without
Speech: And the act of reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth
summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same
things may enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew
that diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may
be reduced to foure generall heads.
First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the word
Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.
Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or
quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being So Long,
for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little
change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider; and
for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion; for Hot, Heat; for Long,
Length, and the like. And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and
properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These
are called Names Abstract; Because Severed (not from Matter, but) from the
account of Matter.
Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies, whereby we
make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we reckon not the thing
it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the fancy: and when any
thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our
fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.
Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names
themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall, Oequivocall,
are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation, Commandement, Narration,
Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other such, are names of Speeches.
Use Of Names Positive
And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark somewhat
which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or
may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned
to be; or Words and Speech.
Negative Names With Their Uses
There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie that
a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words Nothing, No Man,
Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the like; which are nevertheless of
use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past
cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse
to admit of Names not rightly used.
Words Insignificant
All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One,
when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; whereof
there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men, and pusled Philosophers.
Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are
contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or (which is
all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any
affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and
made one, signifie nothing at all. For example if it be a false affirmation to
say A Quadrangle Is Round, the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a
meere sound. So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or
blown up and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd
and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet
with a senselesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or
Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole,
but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that
one is Latin, the other French.
Understanding
When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the
words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to
signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding being nothing els, but
conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for
ought I know it is,) then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore
of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no
Understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat
the words softly, or con them in their mind.
What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions of
mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the
Passions.
Inconstant Names
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease
us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man
at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of Inconstant signification.
For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our
affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we
can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we
conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of
different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a
tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man bust take
heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their
nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of
Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare; and
one Cruelty, what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity;
one Gravity, what another Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be
true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech:
but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the
other do not.
CHAPTER V. OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.
Reason What It Is
When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall, from
Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of one summe
from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence
of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of
the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some
things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other
operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for
Multiplication, is but Addition together of things equall; and Division, but
Substracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident
to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and
taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in
Numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and
superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force, Power,
and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences Of Words; adding
together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two Affirmations, to make a
syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the Summe, or
Conclusion of a syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other.
Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions, to find mens Duties; and Lawyers,
Lawes and Facts, to find what is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men.
In summe, in what matter soever there is place for Addition and Substraction,
there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has
nothing at all to do.
Reason Defined
Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is,
which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of
the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding
and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the
Marking and Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon by
our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to
other men.
Right Reason Where
And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may
often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the
ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and
inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason,
as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible art: But no one mans Reason,
nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an
account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously
approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the
parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some
Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their
controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right
Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever:
And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand
right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined,
by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of
men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion,
that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that
will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken
for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of
right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.
The Use Of Reason
The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one,
or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled
significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence
to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a
certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and
inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the
summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill
is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for;
he advantages himselfe no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse,
trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of
all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth
not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the
significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not
know any thing; but onely beleeveth.
Of Error And Absurdity
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular
things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely
to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought
likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded
it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent
men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall
upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it
is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in
presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past,
or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a
generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is
unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we
call Absurd, insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to
me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese; or Immaterial
Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or any Free, but free from being
hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words
were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.
I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other
Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt
to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now
I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the
consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that
is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things,
whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another.
But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge of
Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men,
those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most
true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd,
but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For
there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or
Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used
onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.
Causes Of Absurditie
The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in
that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from settled
significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing
the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three.
And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which
I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversly
named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of
their names into assertions. And therefore
The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of
Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that say, Faith Is
Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or Breathed into any thing,
but body; and that, Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are Spirits, &c.
The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of Bodies
Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that say, the Colour
Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.
The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or Speeches; as
they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A Living Creature Is
Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.
The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and Speeches; as
they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition; A Mans Command Is
His Will; and the like.
The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in
stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common
speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither, The Proverb Sayes This Or
That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and
seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.
The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and learned by
rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate, Consubstantiate,
Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.
To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any
absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps
forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they
have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and
also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?
Science
By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us;
nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first
in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in
proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion
of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the Connexions of
one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of
names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And
whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and
irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one
fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do
something els when we will, or the like, another time; Because when we see how
any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like
causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.
Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained
the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility
apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men,
though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some
degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern
themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of
experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but
specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For
as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it,
that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: but for
other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse
in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point
like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the
women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.
But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with
their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them
that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of
causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on
false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not
so, but rather causes of the contrary.
To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact
definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the Pace;
Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the End. And on the
contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like Ignes Fatui;
and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their
end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.
Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference
As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though
wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did always
distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia, ascribing the former to Experience,
the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us
suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling
his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of
where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible
posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the
later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. But they
that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are
like him that trusting to the false rules of the master of fence, ventures
praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.
Signes Of Science
The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.
Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same;
that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another:
Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon
many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all
uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that
may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has
not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and
be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions,
is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of
those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their
reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires,
where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their
private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne
wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.
CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS
COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS. AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.
Motion Vitall And Animal
There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called
Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their
whole life; such as are the Course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the
Concoctions, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of
Imagination: The other in Animal Motion, otherwise called Voluntary Motion; as
to Go, to Speak, to Move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied
in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans
body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is
but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already
sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like
Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither, Which
Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall
beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, doe not conceive
any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space
it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not
hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that
which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first
be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man,
before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions,
are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.
Endeavour; Appetite; Desire; Hunger; Thirst; Aversion
This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called
APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other,
oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and Thirst.
And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION.
These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of
them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do
the Greek words for the same, which are orme and aphorme. For nature it selfe
does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for
somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite
to go, or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must
acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd speech;
for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and Motions cannot.
That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE those things,
for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the same thing; save
that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the object; by Love, most
commonly the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence;
and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.
Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food,
Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more properly be
called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;) and some other
Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed
from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For
of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further
Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which
we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or
not.
Contempt
Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne:
CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in
resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is
already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from want of
experience of them.
And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it is
impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same
Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of
almost any one and the same Object.
Good Evill
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it,
which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion,
evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good,
evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth
them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good
and evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the
Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,)
From the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men
disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.
Pulchrum Turpe; Delightfull Profitable; Unpleasant Unprofitable
The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of
Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are Pulchrum and
Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes
promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth evill. But in our Tongue we
have not so generall names to expresse them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some
things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or
Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and
the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places
signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and
evill. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is
Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum,
Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Utile, Profitable; and as
many of evill: For evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; evill in Effect,
and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant, Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile,
Unprofitable, Hurtfull.
Delight Displeasure
As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before)
onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to
the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so,
when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other
organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour;
which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But
the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or
TROUBLE OF MIND.
Pleasure Offence
This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight,
and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help
thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly
called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary,
Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.
Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and
Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. And consequently
all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or lesse;
and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.
Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy Paine Griefe
Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present;
And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall, as it is used by
those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this
kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body; as also all that is
pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, Or Touch; Others arise from the
Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things;
whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures
Of The Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called
JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE;
others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.
These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and
griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when
they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of
the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or
hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from
the Alteration or succession it selfe.
Hope— For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.
Despaire— The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.
Feare— Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.
Courage— The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance, COURAGE.
Anger— Sudden Courage, ANGER.
Confidence— Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.
Diffidence— Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.
Indignation— Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same
to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.
Benevolence— Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If
to man generally, GOOD NATURE.
Covetousnesse— Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in
signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one
anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or
allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.
Ambition— Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also in the
worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.
Pusillanimity— Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And
fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.
Magnanimity— Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.
Valour— Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.
Liberality— Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY
Miserablenesse— Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or
PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.
Kindnesse— Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.
Naturall Lust— Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL LUST.
Luxury— Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination of
Pleasure past, LUXURY.
The Passion Of Love; Jealousie— Love of one singularly, with desire to be
singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is
not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.
Revengefulnesse— Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some
fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.
Curiosity— Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living
creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but
also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food,
and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing
causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the
continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short
vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.
Religion Superstition; True Religion— Feare of power invisible, feigned by
the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed,
superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, TRUE
RELIGION.
Panique Terrour— Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE
TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them; whereas in
truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the
cause, though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to
know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or
multitude of people.
Admiration— Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to man,
because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.
Glory Vaine-glory— Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and
ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which, if
grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with
Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or onely supposed by
himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINE-GLORY: which
name is properly given; because a well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt;
whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.
Dejection— Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection of
mind.
The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in
ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished
by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is corrected often times by
Age, and Employment.
Sudden Glory Laughter— Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those
Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own,
that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to
them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced
to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other
men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of
Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free
others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.
Sudden Dejection Weeping— On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the passion
that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away
some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and they are most subject to
it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and Children.
Therefore, some Weep for the loss of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse;
others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation.
But in all cases, both Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking
them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.
Shame Blushing— Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is SHAME,
or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the
apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the
love of good reputation; and commendable: in old men it is a signe of the same;
but because it comes too late, not commendable.
Impudence— The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.
Pitty— Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from the
imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called
also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING: and
therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the
least Pitty; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think
themselves least obnoxious to the same.
Cruelty— Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which
men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any
man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes, without other end of his
own, I do not conceive it possible.
Emulation Envy— Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or
other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal
or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with Endeavour to supplant or
hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.
Deliberation— When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and
Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good
and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come
successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it,
sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes
Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and
Feares, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that
we call DELIBERATION.
Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly
impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so;
because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But of things impossible,
which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is
called DELIBERATION; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of
doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.
This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is no
less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also
Deliberate.
Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they Deliberate, is
either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of
doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or Aversion.
The Will
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the
action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the
faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily also
have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it
is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no
Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from
the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an
Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the
same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The Last Appetite In
Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do
a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an
Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of
it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites
make any action Voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions
should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action should
be both Voluntary & Involuntary.
By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from
Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but
also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those
consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary Actions.
Formes Of Speech, In Passion
The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the
same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts. And
first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as, I Love, I Feare,
I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of them have particular
expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be
when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they
proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper
to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then
This Will Follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that
Reasoning is in generall words, but Deliberation for the most part is of
Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This,
Forbear That; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command;
otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory, of Indignation,
Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to know, there is a
peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is It, When Shall It, How Is
It Done, and Why So? Other language of the Passions I find none: for Cursing,
Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech; but as the actions
of a tongue accustomed.
These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of
our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used
arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best
signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body,
actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know the man to have.
Good And Evill Apparent
And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by
foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof
we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a
long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the
end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences be greater
than the evill, the whole chain is that which Writers call Apparent or Seeming
Good. And contrarily, when the evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent
or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and
surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he
will, to give the best counsel unto others.
Felicity
Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time
desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I
mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual
Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and
can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What
kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall
no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the
word of School-men, Beatifical Vision, is unintelligible.
Praise Magnification
The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of
anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatness of
anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of
a man's felicity is by the Greeks called Makarismos, for which we have no name
in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose to have been
said of the passions.
CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE
Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End,
either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse,
wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.
Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing
will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So
that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a
Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not
Been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in
Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the same is alternate Opinion in the
Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in
Deliberation is called the Will, so the last Opinion in search of the truth of
Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him
that Discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question
of Good or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate,
in the question of True, or False is called DOUBT.
No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to
come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever
after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have said before is
called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by
Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know
absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has
been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that
not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to
another name of the same thing.
Science Opinion Conscience
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the
Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into general
Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or last sum is called
the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional
Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called
Science. But if the first ground of such Discourse be not Definitions, or if the
Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or
Conclusion is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though
sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being
understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said
to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together.
And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a
third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak
against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that
the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto very diligently in all
times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the
knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is
Rhetorically said that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all,
men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,)
and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that
reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change
or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at
most but that they think so.
Beliefe Faith
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at
some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it
beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of
whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not
so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called
BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the
truth of what he sayes. So then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying
of the man; the other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A
Man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But
to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying.
But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In; as also the Latine, Credo
In; and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used but in the writings of Divines.
In stead of them, in other writings are put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him;
I Rely On Him: and in Latin, Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno Anto:
and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many
disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.
But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the
Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not onely
Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth
they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the Faith
and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they do not all
believe the Doctrine of the Creed.
From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it
be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the
principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee
have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or
trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done
in Believing, is done to him onely. And consequently, when wee Believe that the
Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation from God
himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take,
and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto
them in the name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in
him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a
true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I
should not believe all that is written By Historians, of the glorious acts of
Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any
just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the
Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein,
but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other
reason, than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings;
whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.
CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;
AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS
Intellectuall Vertue Defined
Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for
eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all
men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are always
understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should
be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a Good Witte; though the
same word Witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.
Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired
These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I mean
not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense;
wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is
not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by
Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This
NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two things; Celerity Of Imagining,
(that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and Steddy Direction to
some approved end. On the Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or
fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes
by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.
Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion
And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens
passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore
some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to, and observe
differently the things that passe through their imagination. And whereas in his
succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they
think on, but either in what they be Like One Another, or in what they be
Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that
observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by
others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good
Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is
called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in
case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement: and
particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein, times, places,
and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called DISCRETION. The former,
that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but
the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without
the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons,
necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his
thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This
done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that
will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with
new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without
Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse;
such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their
purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long
digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of
folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of
experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to
others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other
men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit
to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.
In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets,
Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required: But the Fancy
must be more eminent; because they please for the Extravagancy; but ought not to
displease by Indiscretion.
In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse
consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that
are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the
stile.
In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant; because
the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done by noble, or
by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an
action laudable, or culpable.
In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the
Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.
In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement
does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt
similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are
in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit
them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.
And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how
extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe
of want of wit; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the
Fancy be never so ordinary.
The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean,
obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse
cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and
Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of
unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to
write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from
being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good
company. And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in
profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the
sounds, and aequivocal significations of words; and that many times with
encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before
persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words
that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of
Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but
Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without
Judgement not.
Prudence
When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a
multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe
they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not easie, or usuall,
This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory
of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so
much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the
Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but
lyes in different occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern
well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but
different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as
great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain
husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy
Counseller in the affaires of another man.
Craft
To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as
usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdome,
which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is
contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latines Call
Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of a present
danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robbs one to
pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura,
which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.
Acquired Wit
As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there is
none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the
Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and
sixth Chapters.
The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the
difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the
body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference proceeded from
the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior,
there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other
Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the
Passions; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens
complexions; but also from their difference of customes, and education.
The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally,
the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All
which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches,
Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.
Giddinesse Madnesse
And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is
as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free
from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much
Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range
abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds
motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have
no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have
Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have
stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in
others, is that which men call MADNESSE.
Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill
constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the
hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long
continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the
same nature.
The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great
Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt; or great
Dejection of mind.
Rage
Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse called
RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire of Revenge,
when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage: That excessive
love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe,
for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes
Distraction, and Giddinesse: the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion
of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.
Melancholy
Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse commonly
called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in haunting of solitudes,
and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another
particular thing. In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall
behaviour, are called by the generall name of Madnesse. But of the severall
kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if
the Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when
they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.
(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an
opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very
extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when many of them
conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what
argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw
stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude
will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all
their lifetime before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if
this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For
as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the
water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the
Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, thought
wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be well
assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a
troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse;
yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If
some man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in
taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his
civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need
expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.
This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very
often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others; and not
knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular
a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,)
they presently admire themselves; as being in the speciall grace of God
Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.
Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion, may be
gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those of the evill
disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk
too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving,
others laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering
Passions: For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take
from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the
most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind,
would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time
should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are
for the most part meere Madnesse.
The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the
cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some,
from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter
into a man, possesse him, and move his organs is such strange, and uncouth
manner, as mad-men use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men,
Mad-men: but the Later, called them sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed
with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is agitated, or moved with spirits;)
and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati,
men possest.
There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks, at
the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day: whereupon, a
great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had this accident from the
heat, and from The Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce
Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the
Fever, was cured, by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to
proceed from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit
of madnesse in another Graecian city, which seized onely the young Maidens; and
caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of
the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed
from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also their
honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as so hang'd themselves,
and let them hang out naked. This the story sayes cured that madnesse. But on
the other side, the same Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation
of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so
much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal living bodies; and
generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion
with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they calle mad-men Prophets, or
(according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of
them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same
man both Daemoniack, and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because
Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with
them termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by
Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such
opinion, is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to
Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or
Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they
were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is
sayd, (Numb. 11. 25.) to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give it to
the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not
divided. The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit,
enclined to Godlinesse. And where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) "Whom I have filled
with the Spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a spirit
put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in
that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth
unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits,
though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is
extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament
pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision,
or Dream; and the Burthen Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command. How then
could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason,
but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search
naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse
pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto.
For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind;
unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly
think it naturall; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall;
and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence
it came to passe, when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the
multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but
the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels;
as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some
said, "He hath a Divell, and is mad;" whereas others holding him for a Prophet,
sayd, "These are not the words of one that hath a Divell." So in the old
Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2 Kings 9.11.) was a Prophet; but some
of the company asked Jehu, "What came that mad-man for?" So that in summe, it is
manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinary manner, was thought
by the Jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the
Sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at
all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby perhaps
the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.
But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were
possest; and not as if they were mad. To which I can give no other kind of
answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner
against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to
shew unto men the kingdome of God; and to prepare their mindes to become his
obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the
disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason. Whether the
Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant
actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him
not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which
is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour
speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that
cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they
speak to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8.26.) to have
rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this
does not argue that a Fever is a Divel. And whereas many of these Divels are
said to confesse Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places
otherwise, than that those mad-men confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math.
12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth
through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same
man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable,
alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is
vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was.
So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that
Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.
Insignificant Speech
There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also be
numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I
have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity. And that is,
when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at
all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they
have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by
obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of
matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse
Philosophy. The common sort of men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are
therefore, by those other Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured
their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would
need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into
his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult
point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation;
Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same
intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted
withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning of
these words. "The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the
second, by force of the Essential subordination of the second causes, by which
it may help it to worke?" They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth
chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of The Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God. When
men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make
others so? And particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where after
certain words spoken, they that say, the White-nesse, Round-nesse, Magni-tude,
Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer,
into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes and
Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean
alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse moveable from one
place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst
the many sorts of Madnesse; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of
their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide
Intervals. And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.
CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE
There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of Fact: the other
Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To Another. The former is
nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a
Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the Knowledge required in a
Witnesse. The later is called Science; and is Conditionall; as when we know,
that, If The Figure Showne Be A Circle, Then Any Straight Line Through The
Centre Shall Divide It Into Two Equall Parts. And this is the Knowledge required
in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.
The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History. Whereof there be two
sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such Facts, or
Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as are the Histories
of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is Civill History;
which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.
The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations of
Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called Books of
Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the
Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the
following Table.
I. Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called
also PHILOSOPHY
A. Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is
called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY
1. Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall;
which are Quantity, and Motion.
a. Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate;
which, being the Principles or first foundation of
Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima
PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA
b. Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined
1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined
a) By Figure, By Number
1] Mathematiques,
GEOMETRY
ARITHMETIQUE
2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in
Speciall
a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the
great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,
1] Cosmography
ASTRONOMY
GEOGRAPHY
b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and
Figures of Body,
1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight
Science of
ENGINEERS
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION
2. PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities
a. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such
as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish
METEOROLOGY
b. Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent
1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres
a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of
this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the
Science of
SCIOGRAPHY
b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,
ASTROLOGY
2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that
fill the space between the Starres; such as are the
Ayre, or substance aetherial.
3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial
a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are
without Sense,
1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as
Stones, Metals, &c
. 2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables
b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals
1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in
Generall
a] Consequences from Vision,
OPTIQUES
b] Consequences from Sounds,
MUSIQUE
c] Consequences from the rest of the senses
2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall
a] Consequences from Passions of Men,
ETHIQUES
b] Consequences from Speech,
i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.
POETRY
ii) In Persuading,
RHETORIQUE
iii) In Reasoning,
LOGIQUE
iv) In Contracting,
The Science of
JUST and UNJUST
B. Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is
called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY
1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to
the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.
2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of
the Subjects.
CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR AND WORTHINESS
Power
The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain
some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or Instrumentall.
Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as
extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility.
Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are
means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the
Secret working of God, which men call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in
this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy
bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.
The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of
most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or civill, that has the
use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a
Common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the
Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants,
is Power; To have Friends, is Power: for they are strengths united.
Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends,
and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not;
but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.
Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerance of
those that need protection.
So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the same
Reason.
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the
reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the
assistance, and service of many.
Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good
fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.
Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth
love.
Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to
prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to
others.
Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths,
where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.
Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.
Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the
favour of women and strangers.
The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not
acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few
things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such
as in a good measure have attayned it.
Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other
Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power;
And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques; yet,
because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be
esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.
Worth
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is
to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not
absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. An able
conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent;
but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of
Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the
seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate
themselves as the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than
it is esteemed by others.
The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is
commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is
to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and low, in this
case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on
himselfe.
Dignity
The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value of him by
the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command, Judicature, publike
Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value.
To Honour and Dishonour
To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a signe we
have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde is, the
more is the Honour.
To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no
power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour.
To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying of
Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour;
because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps. To
be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a
signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to Dishonour.
To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being a
confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.
To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to
love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare then he
expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.
To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but
goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to
Dishonour.
To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency,
and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend. To speak to him
rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to
Dishonour.
To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion
of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour.
To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to
Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go
forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.
To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or which
the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving the Honour done
by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do
them, is to Dishonour.
To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his
judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of errour;
and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.
To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones
Enemy, is to Dishonour.
To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of approbation
of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.
To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe
of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases,
to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.
All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as without
Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have the supreme
Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there
be other Honours.
A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or
Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his will
to Honour him.
The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should be
conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the Kings
Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him, proclayming, "Thus
shall it be done to him that the King will honour." And yet another King of
Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service,
to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so to do; but with his addition,
that he should weare it as the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour. So that
of Civill Honour; such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places
Coats, and Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so
many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.
Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and
signe of Power.
And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as
arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.
Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill
fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are Power.
Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are
Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity,
Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.
Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as
being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And Irresolution,
Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments, and little
advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and
resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he
resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.
All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much
Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are
Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly,
Dishonourable.
Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some
thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power. But if it
seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the
gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise;
but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other
trash.
To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great
Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for which
he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.
To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they the
more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the contrary,
to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.
Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as signes
of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft,
Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.
Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and
difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for
Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient Heathen
did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they
introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but
unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter,
as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises,
in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he
had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the Cattell of
Appollo, from his Herdsmen.
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it was
thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather a lawfull
Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations; as is
manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in this part of the
world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till
such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy
for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of
Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are
Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the
fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are
driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.
Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent
Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth either in
such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in
other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been derived from
the Antient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German
Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have
not inhabited. The antient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their
Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted
Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted
not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families:
but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people
of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The
Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived into England,
France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they either ayded the Romans, or
made their own Conquests in these Westerne parts of the world.
For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings,
divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families, that
continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords, principally to
the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their
followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their
Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put
some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And his ornament
both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the
eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the Old
master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such
Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to
distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these
Lords, is the great and antient Gentry; which for the most part bear living
creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts,
Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War; nothing being then in honour,
but vertue military. Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths,
gave divers manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned
from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which, by an
observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek and Latine, as
make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.
Titles of Honour
Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are
Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne Power of the
Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of Office, and Command,
derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in
Latine Duces, being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall
company out of friendship; and were left to govern and defend places conquered,
and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or
bounds of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the
Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German
Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a
Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war
about their persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that
signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence
to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones, and after Barones; and
(in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the originall of
Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most
excellent Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour,
by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable government, were
turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the
precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and men were made
Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither
possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.
Worthinesse Fitnesse
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also
from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for
that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually
named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.
For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other
charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging
of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the
well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse
be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of
Riches, Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have
it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For
Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of
which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.
CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
What Is Here Meant By Manners
By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should
salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before
company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those qualities of
man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end
we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose
of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor
Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall
Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he,
whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse
of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being
still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans
desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure
for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and
inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the
assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly
from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of
the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect
desired.
A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men
So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind,
a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in
Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more
intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content
with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live
well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it
is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring
it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a
new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall
pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some
art, or other ability of the mind.
Love Of Contention From Competition
Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to
Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining
of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other. Particularly,
competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend
with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they
may obscure the glory of the other.
Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease
Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common Power:
because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for
from his own Industry, and labour.
From Feare Of Death Or Wounds
Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. On
the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition;
as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined to
continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there
is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by
causing a new shuffle.
And From Love Of Arts
Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common Power:
For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection
from some other Power than their own.
Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise
Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose
judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we contemn also the
Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there
be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joyes, that are either
swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme
torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight
therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby
to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any
thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the
imagination.
Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits
To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater
benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love; but
really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that
in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he
might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome;
which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have received benefits from one, whom
we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new
depession: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an
honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to
receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope
of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the
obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth an Emulation
of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention
possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged
by confessing it.
And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or
forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.
Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear
Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by
society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and
liberty.
And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit
Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better
disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For
these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first.
And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell, to hold
together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that
can proceed from subtilty of Wit.
Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great
sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to
ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty appears, they
look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.
Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of
other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of
hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and
in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not
seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be
salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.
Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government,
are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique Employment in counsell or
magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers
are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and
others
Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small Matters
Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose the
occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in
deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what
is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the
other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by
weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.
Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such
actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their
Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.
Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and Kindnesse
Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because
the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them
Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to
those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against
danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.
And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes
Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men
whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the
opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he
should deceive them.
And From Want Of Understanding
Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding,
disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the
errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error,
nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.
From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the
same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a
private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet
haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater
tincture of choler.
From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study
and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one
multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in
killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing
Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that
which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the
perswasion of one.
Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong
Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity, Law, and
Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions; in
such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish;
and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an
Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use the false measure of Justice
barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule
of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents,
and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not
so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and
from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when
their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as
reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and
Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the
doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject
what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I
doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or
to the interest of men that have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle
Should Be Equall To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have been, if
not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre
as he whom it concerned was able.
Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace Ignorance of
remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate,
and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it
comes to passe, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the
Publique, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers,
Collectors, and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as
find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged
themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority,
for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.
Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature
Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to believe
many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they
may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because
men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that
Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man bothe to believe lyes,
and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.
Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time
Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of
things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the
present to their best advantage.
Naturall Religion, From The Same
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration
of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of
necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause,
whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call God. So
that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without
being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they cannot
have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that
is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being
brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe,
there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he
feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind,
such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and
their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men
call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things,
yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that
hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign
unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of
their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the
time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of
their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the
innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of
Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which
every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that
Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.
And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that
have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it
into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes
of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern
others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.
CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION
Religion, In Man Onely
Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely; there is
no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely in Man; and
consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof,
not to be found in other Living creatures.
First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes
And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the
Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so much, as to
be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune.
From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of Things
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think also it
had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than
sooner or later.
From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things
Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of
their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the
time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and
dependance of the things they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been
produced by another; and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And
when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of
good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of
them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of
other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.
The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come The two
first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that
have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man,
who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and
procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time
to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an
estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is,
The Prudent Man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect,
where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was
repayred in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care
of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death,
poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in
sleep.
Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible Things
This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of
causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And
therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either
of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which
sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at
first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the
many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God
Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire
men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and
operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in time to come. For
he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and
immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge
himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that
there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that
is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean
by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the
solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of
the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many
Gods, as there be men that feigne them.
And Suppose Them Incorporeall
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed; they
could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but that it was
the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man, was of the
same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or
in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such
apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, and
externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts; as the Latines called them
Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies;
and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they
appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were
Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind of any man by
nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory
signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall; yet they can never have the
imagination of any thing answering to them: And therefore, men that by their own
meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and
Eternall God, choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their
understanding; than to define his Nature By Spirit Incorporeall, and then
Confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a
title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature
understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as
remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.
But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything
Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought their
effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to
passe, men that know not what it is that we call Causing, (that is, almost all
men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring what they
have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before,
without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or
connexion at all: And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like
things to come; and hope for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things
that have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their
war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their warre in
Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since.
In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or
unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them;
as Charming, and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe,
they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into
any thing.
But Honour Them As They Honour Men
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers invisible, it
can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use
towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Considerate
Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one
another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth
nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to
rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.
And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events
Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things which
shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or evill fortune
in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular undertaking, men are
naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the
time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things, after one or two
encounters, for Prognostiques of the like encounter ever after, but also to
believe the like Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived
a good opinion.
Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes,
Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques,
consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason of the different
Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies
so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part
ridiculous to another.
Made Different By Culture
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have
been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own
invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and direction: but
both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them,
the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society. So that
the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane Politiques; and teacheth
part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion
of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that
have yeelded themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God. Of the former sort,
were all the Founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of
the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been
derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.
The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme
And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning the
nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has
not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a God, or
Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by
some Spirit or other.
The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.
The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so
many Gods.
Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a Leeke,
Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called
Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres; the Woods, with Fawnes,
and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn,
with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every house, with it Lares, or
Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall
Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places
with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries,
and Bugbears. They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to meer
Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love,
Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they
prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names
hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill,
for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name
of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the
name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by
the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae:
insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his
Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Divel.
The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground
for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptnesse to
attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependence at all
apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second
causes, a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing the cause of
Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtilty and Craft, to
Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other
Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods,
as of businesse.
And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards
their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named; the
same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture, and
Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or
generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for whose representation they were
made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the
more stand in feare of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and
officers, and revenues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is,
consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods,
Mountains, and whole Ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely the shapes,
some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and
Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this
not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by
mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven,
as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge, and other passions
of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft,
Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of Power, or a
cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against
Law, rather than against Honour.
Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but
Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall, divine
Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon
pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have added innumerable
other superstitious wayes of Divination; and made men believe they should find
their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the priests
at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made
ambiguous by designe, to own the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating
vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in
the leaves of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of
Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later
times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique:
Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed
with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasme; and these kinds
of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy; Sometimes in the
aspect of the Starres at their Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and
esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and feares,
called Thumomancy, or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that
pretended conference with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and
Witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the
Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrayles
of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in
Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the Lineaments of the
face; which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in
casuall words, called Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as
Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and
the like, which they called Portenta and Ostenta, because they thought them to
portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come; Sometimes, in meer Lottery, as
Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses in Homer, and
Virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So easie are men to be drawn
to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can
with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.
The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen And therefore the
first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the Gentiles, whose
ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places
taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts
which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their
own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit; or else that
they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes
might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the
Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the
first King and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife
to be the children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion,
pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove. Secondly,
they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing
to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe
Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls, by which they were to
believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and that ill success in War,
great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans private Misery, came
from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship,
or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required. And
though amongst the antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in
the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life; which divers
of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly
derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary.
And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their
end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their
misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their Ceremonies, or on
their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their
Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls, and
publike Gomes, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to
keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the State. And
therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known
World, made no scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of
Rome it selfe; unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their
Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but
that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull
to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus you
see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.
The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same But where God
himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he also made to
himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of behaviour towards
himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the
Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion; and therefore the distinction
of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that
God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen
Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the
generall command of the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or
Company of his own. God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen
people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the Kingdome of
God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an
other place.
The Causes Of Change In Religion
From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of
the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only
an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can never
be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made
to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in
reputation.
For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a
multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man,
and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God
himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth
necessarily, when they that have the Goverment of Religion, shall come to have
either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or
that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of divine Revelation; that
the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and
(without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.
Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities
That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that formeth a
Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning of a
beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be
true: and therefore to enjoyne the beliefe of them, is an argument of ignorance;
which detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall
propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed
have of many things above, but of nothing against naturall reason.
Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish
That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing, or saying
of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other men to
believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are
therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to
fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and
Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as
proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to
be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall, for lesser faults?
That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of
private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or seemeth
to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to
themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to
themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of
others
Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles
Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can be no other,
than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a Miracle;) or
extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have
been received from them that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as
approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what
the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought
into them. For as in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes,
and arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall,
(which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.
All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in the
Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of Israel; who
when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy
conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40 dayes, revolted from the worship
of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up (Exod.32 1,2) a
Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from
whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua,
and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges 2
11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles
fayling, Faith also failed.
Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam.8.3) being constituted by their father
Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel
refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner than he was King
of other people; and therefore cryed out to Samuel, to choose them a King after
the manner of the Nations. So that Justice Fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch,
as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.
And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in all
parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased wonderfully
every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and
Evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably be attributed, to the
contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought
themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between Princes. Also
the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in
England, and many other parts of Christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of
Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People: and partly from
bringing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the
Schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as
brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent
intention; and enclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of
their own Princes, as in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.
Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for
Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his
spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes,
that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those Princes, they might without
warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign Authority, as easily as it has been
excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it
conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ,
unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That
whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by
Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Alleageance, if by
the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique
of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his
Kingdome given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what
Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases
criminall? Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private
Masses, and Vales of Purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to
mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and
Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity,
Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes
of Religion in the world, to one and the some cause; and that is, unpleasing
Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that
hath presumed most of Reformation.
CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND,
AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that
though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of
quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference
between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon
claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are
in the same danger with himselfe.
And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon
words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible
rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not
a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after
somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength.
For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men,
in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make
such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which
almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is,
than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring
with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever
they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more
learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For
they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth
rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not
ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that
every man is contented with his share.
From Equality Proceeds Diffidence
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of
our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to
their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their
delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence
it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other
mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat,
others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to
dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of
his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.
From Diffidence Warre
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to
master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great
enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth,
and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in
contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther
than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at
ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they
would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And
by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a
mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe)
in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every
man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon
himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally
endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power, to
keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a
greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel.
First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third,
for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens
persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third,
for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of
undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred,
their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.
Out Of Civil States,
There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is manifest,
that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe,
they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of
every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the
act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell
is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in
the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of
Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination
thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no
assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.
The Incommodites Of Such A War
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is
Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without
other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall
furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because
the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as
require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time;
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare,
and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that
Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one
another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the
Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him
therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and
seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even
in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes, and
publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what
opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow
Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he
locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I
do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and
other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that
proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which till
Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed
upon the Person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of
warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but
there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many
places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof
dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in
that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what
manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the
manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government,
use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a
condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and persons of
Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall
jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons
pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons,
and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their
neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the
Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which
accompanies the Liberty of particular men.
In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that
nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice
have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no
Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues.
Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind.
If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as
his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not
in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no
Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every
mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the
ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a
possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his
Reason.
The Passions That Incline Men To Peace
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such
things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to
obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men
may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called
the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two
following Chapters.
CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS
Right Of Nature What
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty
each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation
of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing
any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the
aptest means thereunto.
Liberty What
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word,
the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part
of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power
left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.
A Law Of Nature What
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out
by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by
which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this
subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be
distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare;
Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right,
differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are
inconsistent.
Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent
Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case
every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use
of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes;
It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing;
even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of
every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how
strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily
alloweth men to live.
The Fundamental Law Of Nature
And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, "That every
man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when
he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of
Warre." The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall
Law of Nature; which is, "To seek Peace, and follow it." The Second, the summe
of the Right of Nature; which is, "By all means we can, to defend our selves."
The Second Law Of Nature
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour
Peace, is derived this second Law; "That a man be willing, when others are so
too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it
necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe." For as
long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are
all men in the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their
Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of
his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather
than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; "Whatsoever
you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them." And that Law of
all men, "Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri ne feceris."
What it is to lay down a Right
To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe of the Liberty,
of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that
renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right which
he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by
Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own originall
Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that
the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but
so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.
Renouncing (or) Transferring Right What; Obligation Duty Justice
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it to
another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof
redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some
certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or
granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder
those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and
that he Ought, and it his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own:
and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right
being before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the
controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations
of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to
contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called
Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had
voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or
Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary
and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or
hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these
Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often)
both Words and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and
obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for
nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill
consequence upon the rupture.
Not All Rights Are Alienable
Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either in
consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some
other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the
voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good To Himselfe. And therefore
there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other
signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the
right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life;
because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The
same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is
no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering
another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he
seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not.
And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring or
Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his
life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And
therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the
End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he
meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words
and actions were to be interpreted.
Contract What
The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.
There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and
transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the
Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying
and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be
delivered some time after.
Covenant What
Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his
part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after,
and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is called
PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in
which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his
performance is called Keeping Of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of
performance (if it be voluntary) Violation Of Faith.
Free-gift
When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties
transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or
from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity;
or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in
heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREEGIFT, GRACE: which words signifie
one and the same thing.
Signes Of Contract Expresse
Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference. Expresse, are words
spoken with understanding of what they signifie; And such words are either of
the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I Have Given, I Have Granted, I
Will That This Be Yours: Or of the future; as, I Will Give, I Will Grant; which
words of the future, are called Promise.
Signes Of Contract By Inference
Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes the
consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; sometimes the
consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a signe by Inference, of any
Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the Contractor.
Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or Past
Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are
an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they
be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give, they are a signe I have not
given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till
I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the time Present, or
Past, as, "I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow," then is my to
morrows Right given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though
there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the
signification of these words, Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras, and Cros Dabo; that is
between "I will that this be thine to morrow," and, "I will give it to thee to
morrow:" For the word I Will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act
of the will Present; but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the
will to Come: and therefore the former words, being of the Present, transferre a
future right; the later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there
be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though
the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of the
future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a
race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right
passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have
let them runne.
Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future In
Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time Present,
or Past; but also where they are of the Future; because all Contract is mutuall
translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that promiseth onely, because
he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood
as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse he had been content to
have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first.
And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, A
Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.
Merit What
He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT that
which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as Due.
Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him onely that
winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it;
though this be a Free Gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to Merit, and to
have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize,
and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the
Event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this
difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the
Contractors need; but in this case of Free Gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by
the benignity of the Giver; In Contract, I merit at The Contractors hand that
hee should depart with his right; In this case of gift, I Merit not that the
giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should
be mine, rather than anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that
distinction of the Schooles, between Meritum Congrui, and Meritum Condigni. For
God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall
desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits
prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex
Congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousnesse,
or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely; they say, no
man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that
distinction; but because Disputers do not agree upon the signification of their
own termes of Art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirme any
thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as
a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize
as Due.
Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe presently, but
trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of
Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is
Voyd; But if there be a common Power set over them bothe, with right and force
sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first,
has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are
too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without
the feare of some coerceive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where
all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot
possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray
himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending
his life, and means of living.
But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that
would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for
that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.
The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be alwayes
something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or other signe of
the Will not to performe; else it cannot make the Covenant Voyd. For that which
could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance
of performing.
Right To The End, Containeth Right To The Means
He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it, as
farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood to
transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he that sells a
Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man The Right
of government in Soveraignty, are understood to give him the right of levying
mony to maintain Souldiers; and of appointing Magistrates for the administration
of Justice.
No Covenant With Beasts
To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not understanding
our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of Right; nor can
translate any Right to another; and without mutuall acceptation, there is no
Covenant.
Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation
To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as God
speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants that
govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise we know not whether our
Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that Vow any thing contrary to
any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if
it be a thing commanded by the Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law
that binds them.
No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future
The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth under
deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act,
and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes understood to be
something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to
performe.
And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no
Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought
possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it
selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned
endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to more no man can be
obliged.
Covenants How Made Voyd
Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being
Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and Forgivenesse,
the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which
the obligation consisted.
Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide
Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are
obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my life,
to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one receiveth the
benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it; and
consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer Nature)
forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore Prisoners of warre,
if trusted with the payment of their Ransome, are obliged to pay it; And if a
weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is
bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and
just cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be
forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay
it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without
Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I
lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.
The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The Later To Another
A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away his
Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and
therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.
A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is Voyd
A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd. For
(as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save
himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof is the
onely End of laying down any Right,) and therefore the promise of not resisting
force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man
may Covenant thus, "Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me;" he cannot Covenant thus
"Unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me." For
man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting;
rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting.
And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to
Execution, and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have
consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.
No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe
A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon, is likewise
invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge, there is no
place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is followed with
Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is
also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into
misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an
Accuser, if it be not willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature;
and therefore not to be received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be
credited, his not bound to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be
reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture,
and light, in the further examination, and search of truth; and what is in that
case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the
informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a
sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false
Accusation, he does it by the Right of preserving his own life.
The End Of An Oath; The Forme Of As Oath
The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to
the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but two imaginable
helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the consequence of
breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it.
This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the
pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part
of Mankind. The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very
generall Objects: one, the Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, the Power of
those men they shall therein Offend. Of these two, though the former be the
greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare. The
Feare of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the
nature of man before Civill Society. The later hath not so; at least not place
enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer Nature,
the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell. So that
before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre,
there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the
temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of
that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Feare as a
Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two men not
subject to Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth:
Which Swearing or OATH, is a Forme Of Speech, Added To A Promise; By Which He
That Promiseth, Signifieth, That Unlesse He Performe, He Renounceth The Mercy Of
His God, Or Calleth To Him For Vengeance On Himselfe. Such was the Heathen
Forme, "Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this Beast." So is our Forme, "I
shall do thus, and thus, so help me God." And this, with the Rites and
Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of
breaking faith might be the greater.
No Oath, But By God
By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or Rite,
then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no Swearing by
any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men have sometimes used
to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby
understood, they attributed to them Divine honour. And that Swearing
unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name: and Swearing by other
things, as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custome,
gotten by too much vehemence of talking.
An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation
It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a
Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as
with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an Oath.
CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE
The Third Law Of Nature, Justice
From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to another,
such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a
Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their Covenants Made: without which,
Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all
things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.
Justice And Injustice What
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE.
For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and
every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust.
But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of
INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is
not Unjust, is Just.
Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth But
because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not performance on
either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are invalid; though the
Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there
can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken away; which while men are in
the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of
Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power, to compell
men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some
punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their
Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men
acquire, in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power
there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be
gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they
say, that "Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own." And
therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice;
and where there is no coerceive Power erected, that is, where there is no
Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things:
Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the
nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of
Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to
compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.
Justice Not Contrary To Reason
The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and
sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be
no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto; and
therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not
against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He does not therein deny, that
there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that
such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice:
but he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the
same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with
that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then,
when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to
neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men.
The Kingdome of God is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by
unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to
receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice;
or else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this,
Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue; and some that in all
other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it, when
it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen that believed, that Saturn
was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be
the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries
on Litleton; where he sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of
Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be
voyd; From which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the
Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his
father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can
never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the
benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most
to their ends. This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.
For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of
performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over the
parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either where one of
the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make him
performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against
the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not against
reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a
man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned
on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not
expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it
reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre, wherein every
man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an
Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe
from destruction, without the help of Confederates; where every one expects the
same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he
which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason
expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power.
He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he
thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite
themselves for Peace and defence, but by the errour of them that receive him;
nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their
errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his
security; and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and
if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not
foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his
preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear
him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.
As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of Heaven,
by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not
breaking, but keeping of Covenant.
And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is
manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be
expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are
taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason.
Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by
which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently
a Law of Nature.
There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature, to
be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to
the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the
breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; (such
are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebell against,
the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their own consent.) But because
there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the
reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded
upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know
those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of
Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.
Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The Person To Whom Made
Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do
neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and such as use
not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason. For
if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same
ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it.
Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What
The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie one
thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are
attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners, to
Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the Conformity,
or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular
Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his
Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such
men are more often in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and
Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a
Righteous man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that
proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an
Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, of forbeares
to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the
apparant benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to humane Actions the
relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely
found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life,
to fraud, or breach of promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is
meant, where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.
But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse; and the
Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the name of
Guilty.
Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions
Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do
Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any
individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to say
Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Injured; namely him, to whom the
Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received by one man,
when the dammage redoundeth to another. As when The Master commandeth his
servant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the
Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the
stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him. And
so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but
not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the
detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are
Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.
Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent Can Be Injury
Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified to the
doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his
originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant, there is no
breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he have; then his
Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant; and so
again there is no Injury done him.
Justice Commutative, And Distributive
Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and Distributive;
and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the later in
proportion Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of
value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution of
equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer
than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things
contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore
the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides that
which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the
performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not
Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely. And
therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is
not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a
Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring,
and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other
acts of Contract.
And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the
act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him
Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his
own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though improperly)
Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature,
as shall be shewn in due place.
The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude
As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude depend on
Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is the fourth Law of
Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, "That a man which receiveth
Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no
reasonable cause to repent him of his good will." For no man giveth, but with
intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary
Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be
frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor
consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and
therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to
the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek Peace.
The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to
Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.
The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance
A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, "That every man
strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest." For the understanding whereof, we
may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature,
rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones
brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as that stone which by the
asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe
fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth
the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so
also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things which
to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness
of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as
combersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by
necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which
is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for
things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and
therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which
commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE,
(the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward,
Intractable.
The Sixth, Facility To Pardon
A sixth Law of Nature is this, "That upon caution of the Future time, a man
ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it." For
PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them that
persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to them
that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an aversion to Peace; and
therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.
The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect Onely The Future Good
A seventh is, " That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,)
Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good
to follow." Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other
designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this
Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security
of the Future Time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit
to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end;
(for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is
vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the
introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly
stiled by the name of Cruelty.
The Eighth, Against Contumely
And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; insomuch as
most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in
the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this Precept, "That no man by
deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another."
The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely.
The Ninth, Against Pride
The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer
Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequallity
that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that Aristotle in
the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men
by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he
thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that
had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant
were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not
only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so
foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor
when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust
their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the
Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be
acknowledged; or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think
themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall
termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of
Nature, I put this, "That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature."
The breach of this Precept is Pride.
The Tenth Against Arrogance
On this law, dependeth another, "That at the entrance into conditions of
Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content
should be reserved to every one of the rest." As it is necessary for all men
that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that is to say, not to
have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life, to retaine
some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to
go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or
not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace, men require for
themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do
contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall
equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this
law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant Men. The Greeks call
the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share.
The Eleventh Equity
Also "If a man be trusted to judge between man and man," it is a precept of
the Law of Nature, "that he deale Equally between them." For without that, the
Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He therefore that is
partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the use of
Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the fundamentall Lawe of
Nature) is the cause of Warre.
The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that
which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have sayd before)
distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons, Prosopolepsia.
The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common
And from this followeth another law, "That such things as cannot be divided,
be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit,
without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right."
For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.
The Thirteenth, Of Lot
But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common.
Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth, "That the Entire
Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined
by Lot." For equall distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of
equall distribution cannot be imagined.
The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First Seising
Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is that which
is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either Primogeniture, (which the
Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given by Lot;) or First Seisure.
And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided,
ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases to the
First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.
The Fifteenth, Of Mediators
It is also a Law of Nature, "That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe
Conduct." For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth
Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.
The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement
And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes, there may
neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were
done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against
the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question
Of Right; therefore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to
stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This
other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it
is of the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversie, submit their Right
to the judgement of an Arbitrator."
The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge
And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own
benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so
fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be
Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the
cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.
The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has In Him Cause Of Partiality
For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbitrator,
to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the
victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken (though an
unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And
thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the
Law of Nature.
The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse
And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit to one,
than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third;
or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left
to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.
These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the
conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of
Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular
men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance; which may therefore
also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden;
but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.
A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May Easily Be Examined
And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature, to
be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting
food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men
unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible even to
the meanest capacity; and that is, "Do not that to another, which thou wouldest
not have done to thy selfe;" which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in
learning the Lawes of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with
his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance,
and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde
nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will
not appear unto him very reasonable.
The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience Alwayes,
But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature oblige In
Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but
In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes. For he that
should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and
place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others,
and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all Lawes of
Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that shall observe the
same Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War;
& consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.
And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely by a fact
contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it
contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; which
where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.
The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;
The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice, Ingratitude,
Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be
made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace
destroy it.
And Yet Easie
The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean
an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they
require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance,
fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.
The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall Philosophy
And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For Morall
Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the
conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie
our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and
doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their
Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell,
hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to
Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times,
differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what
another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes,
Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long as man is in the condition
of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the
measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently all men agree on this, that Peace
is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed
before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws
of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices,
Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore
the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But
the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and
Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they come to
be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place
them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring,
made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.
These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but
improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth
to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law, properly is the word
of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the same
Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things;
then are they properly called Lawes.
CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED
A Person What
A PERSON, is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or
as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to
whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction."
Person Naturall, And Artificiall
When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person:
And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other,
then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.
The Word Person, Whence
The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon, which
signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or Outward
Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes more particularly
that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the
Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in
Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on
the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent
himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person,
or act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it where he saies, "Unus
Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my
own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;") and is called in diverse occasions,
diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an
Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.
Actor, Author; Authority
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom
they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that owneth his words
and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority. For
that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in
latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as
the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action,
is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of
doing any act: and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him
whose right it is.
Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author
From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority,
he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no
lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therfore all that
hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of Covenants between man and
man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors,
Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is
in their Commission, but no farther.
And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer, not
knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged
by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made
against, or beside the Authority he gave.
But Not The Actor
When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of the
Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but the Author
breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature;
yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do it, is against the Law of
Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.
The Authority Is To Be Shewne
And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the Actor, not
knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case such Authority
be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the
Covenant made with the Author, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance. But
if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance,
than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case
maketh himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the
Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned,
it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.
Things Personated, Inanimate
There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction.
Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated by a
Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, nor
therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to
procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of
those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be
some state of Civill Government.
Irrational
Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may be
Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during that time)
of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of
Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the Folly, he that hath
right of governing them, may give Authority to the Guardian. But this again has
no place but in a State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion
of Persons.
False Gods
An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the Gods of
the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were Personated, and
held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time
dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be Authors: for a Idol is
nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State: and therefore before
introduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be
Personated.
The True God
The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed the
Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own name, with Hoc
Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit Dominus. Secondly, by the son of
man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the
Jewes, and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of
himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or
Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a
Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.
A Multitude Of Men, How One Person
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one
Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that
Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity
of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that
beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be
understood in Multitude.
Every One Is Author
And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be
understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative faith,
or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from
himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case
they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what,
and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave
him commission to Act.
An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces
And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater
number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser number
pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative,
there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and
thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce
the Representative hath.
Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable
And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is not great,
whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore oftentimes
mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in
number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of
votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary
condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne,
is to absolve; but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is
not true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring
till another time; For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution,
is a decree of Dilation.
Negative Voyce
Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;) whereof
every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the
Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative; because by the
diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases
of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else,
so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.
Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have
before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second
is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to
say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain
time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine
Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for
Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.
PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH
CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH
The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and
Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves,
(in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own
preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting
themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily
consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is
no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the
performance of their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature set
down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.
Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe)
Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves, without the terrour of
some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions,
that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants,
without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.
Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept,
when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no
Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may
lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.
And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle
one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law
of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour;
and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to
abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry.
And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but
greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all
pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to
Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours,
by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are
rememdbred for it in after ages with honour.
Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes
Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this
security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the
other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the
Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The Multitude
sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain
number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when
the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine
the event of warre, as to move him to attempt.
Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By One Judgement
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed
according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can
expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor
against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning
the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one
another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby
they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also
when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their
particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to
consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a
common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to
do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to be any Civill
Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without
subjection.
And That Continually
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time
of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a
limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory
by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when
either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy,
is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their
interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.
Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,
Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any Coercive Power
It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably
one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst Politicall
creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements
and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he
thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps
desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,
First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which
these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that
ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from
the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby
the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with
other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not
see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common
businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves
wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and these strive
to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it
into Distraction and Civill warre.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making
knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that
art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in
the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or
diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and
troubling their Peace at their pleasure.
Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and
Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with
their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease:
for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and controule the Actions of
them that governe the Common-wealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by
Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be
somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and
lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their
actions to the Common Benefit.
The Generation Of A Common-wealth
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from
the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to
secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of
the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all
their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may
reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much
as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and
every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that
so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which
concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every
one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than
Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same
Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if
every man should say to every man, "I Authorise and give up my Right of
Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition,
that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like
manner." This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a
COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great
LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which
wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie,
given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so
much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled
to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their
enemies abroad.
The Definition Of A Common-wealth
And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,)
is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with
another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and
Common Defence."
Soveraigne, And Subject, What
And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have
Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by Naturall
force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their
children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by
Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that
condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some
Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him
against all others. This later, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or
Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition.
And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth by Institution.
CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION
The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree,
and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of
Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them
all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that
Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and
Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were
his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.
The Consequences To Such Institution, Are
I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and
Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the
consent of the People assembled.
First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by
former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have
already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the
Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst
themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his
permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without
his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited
Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man,
or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own,
and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall
do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest
should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have
also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and
therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so
again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign,
be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own
punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do:
And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be
punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas
some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new
Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no
Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person;
which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But
this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders
own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile,
and unmanly disposition.
2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to
him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to
any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the
Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of
forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made Soveraigne
maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he
must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must
make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is
impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many
severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the
Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of
them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest,
because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by
the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or
himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no
Judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and
every man recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength,
contrary to the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to
grant Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch
receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from
want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but
what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that Man,
or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by
them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an
Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to
have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the
People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such
or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the
Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a
Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the
government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of
Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.
3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The
Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly, because
the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that
dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the
actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he
voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he
sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to
stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand
thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to
his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or
not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their
decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might
without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.
4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject
Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to
be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority
from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by
this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the
Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his
Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore
ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to
do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have
Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the
proper signification.
5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject
Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his
Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the actions of his
Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.
6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace
And Defence Of His Subjects
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them
all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of
Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge
both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and
disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be
done, both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention
of discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are
lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,
And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them
Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and
Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what
occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to
Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before
they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in
the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of mens Actions, in
order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing
ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of
the same by Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than
Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a
Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and
Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths
may be generally offensive; Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new
Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the
Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up
Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their
condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and
they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth
therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all
Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace, thereby to
prevent Discord and Civill Warre.
7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May
Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject
Can Without Injustice Take It From Him
Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the
Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy and what Actions he
may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it
men Call Propriety. For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already
been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre:
and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on
Soveraign Power, is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These
Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull
in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the lawes of
each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law be now restrained
to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a great
part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts the Civill Law.
8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature
And Decision Of Controversies:
Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to
say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law,
either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision of
Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of
another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every man
remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the
right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of
Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.
9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:
Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and Peace
with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is
for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd
for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses
thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in
their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under
one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the
command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it
Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the
Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.
10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,
Both Of Peace, And Warre:
Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Councellours,
Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and War. For seeing the
Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and Defence; he is
understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his
discharge.
11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No
Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:
Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with riches,
or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with
ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath formerly made; or if there
be no Law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging
of men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service
to the same.
12. And Of Honour And Order
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves;
what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men;
from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and
at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their
strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour,
and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to
deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some
or other, to put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that
not onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the
Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign
therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order
of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in
publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.
These Rights Are Indivisible
These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which are
the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of men, the
Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable, and
inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of the estate and persons of
Infant heires; to have praeemption in Markets; and all other Statute
Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect
his Subject be retained. But if he transferre the Militia, he retains the
Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the
Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government
of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And
so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the
holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace
and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted. And this
division is it, whereof it is said, "A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot
stand:" For unlesse this division precede, division into opposite Armies can
never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest
part of England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into
this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after
between the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed
men in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in England,) that
do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally
acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries
are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have
hetherto been.
And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct
Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power
And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted away, yet
if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and the name
of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is
voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all
is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.
The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence
Of The Power Soveraign
This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than every
one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse power than them
all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one
person, then All Together, and Every One, signifie the same; and the speech is
absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as one Person (which person
the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the
Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see
well enough, when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a
Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in
whomsoever it be placed.
And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be greater,
than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty is the fountain of
Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his Creatures. As in
the presence of the Master, the Servants are equall, and without any honour at
all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign. And though they
shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight; yet in his
presence, they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun.
Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,
And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not
Submitting Readily, To A Lesse
But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very miserable;
as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of him, or them
that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And commonly they that live under
a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the
government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the
inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes,
if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the
estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the
greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people in
generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible
calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of
masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their
hands from rapine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of
Soveraign Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect
in the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their
own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it
necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can in time of Peace,
that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or
take advantage on their Enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable
multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Self-love,) through which,
every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those
prospective glasses, (namely Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the
miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.
CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,
AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER
The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three
The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the
Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the Multitude.
And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than
one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every
one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be
but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For the Representative must needs be One man,
or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the
Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an
Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular
Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an
ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or
More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be
indivisible) entire.
Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy, And Aristocracy
There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy; as
Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Formes of
Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented
under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy,
called it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a
Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government;) and yet I
think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government:
nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one
kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by
the Governours.
Subordinate Representatives Dangerous
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please,
give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as well as give such
Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject
themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other
Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a Soveraign Power,
there can be no other Representative of the same people, but onely to certain
particular ends, by the Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two
Soveraigns; and every man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by
opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in
Peace) is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of
Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And
therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting the
People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power to make known
their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than
themselves, for the absolute Representative of the people: so it is absurd also,
to think the same in a Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth,
should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the
Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the
title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by
them for their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their
Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those
men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions,
and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which may serve as an
admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute Representative of a
People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they
admit of any other generall Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they
mean to discharge the truth committed to them.
Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes
The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth not in
the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to
produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end they were
instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First,
that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that
bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person. And though he be carefull in his
politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse
carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and
friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the
private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more
potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and
private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced.
Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches,
power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and
reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure;
whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or
dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or
Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private
fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious
advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.
Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he
pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter
about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as long before
the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a Soveraigne
Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right
thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have beene
versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give
their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to
action, but not governe them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the
Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein
an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne
Multitude.
Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other
Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of
Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few,
that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme, (which may happen by
security, negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a
few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or
interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a
Civill Warre.
Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by
the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be
deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable
inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne Power is in
an Assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill
Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming
one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by
turnes. And whereas the Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much
more numerous, than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch,
which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that
is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to
hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is mans
Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles
Justice.
Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie may
descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and Evill: and
consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the hand of another
Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by his right, and in his
name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there
is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a
Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient,
than Confusion, and Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be
pretended, must arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so
great honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this
inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we
are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the
Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by
not controlling the Custome in that case received: And then such inconvenience
(if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition,
and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the
people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is
the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for such
Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the
Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation
of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his
death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit,
and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote
themselves by his destruction, or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that
sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the
Government under a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the
publique Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the
ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is
no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is
not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same
condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For as a Child wants the
judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated to
take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed: So an Assembly wanteth
the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad.
And as a Child has need of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and
Authority: So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all
great dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of
Dictators, or Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary
Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their
Power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than
Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.
Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three; that is
to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where the generall
Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is in an Assembly of
certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest: Yet he that
shall consider the particular Common-wealthes that have been, and are in the
world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined
to think there be other Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for
example, Elective Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into
their hands for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited:
which Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise
if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and
govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seeme
perhaps at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government.
But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the
Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the
Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a
Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or
Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.
And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life,
as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine Yeares or
Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint
his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to
elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which
after his decease may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and
dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who
have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that
the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they
have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if
there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was
first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to
provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with
the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And
consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.
Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them
that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme;
that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that
Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by consequence the government not
Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where
the Kings had a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the
Ephori.
Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea (for
example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy; because they
were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of them, had right to enter;
nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into
which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were governed by one
Person, which though as to the people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or
Democracy; yet as to the people of Judea, which had no right at all of
participating in the government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are
governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are governed by
an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over
another man; but of one people, over another people.
Of The Right Of Succession
Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not
onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an
Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of
life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into
the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One man, as
soon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call
the Right of Succession.
There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the
Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other particular
Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the
Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in himselfe. And if it
be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the Common-wealth
dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of
them that did institute the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not
temporary security.
In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude that
are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of Succession,
have in that forme of Government no place at all.
In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of another
into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to whom belongeth the
choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that which the Representative
doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as Author. And though the
Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of
their Court; yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made; and
by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled.
The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The greatest
difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the difficulty
ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the
Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these
cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is
accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a
Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings
and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are
to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the
Succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the
death of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude
without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom they
should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: And therefore
they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch; every man having equall right
to submit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him, or if he can,
protect himselfe by his owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the
condition of a War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which
Monarchy had its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the
Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the
Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.
And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the Monarch
in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power; it
is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or by other tacite signes
sufficient.
Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;
By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life time,
viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared who should be
their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply the Children, or
nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would
have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that
such a man shall be his Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man
immediately after the decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being
Monarch.
Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;
But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall signes of
the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And therefore where the
Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next
of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for that, if the will of him that was
in posession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his
life time. And likewise where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred
succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred
Male, for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the
Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it
is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.
Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection
But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is to be
understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government remain
Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe. Secondly,
that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because
men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to advance their own children,
than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female;
because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger.
Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so
still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is alwayes
presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and 'tis evident
that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse
of his neerest kindred.
To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of Another Nation,
Not Unlawfull
But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words of
Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may
sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers
(that is, men not used to live under the same government, not speaking the same
language) do commonly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his
Subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not
necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the
unskilfulnesse of the Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And
therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their
Government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they
thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to
Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but
also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of
charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King James,
aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland.
Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill
warres, which make both those Kingdomes at this present, miserable. It is not
therefore any injury to the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession
by Will; though by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found
inconvenient. Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that
whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may
arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.
CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL
A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is
acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many
together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all
the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his
Power.
Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution
And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by
Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it for fear
of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case, they
subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for
fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed
from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any
kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true, that in a
Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of
death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is
contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but
because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he
may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant,
that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a
man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: But when the Soveraign, who is
the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that exorted the promise,
as by the Author of such absolution.
The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both
But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both. His
Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit
it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be
Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of
Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the
Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose
Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers;
and to determine of Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons
whereof, are the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same
Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.
Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By Generation, But By Contract
Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The right of
Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children; and is
called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the
Parent had Dominion over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs
Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to
the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that
are equally Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong
equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no
man can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the
Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there
is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the
woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-wealths, this
controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and for the most part, (but not
alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for the most part
Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families.
But the question lyeth now in the state of meer Nature; where there are supposed
no lawes of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of
Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their
children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents between
themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose
thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the
Contract. We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of the
neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue Male
should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion
of the Females was in the Mother.
Or Education;
If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the condition
of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is
the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the right of
Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again,
seeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother; so as she may either
nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and
is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the
Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish
it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom
it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man
becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him,
in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.
Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents To The Other
If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power: and
if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign Queen marrieth one of
her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is
her subject.
If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child, and
contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of the
Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion followeth
the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign of each Country
hath Dominion over all that reside therein.
He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over their
Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath
Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a Title, without
the effect.
The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of The Rights Of Possession
The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same manner,
as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have already
sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.
Despoticall Dominion, How Attained
Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers
call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or Master; and is the
Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this Dominion is then acquired to
the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death,
covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will,
that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor
shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the
Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be
derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to
Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or
bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall
consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no
obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry
away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall
liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his
Master, is trusted by him.
Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The Vanquished
It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the
Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is Conquered;
that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in,
and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an enemies rendring
himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to
discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee
shall think fit.
And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which the
Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the Victor,
by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome, or Service: and
therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till
farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to
discretion. And then onely is his life in security, and his service due, when
the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in
Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their
task-masters.
The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the
use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and
of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his
Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising
whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him,
or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is
himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.
In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Despoticall
Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution; and for
the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So that
for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one the
Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest,
that is by the Submission of each particular, to avoyd death or bonds; to demand
of one Nation more than of the other, from the title of Conquest, as being a
Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty. For the
Soveraign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all;
and so every man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword,
which is the condition of war.
Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom
By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some
Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little
Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and
his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the
Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a Family is not properly a
Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other
opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For where a
number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may
use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or
by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a
very small company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their
armes, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And
thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction,
of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes of men, in erecting of
Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted
with power enough for their protection.
The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture
Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To Moses,
the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) "Speak thou to us, and we will
heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye." This is absolute
obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of
Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) "This shall be the Right of the King you
will have to reigne over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his
Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in
his harvest; and to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots;
and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He
shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to
his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the
men of his chamber, and to his other servants. He shall take your man-servants,
and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his
businesse. He shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his
servants." This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, "you shall
be his servants." Againe, when the people heard what power their King was to
have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c.) "We will be as
all other nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to
conduct our wars." Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the
Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power, as one
man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of King Salomon to
God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) "Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy
people, and to discerne between Good and Evill." It belongeth therefore to the
Soveraigne to bee Judge, and to praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and
Evill; which Rules are Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power.
Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and
his Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9) "God
forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of God." For
obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) "Servants obey your masters
in All things," and, (Verse. 22) "Children obey your Parents in All things."
There is simple obedience in those that are subject to Paternall, or Despoticall
Dominion. Again, (Math. 23. 2,3) "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre
and therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do." There
again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2) "Warn them that they
subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey them."
This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe acknowledges, that
men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings imposed, where he sayes, "Give to
Caesar that which is Caesars;" and payed such taxes himselfe. And that the Kings
word, is sufficient to take any thing from any subject, when there is need; and
that the King is Judge of that need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes,
commanded his Disciples to take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into
Jerusalem, saying, (Mat. 21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over against you, and you
shall find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to
me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them:
And they will let them go." They will not ask whether his necessity be a
sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in
the will of the Lord.
To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) "You shall be
as Gods, knowing Good and Evill." and verse 11. "Who told thee that thou wast
naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not
eat?" For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good and Evill, being forbidden by the
name of the fruit of the tree of Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The
Divell to enflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed
beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good
and Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods
office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to
distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that having eaten, they
saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had
formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was
then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was Gods will to create
them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe.
And thereupon God saith, "Hast thou eaten, &c." as if he should say, doest thou
that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it
is cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of them that
have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be censured, nor
disputed.
Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute
So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and
Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in Monarchy,
or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is
as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited
a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of the want
of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much
worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences;
but there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what
proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants, from
which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power
too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that
can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.
The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and
when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again,
when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from Sedition and Civill
Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been
destroyed, but by forraign warre, the Subjects never did dispute of the
Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an argument for the Practise of men, that have
not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature
of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the
ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should
lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred,
that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths,
consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as
Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure,
nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the
method to find out.
CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS
Liberty What
Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by
Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse
to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatsoever is so
tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space
is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not
Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilest they are
imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is
kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger
space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as
without those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of
motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it
wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man
is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.
What It Is To Be Free
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, A
FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able
to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to." But when the words Free,
and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that
which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore,
when 'tis said (for example) The way is free, no liberty of the way is
signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is
free, there is not meant any liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was
not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not
the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged
to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the word Freewill, no
liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of
the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has
the will, desire, or inclination to doe.
Feare And Liberty Consistent
Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the
Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very willingly, and
may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was
Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for Feare of Imprisonment, which
because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man at Liberty.
And generally all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law,
or actions, which the doers had Liberty to omit.
Liberty And Necessity Consistent
Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only
Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise in the
Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed from their will)
proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire,
and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which causes in a continuall chaine
(whose first link in the hand of God the first of all causes) proceed from
Necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the
Necessity of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore
God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty of man in
doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity of doing that which God
will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things, which God does
not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor
appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And did not
his will assure the Necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans
will dependeth, the Liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impediment to
the omnipotence and Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in
hand) of that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.
Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also
have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves,
by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or
Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to
their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be
made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.
Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the Liberty
of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, for the
regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:)
it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws
praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall
suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee take Liberty in the
proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and
prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they
so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it
is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all
other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it
they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them, without
a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in
execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which
in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted; such as is the
Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose
their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their
children as they themselves think fit; & the like.
Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign
Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it has been
already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject,
on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because
every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never
wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God,
and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may, and doth
often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be put to death, by the
command of the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: as when
Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he
that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is neverthelesse,
without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince,
that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the
law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by
David;) yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because
the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to
God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of
Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact, evidently
confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned." In the same manner, the people
of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten
years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what
crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment
of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the
market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished,
without actuall accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his
reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make
a Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted
right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.
The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty Of Soveraigns;
Not Of Private Men
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in the
Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the
writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning
in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the Libertie of
the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should
have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of
it also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of
every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to
expect from the Father; no propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full
and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths
not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an
absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or
Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit.
But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the
confines of battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their
neighbours round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free
Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own
Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist, or
invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in
great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre,
that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the
Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be
Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.
But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of
Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their
Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only.
And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for
their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and
change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to
receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths,
from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under
Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but
transcribed them into their books, out of the Practice of their own
Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of
Language, out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the
Poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them
from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that
lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his
Politiques,(lib.6.cap.2) "In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis
commonly held, that no man is Free in any other Government." And as Aristotle;
so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the
opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that
having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and
afterwards by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine
Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of
Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of
their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion
of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so
deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and
Latine tongues.
Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to
say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may
neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights
we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty
we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or
Assembly we make our Soveraign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth
both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by
arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth
not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And
because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, "I
Authorise all his Actions," or from the Intention of him that submitteth
himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which
he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived,
either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End of the
Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves,
and their Defence against a common Enemy.
Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,
Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them
First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of every
one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished
to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has
Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be
transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to
defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,
Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or
mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the
use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live;
yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.
If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a
crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to
confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged
by Covenant to accuse himselfe.
Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these
words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;" in which there is no
restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to
Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when he commands me. "'Tis one thing to
say 'Kill me, or my fellow, if you please;' another thing to say, 'I will kill
my selfe, or my fellow.'" It followeth therefore, that
No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any
other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon
the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office,
dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to
be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey,
frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no
Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.
Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the
enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death,
may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he
substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth
not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be made for
naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is
expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on
one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but
fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same
reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth
himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a
timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to
run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the
Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms,
every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth,
which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.
To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty,
or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the
Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very
essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already
resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for
which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then
to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For
they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the
Innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their
bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done,
is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not
unjust at all. But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered,
the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or
defending the rest, unlawfull.
The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On The Silence Of The Law
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases where
the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the liberty to do,
or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And therefore such Liberty is in
some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times more, in other times
lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient.
As for Example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his
own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force. But in
after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away by a Statute made
(by the King) in Parliament. And is some places of the world, men have the
Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.
If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or of right of
possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands,
or concerning any penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law;
He hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject;
and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the
Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he
declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by
that Law. The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and
consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause;
and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by
pretence of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that
is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every
subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign,
brings it against himselfe.
If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his
Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the
Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to
another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain
termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood
it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the
repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power; and therefore the
Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those Powers, which are
necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace,
of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and
the rest named in the 18th Chapter.
In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their Obedience To Their Soveraign
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long,
and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For
the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect
them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the Soule of the
Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more
receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which,
wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature
applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it. And though
Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in
its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also
through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very
institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.
In Case Of Captivity
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be
within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given
him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the
condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because
he had no other way to preserve himselfe. The case is the same, if he be
deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country. But if a man be held in
prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be
understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can,
make his escape by any means whatsoever.
In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government From Himself And Heyrs
If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and his
heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature; because, though
Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his Kin; yet it
dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who
shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty,
nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he dye without known Kindred, and
without declaration of his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and
consequently no Subjection be due.
In Case Of Banishment
If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not
Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still
Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the
covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is Subject
to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of the
Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.
In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To Another
If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his
Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the
Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own Body; he
is not understood to have given away the Right of Soveraigntie; and therefore
his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the Magistrates formerly placed,
governing not in their own name, but in his. For, his Right remaining, the
question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates and
Officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those,
which he himself had formerly appointed.
CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT, POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE
The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People
Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I am in
order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes, which resemble
the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By SYSTEMES; I understand any
numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one Businesse. Of which, some are
Regular, and some Irregular. Regular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of
men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.
Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but their own
Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have spoken already in
the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are Dependent; that is to say,
Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which every one, as also their
Representative is Subject.
Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private. Politicall
(otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,) are those, which are
made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth. Private, are
those, which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie
from a stranger. For no authority derived from forraign power, within the
Dominion of another, is Publique there, but Private.
And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull, are those
which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawfull. Irregular
Systemes, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of
People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe,
(such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse
end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be
considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull.
In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The Representative Is Limited
In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited: And
that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign. For Power
Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every Commonwealth, is
the absolute Representative of all the Subjects; and therefore no other, can be
Representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave;
And to give leave to a Body Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute
Representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the Government of so
much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace
and Defence, which the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that
does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For
consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences
are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckoning; to
which all mankind is too prone.
The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a Bodie
Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their Writt, or
Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Common-wealth.
By Letters Patents
For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth, which is
independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the Representative has
there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten Law of Nature;
yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary,
concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembred
without Letters, nor taken notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they
may be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other
permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.
And The Lawes
And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible to be
described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must
determine, that the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the
Letters themselves are silent. And therefore
When The Representative Is One Man, His Unwarranted Acts His Own Onely
In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he does in
the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by the Lawes,
is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other Member thereof
besides himselfe: Because further than his Letters, or the Lawes limit, he
representeth no mans person, but his own. But what he does according to these,
is the act of every one: For of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author,
because he is their Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes
not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and
therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.
When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them That Assented Onely
But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly shall
Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the
Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the Decree
was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to the contrary;
nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration. It is the act of the
Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly
may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or
forfeiture of their Letters (which is to such artificiall, and fictitious
Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the
Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporall
penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies Politique. But they that gave not
their Vote, are therefore Innocent, because the Assembly cannot Represent any
man in things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are not involved in
their Votes.
When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony, Or Owe It, By
Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not If the person of the Body
Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one that is
not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to
mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives. For if
he should have Authority from his Letters, to make the members pay what he
borroweth, he should have by consequence the Soveraignty of them; and therefore
the grant were either voyd, as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to
humane Nature, and an unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be
avowed by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the
present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member therefore is
obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himselfe: because he
that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification of
the Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged; and
seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely for
Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any),
or (if there be none) out of his own estate.
If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.
When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable That Have Assented
But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all
they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the
borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for which
the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe
for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the
payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one, he be discharged.
If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly, The Body Onely Is Obliged
But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged to
the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having liberty of
Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be payd; If he
Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth
the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later,
and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment
from any particular man, but from the common Treasure onely; which fayling he
hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the
acts of the Assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did
neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.
Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies Politique
Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never It is manifest by this,
that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign Power, it is
sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to make open
protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause their
dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may
be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes committed by
other men: But in a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because
he that protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever
is commanded by the Soveraign Power, is as to the Subject (though not so alwayes
in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every Subject
is the Author.
Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province, Colony, Or Town
The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are not onely
distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are constituted, wherein
there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places, and numbers,
subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some are ordained for
Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to an
Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major
part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power limited by
Commission. This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which
he whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for, and
under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries,
that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place,
the Administration of the Government being committed to divers persons, those
Countries where the Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are
called Provinces. But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing
in the Province it selfe, there be few examples. The Romans who had the
Soveraignty of many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and
Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and
Territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from
England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the government of them
here, were committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never
commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each
Plantation send one Governour; For though every man, where he can be present by
Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present,
they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their common
Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government: which is
also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are
unwilling to take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them,
choose rather to trust one Servant, than a Assembly either of their friends or
servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a
Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which in this
place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that Assembly
contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act onely of those
that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons
before alledged. Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony
whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or
goods of any of the Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any
place without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie
elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place alloweth
them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their
members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe,
they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the
Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province, or a Colony, is
appliable also to an Assembly for the Government of a Town, or University, or a
College, or a Church, or for any other Government over the persons of men.
And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member conceive
himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth to
the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained for Judges in such causes,
or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to the Body it self. For the
whole Body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly, is
otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause,
there can be no Judge at all.
Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade
In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the most
commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that is to say,
such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be present at all the
Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will themselves. For proof
whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, and may
buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, according to their own
discretions, doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is
true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can
fraight a Ship, to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home;
and have therefore need to joyn together in one Society; where every man may
either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure;
or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he
thinks fit. But this is no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative
to oblige them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other
subjects. The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater;
which is done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and
abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body
Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers;
another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any
particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in that
Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home
there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainfull
to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at
higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but
one that sels them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.
Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home,
the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what
price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of the people; and by the
sole importation, what price they please on all forraign commodities the people
have need of; both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole
selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the forraign
commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price
of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the
Merchandise is the dearer; and where but one buyeth the cheaper: Such
Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very
profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne
Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price
he could.
The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit to the
whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out
of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of
Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is reason that every
one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of
the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted
with their accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be an
Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if
he will.
If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of
their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself for the whole.
For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but considereth them
as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment
made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the Company,
the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his
debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.
If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be layd
upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the Company. For
there is in this case no other common stock, but what is made of their
particular adventures.
If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable
by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for
in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the Body; which if a
crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority of the Common-wealth,) is
not his.
If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the Body;
but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the
Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if they can doe it by
their own Authority, they can by their own Authority give judgement that the
debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.
A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To The Soveraign
These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either
perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies also whose
times are limited, and that only by the nature of their businesse. For example,
if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall think fit to give command
to the towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to send to him their
Deputies, to enforme him of the condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or
to advise with him for the making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with
one Person representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and
time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique,
representing every Subject of that Dominion; but it is onely for such matters as
shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that by the Soveraign
Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall
be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is dissolved. For if they were the
absolute Representative of the people, then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and
so there would be two Soveraign Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same
people; which cannot consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once
a Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it.
And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole People,
they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People
cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed to
them from their Soveraign expressed.
A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family
Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without
Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other
Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held
for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth
the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the
Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience
in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions,
during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their
Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and
Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in
their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law
of the Common-wealth taketh from them.
Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull
Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into
one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are
the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their
trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority
from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier
propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the
Common-wealth.
Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues
Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer concourse
of people, without union to any particular designe, not by obligation of one to
another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations,
become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of
every particular mans design therein: And his designe is to be understood by the
occasion.
The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall
defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a League of all the
Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull
designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of
factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants,
if there be no power given to any one Man or Assembly, (as in the condition of
meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there
ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths,
over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not
onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the
Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right
by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace and
Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown to the
Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for
evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique, and
unjustly concealed.
Secret Cabals
If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men, part of
the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the guidance of the
rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull, as being a fraudulent seducing
of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest
is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in
him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And
though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law against
it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice
cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his own cause just, till it
be heard, and judged.
Feuds Of Private Families
In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than the
government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires, it is
Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the Common-wealth, he
needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas in Nations not throughly
civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and
invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have
done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.
Factions For Government
And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of Religion, as
of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old
time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls of old time in Greece,
are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a
taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.
Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or
unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of them that
are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the Concourse is
lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a publique Shew, in
usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not
evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of
his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and
tumultuous designe. It may be lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition
to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present
it, it is a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that
purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the
Assembly Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to
suppresse, and bring to Justice.
When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the
Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to
the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at
Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of Pauls
companions before the Magistrate, saying with one Voyce, "Great is Diana of the
Ephesians;" which was their way of demanding Justice against them for teaching
the people such doctrine, as was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion
here, considering the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly
Judged Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these
words,(Acts 19. 40) "If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man, of
any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you
have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully
called. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because,
there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Concourse of
People." Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a
Sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say
concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I
said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles;
such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the
unnaturall conflux of evill humours.
CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIQUE MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER
In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a Common-wealth; In
this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are Publique Ministers.
Publique Minister Who
A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an
Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to represent in that
employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And whereas every man, or assembly
that hath Soveraignty, representeth two Persons, or (as the more common phrase
is) has two Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath
the person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign
Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the
Assembly); they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity, are not
Publique Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the Administration of the
Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other
Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity
of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor Stewards,
Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers of the houshold of a Monarch, are
Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.
Ministers For The Generall Administration
Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a general
Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the
whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the Predecessor of an
Infant King, during his minority, the whole Administration of his Kingdome. In
which case, every Subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he
shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the Kings name, and not
inconsistent with his Soveraigne Power. Of a Part, or Province; as when either a
Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a
Governour, Lieutenant, Praefect, or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one
of that Province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the Soveraign,
and that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right. For such Protectors,
Vice-Roys, and Governours, have no other right, but what depends on the
Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given them, can be interpreted
for a Declaration of the will to transferre the Soveraignty, without expresse
and perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of Publique Ministers
resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that move the severall limbs of a body
naturall.
For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy
Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of some speciall
businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for the Oeconomy of a
Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the Treasure, as Tributes,
Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique revenue, to collect, receive,
issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, because
they serve the Person Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command,
nor without his Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his Politicall
Capacity.
Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the
custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Souldiers; or to
provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea, are
publique Ministers. But a Souldier without Command, though he fight for the
Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of it; because there is
none to represent it to. For every one that hath command, represents it to them
only whom he commandeth.
For Instruction Of The People
They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the
people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the knowledge of
what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godlinesse,
and in peace among themselves, and resist the publique enemy, are Publique
Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it not by their own Authority, but by
anothers; and Publique, because they doe it (or should doe it) by no Authority,
but that of the Soveraign. The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only hath
immediate Authority from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but
the Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei Gratia simply; that is to say, from the
favour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour and providence
of God, and their Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy Dei Gratia & Regis; or Dei
Providentia & Voluntate Regis.
For Judicature
They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers. For in their
Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and their Sentence,
is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature is
essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all other Judges are but
Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power. And as Controversies
are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of Law; so are judgements, some of Fact,
some of Law: And consequently in the same controversie, there may be two Judges,
one of Fact, another of Law.
And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between the
party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to the
Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for
no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign is already agreed on for
Judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare the Cause, and determine it
himself, or appoint for Judge such as they shall both agree on. And this
agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes; as first, if
the Defendant be allowed to except against such of his Judges, whose interest
maketh him suspect them, (for as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his
own Judge,) those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees
on. Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further; for
his appeale is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign himself, and
he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence;
that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is
to say, by himself.
These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot
forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice,
established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By Common
Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant are Subjects: and
by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the Crown) those, where the
Complaynant is the Soveraign. For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof
one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had this Priviledge, to have for
Judges in all Capitall crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be
present; which being ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges
were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies,
every Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of
the Country where the matter in controversie lay; against which he might make
his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception being agreed on, they
were Judged by those twelve. So that having his own Judges, there could be
nothing alledged by the party, why the sentence should not be finall, These
publique persons, with Authority from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct,
or Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be
compared to the organs of Voice in a Body naturall.
For Execution
Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the
Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the
Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison
Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. For every
act they doe by such Authority, is the act of the Common-wealth; and their
service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a Bodie naturall.
Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their own
Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers, Agents, and
Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique Businesse.
But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a troubled
State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private Ministers of
the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the Common-wealth for
Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince, to congratulate, condole, or
to assist at a solemnity, though Authority be Publique; yet because the
businesse is Private, and belonging to him in his naturall capacity; is a
Private person. Also if a man be sent into another Country, secretly to explore
their counsels, and strength; though both the Authority, and the Businesse be
Publique; yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but his
own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-wealth; and
may be compared to an Eye in the Body naturall. And those that are appointed to
receive the Petitions or other informations of the People, and are as it were
the publique Eare, are Publique Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that
office.
Counsellers Without Other Employment Then To Advise
Are Not Publique Ministers
Neither a Counsellor, nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with no
Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the Soveraign
when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a Publique
Person. For the Advice is addressed to the Soveraign only, whose person cannot
in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. But a Body of
Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of Judicature, or of
immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they represent the Monarch, in
delivering his Commands to the Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell,
or Senate propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a
Councell; but when they appoint Judges, or heare Causes, or give Audience to
Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the People: And in an
Aristocracy the Councell of State is the Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives
counsell to none but themselves.
CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH
The Nourishment Of A Common-wealth Consisteth In The Commodities
Of Sea And Land
The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and Distribution
of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or Preparation; and (when
concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the Publique use.
As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those
commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land, and Sea,
God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to man-kind.
For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and
Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of the
Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving
them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) meerly on the labour
and industry of men.
This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly
Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of the
Common-wealth; Forraign, that which is imported from without. And because there
is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth, (except it be of very
vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance, and motion
of the whole Body; and few that produce not something more than necessary; the
superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply
these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by
Exchange, or by just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity
exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have been
Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for
habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased their
Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by
selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other
places.
And The Right Of Distribution Of Them
The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitution of
Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say, in one word Propriety; and belongeth
in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign Power. For where there is no
Common-wealth, there is, (as hath been already shewn) a perpetuall warre of
every man against his neighbour; And therefore every thing is his that getteth
it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety nor Community; but
Uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate defender of
Liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil,
"Let the Civill Law," saith he, "be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded,
(not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can be sure to
receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children." And again; "Take away the
Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another mans." Seeing
therefore the Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth; which can
do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act onely of the
Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make that have not the
Soveraign Power. And this they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, (that is
to say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing
to every man his own.
All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally
From The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Soveraign
In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it selfe:
wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he, and not
according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to
Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the
Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of
the Land of Promise; which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own
discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their
Generall: who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision
of the Tribe of Joseph; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and
ordained for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the
whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary. And though a People
comming into possession of a land by warre, do not alwaies exterminate the
antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of
them their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the
Victors distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the
Conquerour.
Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Soveraign,
But Onely Of Another Subject
From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his
lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them;
and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing
the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,)
is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this
Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And
consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is
contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to
his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them,
is to be reputed voyd. It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or the greater part
of a Soveraign Assembly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their
Passions, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of
the Law of Nature; but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to
make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill
of their Soveraign; because they have authorised all his actions, and in
bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the
Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be
considered hereafter in another place.
The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted
In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be conceived to
have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their Representative; and
that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine the whole expence to the
common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there
could be any Representative conceived free from humane passions, and
infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique
Land, or of any certaine Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth
to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition of meere Nature, and War,
assoon as ever the Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an
Assembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in engaging
the publique stock, into a long, or costly war. Common-wealths can endure no
Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by
externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Publique Riches
cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall
require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands
reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and Chases, either for his
recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved on the
Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his
Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity: For he, and his
Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects land, when they
judged it necessary. Or if those publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as
a sufficient maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of
the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and
(as it appeares by the late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and
Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth;
which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done
by their Representative.
The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend, As Their Distribution,
On The Soveraign
As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places, and
for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to the
Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion
therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with
means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such
things, as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse noxious, or at least
unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is,
to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter
of forraign Traffique.
The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also To The Soveraign
Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth, that
every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or
a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but
is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man;
it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre
their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall
contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to
the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between
Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and
taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be
understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment,
to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (considering the modell
of the whole worke) is sufficient.
Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth
By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are not
presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to some thing
of equal value, and withall so portably, as not to hinder the motion of men from
place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such Nourishment
as the place affordeth. And this is nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony.
For Gold and Silver, being (as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world
highly valued, is a commodious measure for the value of all things else between
Nations; and Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a
Common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between
the Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all
commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all
places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence;
and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-wealth; and goes round
about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as this
Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For naturall
Bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating,
nourisheth by the way, every Member of the Body of Man.
And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self; they
have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by the
power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common measure of the
commodities of all places. But base Mony, may easily be enhanced, or abased.
Secondly, they have the priviledge to make Common-wealths, move, and stretch out
their armes, when need is, into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private
Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with provision. But that Coyne,
which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being
unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is
subject to the change of Laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the
prejudice many times of those that have it.
The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique Use
The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use, are of
two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other, that
Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first sort, are
Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the Treasurers againe,
and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or private
Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with
the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the severall Parts of the
Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries
sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the
same.
The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies
The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call
Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the
Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign Country,
either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre. And when a
Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of
their subjection to their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many
Common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the Common-wealth from which they
went was called their Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then
Fathers require of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their
domestique government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain
united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of Rome; and then
they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and parts of the
Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies (saving Honour, and
League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by
which their Soveraign authorised them to Plant.
CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSELL
Counsell What
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and
inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of
Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them
both, and in may other occasions besides. For the words "Doe this," are the
words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell;
and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these
are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they
perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon
what occasion. But finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not able,
or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake
sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that command;
and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions
they would inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and
render to those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper
and distinct significations, I define them thus.
Differences Between Command And Counsell
COMMAND is, where a man saith, "Doe this," or "Doe this not," without
expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it
followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own
Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely, and the proper
object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.
COUNSELL, is where a man saith, "Doe" or "Doe not this," and deduceth his own
reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And
from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely
(whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he giveth it.
Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that Command
is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of another man.
And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what
he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to
do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if
he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of
a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right
to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to
himselfe; but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know his
designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of
every mans will the proper object.
This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he
that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of
another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And
consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or
an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the
same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the
Proposition in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of,
before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further
Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and
End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell, is Author of
it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else
can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to
the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance
onely, it is punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is
no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he
is subject.
Exhortation And Dehortation What
EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes in him
that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more
briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth not deduce the
consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the
rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he
that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their
speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing
their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other
tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice
of following their advise.
From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation, is
directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it,
which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the definition of
Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his whom he adviseth. And
that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the
long and vehement urging, or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not
required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed
principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is
Counselled, or not at all.
Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where a
man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, he
may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in
a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him
that speaketh indifferently to them all at once. Thirdly, that they that Exhort
and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours,
and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give
be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he
that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a just Judge. But where a man may
lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his
Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and
laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are
for Execution of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity
requireth to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and
phrase of Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.
Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take from the
formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. "Have no other Gods but
me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the
Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale not," &c. are Commands; because
the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our
King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, "Sell all thou hast; give it
to the poore; and follow me," are Counsell; because the reason for which we are
to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have
"Treasure in Heaven." These words, "Go into the village over against you, and
you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me," are
a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master:
but these words, "Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus," are Counsell;
because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God
Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell; but of our
selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for
our sins.
Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours
As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from the
nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may
arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences
of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt, and inept
counsellours be derived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the
consequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech
whereby that experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of
Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the
Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory,
and Mentall Discourse. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a
naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is,
that a naturall man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of
sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own; whereas
they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may
have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their
Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore we may
set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour, That His Ends, And
Interest, Be Not Inconsistent With The Ends And Interest Of Him He Counselleth.
Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into
deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he
that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his
advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear;
that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language,
and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore Rash, And Unevident
Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and
are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of
opinion,) Obscure, Confused, And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All Metaphoricall
Speeches, Tending To The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because such reasoning, and
such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell
towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant To The Office Of A Counsellour.
Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience, and
long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that
to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary to be known, No Man
Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour, But In Such Businesse, As He Hath Not
Onely Been Much Versed In, But Hath Also Much Meditated On, And Considered. For
seeing the businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home,
and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great
knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of
the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without
study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country, and
their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes of all Nations that
may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to, without much experience. Of
which things, not onely the whole summe, but every one of the particulars
requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary
study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before is Judgement. And the
differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one
kind of study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any
thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of
Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has
learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most
experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement,
and is the best Counsellour.
Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse that
hath reference to another Common-wealth, It Is Necessary To Be Acquainted With
The Intelligences, And Letters That Come From Thence, And With All The Records
Of Treaties, And Other Transactions Of State Between Them; which none can doe,
but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they
who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to
obtrude.
Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better
Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many causes.
First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an
Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with their hands, or
feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for
feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by
contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that
have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there
cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique;
and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence
drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are
moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that
enflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to
the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it.
Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the
truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives,
by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly,
where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled with
the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take.
Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice,
wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and
also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the
businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations, made of the
divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least,
that takes away the time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of
Counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to
be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the
Counsells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore
great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and
of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most
confidence.
To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a
great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their
pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing of his
Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate, especially if
there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his
businesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one
consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able
Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that
useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is
carried up and down to his businesse in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but
by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out
of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and
like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a
Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the
inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the
more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is
one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true,
that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many
Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man.
Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to
look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their
marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one;
And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a
forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man
amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of
equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for
very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane
wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their potent
Neighbours.
CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVILL LAWES
Civill Law what
By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore bound to
observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth in
particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular Lawes
belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes of their severall
Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall, to any man. The antient
Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a
Common-wealth; And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire,
and governed by that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they think fit,
call that part the Civill Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own
Civill Lawes. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not
to shew what is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle,
Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of
the study of the Law.
And first it manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but Command;
nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed
to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the
name of the person Commanding, which is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the
Common-wealth.
Which considered, I define Civill Law in this Manner. "CIVILL LAW, Is to
every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word,
Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the
Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what
is not contrary to the Rule."
In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For
every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the Subjects in generall;
some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations; and some to
particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every of those to whom the Command
is directed; and to none else. As also, that Lawes are the Rules of Just, and
Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law.
Likewise, that none can make Lawes but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection
is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified by
sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And
therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be
deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that
followeth.
The Soveraign Is Legislator
1. The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign, be he one
Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy, or
Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the
Common-wealth only, praescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules,
which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the
Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the
Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the Soveraign is the
sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a Law made, but the
Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by another Law, that forbiddeth
it to be put in execution.
And Not Subject To Civill Law
2. The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man, is not
subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to make, and repeale Lawes, he may
when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes
that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he
is free, that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be
bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that
is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.
Use, A Law Not By Vertue Of Time, But Of The Soveraigns Consent
3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not the Length of
Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his
silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer
Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the Soveraign
shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the
Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal bring no prejudice to his Right;
but the question shal be judged by Equity. For many unjust Actions, and unjust
Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any man can remember. And our
Lawyers account no Customes Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill
Customes are to be abolished; But the Judgement of what is reasonable, and of
what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the
Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.
The Law Of Nature, And The Civill Law Contain Each Other
4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other, and are of
equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature, which consist in Equity, Justice,
Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on these depending, in the condition of meer
Nature (as I have said before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly
Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a
Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually Lawes, and not before; as
being then the commands of the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes:
for it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey them. For in the
differences of private men, to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and
what is morall Vertue, and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances
of Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them;
which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law. The Law of Nature
therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the world.
Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For
Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his
own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a Common-wealth,
hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with another, as when they
assemble to make a common Representative, or with the Representative it selfe
one by one, when subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may
receive life;) And therefore Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the Law
of Nature. Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but different parts
of Law; whereof one part being written, is called Civill, the other unwritten,
Naturall. But the Right of Nature, that is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by
the Civill Law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no
other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace.
And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall
liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist
one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.
Provinciall Lawes Are Not Made By Custome, But By The Soveraign Power
5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, subdue a people that have lived
under other written Lawes, and afterwards govern them by the same Lawes, by
which they were governed before; yet those Lawes are the Civill Lawes of the
Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth, For the Legislator is he, not
by whose authority the Lawes were first made, but by whose authority they now
continue to be Lawes. And therefore where there be divers Provinces, within the
Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in those Provinces diversity of Lawes, which
commonly are called the Customes of each severall Province, we are not to
understand that such Customes have their Force, onely from Length of Time; but
that they were antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the
Constitutions, and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by
vertue of the Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present
Soveraigns. But if an unwritten Law, in all the Provinces of a Dominion, shall
be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can
be no other but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all man-kind.
Some Foolish Opinions Of Lawyers Concerning The Making Of Lawes
6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their Authority, and
force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say, from the Will of the
Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and in other Common-wealths
the Soveraign Assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as
are found in the Books of Lawyers of eminence in severall Common-wealths,
directly, or by consequence making the Legislative Power depend on private men,
or subordinate Judges. As for example, "That the Common Law, hath no Controuler
but the Parlament;" which is true onely where a Parlament has the Soveraign
Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For
if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to
controule them, and consequently to controule their controulings. And if there
be no such right, then the Controuler of Lawes is not Parlamentum, but Rex In
Parlamento. And where a Parlament is Soveraign, if it should assemble never so
many, or so wise men, from the Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause;
yet there is no man will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to
themselves a Legislative Power. Item, that the two arms of a Common-wealth, are
Force, and Justice; The First Whereof Is In The King; The Other Deposited In The
Hands Of The Parlament. As if a Common-wealth could consist, where the Force
were in any hand, which Justice had not the Authority to command and govern.
7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and that not
the Letter,(that is, every construction of it,) but that which is according to
the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. And it is true: but the doubt is,
of whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not meant of any
private Reason; for then there would be as much contradiction in the Lawes, as
there is in the Schooles; nor yet (as Sr. Ed, Coke makes it (Sir Edward Coke,
upon Littleton Lib.2. Ch.6 fol 97.b),) an Artificiall Perfection of Reason,
Gotten By Long Study, Observation, And Experience, (as his was.) For it is
possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men
build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine; and of
those that study, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and
resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris
Prudentia, or wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our
Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the
Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily
arise any contradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is
able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all Courts of
Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common-wealth,) is he that
Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved
his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be according thereunto;
which then is his Soveraigns Sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust
one.
Law Made, If Not Also Made Known, Is No Law
8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consisteth in
declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by voyce,
writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that
the Command of the Common-wealth, is Law onely to those, that have means to take
notice of it. Over naturall fooles, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no
more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or
unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the
consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the
actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a
Common-wealth. And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the
notice of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident, not
proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any
particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; And to speak properly, that
Law is no Law to him. It is therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what
arguments, and signes be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that
is to say, what is the will of the Soveraign, as well in Monarchies, as in other
formes of government.
Unwritten Lawes Are All Of Them Lawes Of Nature
And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without exception,
and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take
notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge
of for Law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his own reason, must
be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the
Law of Nature. The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing, nor
Proclamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the
world, "Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by
another to thy selfe."
Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men, or one
particular man and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a Law
of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in
such a condition, from other Subjects. For whatsoever Law is not written, or
some way published by him that makes it Law, can be known no way, but by the
reason of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civill,
but Naturall. For example, if the Soveraign employ a Publique Minister, without
written Instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take for Instructions the
Dictates of Reason; As if he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice, that his
Sentence ought to be according to the reason of his Soveraign, which being
alwaies understood to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if
an Ambassador, he is (in al things not conteined in his written Instructions) to
take for Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most conducing to his
Soveraigns interest; and so of all other Ministers of the Soveraignty, publique
and private. All which Instructions of naturall Reason may be comprehended under
one name of Fidelity; which is a branch of naturall Justice.
The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other Lawes,
to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey them, either by
word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the Soveraign
Authority. For the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his own word,
or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person
of the Common-wealth, is to be supposed alwaies consonant to Equity and Reason.
And in antient time, before letters were in common use, the Lawes were many
times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or
reciting them, might the more easily reteine them in memory. And for the same
reason Solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten Commandements (Prov. 7. 3) upon
his ten fingers. And for the Law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the
renewing of the Covenant, (Deut. 11. 19) he biddeth them to teach it their
Children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed,
and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and dores of their
houses; and (Deut. 31. 12) to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to
heare it read.
Nothing Is Law Where The Legislator Cannot Be Known
Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there be
manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Soveraign. For private
men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust
designes, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for Lawes
what they please, without, or against the Legislative Authority. There is
therefore requisite, not only a Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient
signes of the Author, and Authority. The Author, or Legislator is supposed in
every Common-wealth to be evident, because he is the Soveraign, who having been
Constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be
sufficiently known. And though the ignorance, and security of men be such, for
the most part, as that when the memory of the first Constitution of their
Common-wealth is worn out, they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be
defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be
righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make
question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the
Soveraignty is placed. And it is a Dictate of Naturall Reason, and consequently
an evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection
whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others.
Therefore of who is Soveraign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evill
men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of
the Authority derived from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge
of the publique Registers, publique Counsels, publique Ministers, and publique
Seales; by which all Lawes are sufficiently verified.
Difference Between Verifying And Authorising
Verifyed, I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the Testimony
and Record; not the Authority of the law; which consisteth in the Command of the
Soveraign only.
The Law Verifyed By The Subordinate Judge
If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the Law of Nature;
that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge, that by Commission
hath Authority to take cognisance of such causes, is a sufficient Verification
of the Law of Nature in that individuall case. For though the advice of one that
professeth the study of the Law, be usefull for the avoyding of contention; yet
it is but advice; tis the Judge must tell men what is Law, upon the hearing of
the Controversy.
By The Publique Registers
But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law; every man
by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be
sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the crime, whither
it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to doe so: for when a man doubts whether
the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may informe himself, if he will;
the doing is unlawfull. In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a
case determined by the written Law, which he may by himself, or others see and
consider; if he complaine before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and
bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.
By Letters Patent, And Publique Seale
If the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have seen his
Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to have had the means
to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of his
Authority. For every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour, to informe
himself of all written Lawes, that may concerne his own future actions.
The Interpretation Of The Law Dependeth On The Soveraign Power
The Legislator known; and the Lawes, either by writing, or by the light of
Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very materiall
circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the
Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of the
Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law
consisteth; And therefore the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the
Authority Soveraign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the
Soveraign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. For else,
by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law my be made to beare a sense, contrary to
that of the Soveraign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.
All Lawes Need Interpretation
All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation. The unwritten
Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as without partiality, and passion,
make use of their naturall reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof
without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some
cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become of
all Laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able
Interpreters. The written Laws, if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted,
from the divers significations of a word, or two; if long, they be more obscure
by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written Law,
delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect
understanding of the finall causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of
which finall causes is in the Legislator. To him therefore there can not be any
knot in the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or
else by making what ends he will, (as Alexander did with his sword in the
Gordian knot,) by the Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can doe.
The Authenticall Interpretation Of Law Is Not That Of Writers
The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a Common-wealth, dependeth not
on the books of Morall Philosophy. The Authority of writers, without the
Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not their opinions Law, be they never so
true. That which I have written in this Treatise, concerning the Morall Vertues,
and of their necessity, for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee
evident Truth, is not therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths
in the world, it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be naturally
reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraigne Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were
a great errour, to call the Lawes of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so
many volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and
of themselves.
The Interpreter Of The Law Is The Judge Giving Sentence Viva Voce
In Every Particular Case
The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the Judge
constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and determine such
controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the Law
to the present case. For in the act of Judicature, the Judge doth no more but
consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and
Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation of the Law
of Nature; which Interpretation is Authentique; not because it is his private
Sentence; but because he giveth it by Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it
becomes the Soveraigns Sentence; which is Law for that time, to the parties
pleading.
The Sentence Of A Judge, Does Not Bind Him, Or Another Judge
To Give Like Sentence In Like Cases Ever After
But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may erre in a
Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant
to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to doe it. No mans error
becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither (for the same
reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow it. For though
a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Soveraign, if he know and allow it,
in such Lawes as are mutable, be a constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which
every little circumstance is the same; yet in Lawes immutable, such as are the
Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges, in the like
cases for ever after. Princes succeed one another; and one Judge passeth,
another commeth; nay, Heaven and Earth shall passe; but not one title of the Law
of Nature shall passe; for it is the Eternall Law of God. Therefore all the
Sentences of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a
Law contrary to naturall Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges, can warrant
an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge of the trouble of
studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,) from the principles of his
own naturall reason. For example sake, 'Tis against the Law of Nature, To Punish
The Innocent; and Innocent is he that acquitteth himselfe Judicially, and is
acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge. Put the case now, that a man is accused
of a capitall crime, and seeing the powers and malice of some enemy, and the
frequent corruption and partiality of Judges, runneth away for feare of the
event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legall triall, and maketh it
sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof
acquitted, is neverthelesse condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest
condemnation of the Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the
world, where this can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law
by the Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same. For he that judged
it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to
succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be
punished for flying: But that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for
presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially,
is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no place after Judgement
given. Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of England. "If
a man," saith he, "that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth
for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it
be found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency,
Forfeit all his goods, chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the Forfeiture of
them, the Law will admit no proofe against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon
his flight." Here you see, An Innocent Man, Judicially Acquitted,
Notwithstanding His Innocency, (when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his
acquitall, Upon A Presumption In Law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath.
If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact, (which was
Capitall,) the Sentence ought to have been Capitall: if the presumption were not
of the Fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no Law
of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon
the Presumption of the Judges. It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe
shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law. For all Judges, Soveraign and
subordinate, if they refuse to heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice: for though
the Sentence be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes
offered, are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man
ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements,
or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature,
wherein mens Judgements have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this
is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the party
pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed him in that Office.
In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is not
the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For Commentaries
are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text; and therefore need other
Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such Interpretation. And therefore
unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised by the Soveraign, from which the
subordinate Judges are not to recede, the Interpreter can be no other than the
ordinary Judges, in the some manner, as they are in cases of the unwritten Law;
and their Sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that
particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like
judgements. For a Judge may erre in the Interpretation even of written Lawes;
but no errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall
Sentence of the Soveraigne.
The Difference Between The Letter And Sentence Of The Law
In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Letter, and the
Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered
from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished. For the significations of almost
all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphoricall use of them,
ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is onely
one sense of the Law. But if by the Letter, be meant the Literall sense, then
the Letter, and the Sentence or intention of the Law, is all one. For the
literall sense is that, which the Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity:
For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne.
He ought therefore, if the Word of the Law doe not fully authorise a reasonable
Sentence, to supply it with the Law of Nature; or if the case be difficult, to
respit Judgement till he have received more ample authority. For Example, a
written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall
be restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence leaves his house
empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no speciall
Law ordained. It is evident, that this case is contained in the same Law: for
else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the
Intention of the Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to Judge
according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsly of a fact, which the Judge
saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In this case
neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of the
Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence of the
Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary: but procure of the
Soveraign that another be made Judge, and himselfe Witnesse. So that the
incommodity that follows the bare words of a written Law, may lead him to the
Intention of the Law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no
Incommodity can warrant a Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right,
and Wrong, is not Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the
Common-wealth.
The Abilities Required In A Judge
The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is to say, in a
good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate; namely the study of the
Lawes. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact, from none but the
Witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the Law, from nothing but the
Statutes, and Constitutions of the Soveraign, alledged in the pleading, or
declared to him by some that have authority from the Soveraign Power to declare
them; and need not take care before-hand, what hee shall Judge; for it shall bee
given him what hee shall say concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee
shall say in point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings shew it, and
by authority interpret it upon the place. The Lords of Parlament in England were
Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet
few of them were much versed in the study of the Lawes, and fewer had made
profession of them: and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were appointed
to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority of giving
Sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trialls of Right, Twelve men of the
common People, are the Judges, and give Sentence, not onely of the Fact, but of
the Right; and pronounce simply for the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that
is to say, are Judges not onely of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a
question of crime, not onely determine whether done, or not done; but also
whether it be Murder, Homicide, Felony, Assault, and the like, which are
determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed to know the Law of
themselves, there is one that hath Authority to enforme them of it, in the
particular case they are to Judge of. But yet if they judge not according to
that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unlesse it be
made appear, they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by
reward. The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Lawes,
are, first A Right Understanding of that principall Law of Nature called Equity;
which depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on the goodnesse
of a mans own naturall Reason, and Meditation, is presumed to be in those most,
that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon.
Secondly, Contempt Of Unnecessary Riches, and Preferments. Thirdly, To Be Able
In Judgement To Devest Himselfe Of All Feare, Anger, Hatred, Love, And
Compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, Patience To Heare; Diligent Attention In
Hearing; And Memory To Retain, Digest And Apply What He Hath Heard.
Divisions Of Law
The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers manners,
according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. For
it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on the scope of the Writer; and
is subservient to every mans proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we
find seven sorts of Civill Lawes.
1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles Of The Prince, that is, of the
Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these, are the
Proclamations of the Kings of England.
2. The Decrees Of The Whole People Of Rome (comprehending the Senate,) when
they were put to the Question by the Senate. These were Lawes, at first, by the
vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the people; and such of them as by the
Emperours were not abrogated, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. For all
Lawes that bind, are understood to be Lawes by his authority that has power to
repeale them. Somewhat like to these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament in
England.
3. The Decrees Of The Common People (excluding the Senate,) when they were
put to the question by the Tribune of the people. For such of them as were not
abrogated by the Emperours, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. Like to
these, were the Orders of the House of Commons in England.
4. Senatus Consulta, the Orders Of The Senate; because when the people of
Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it was thought
fit by the Emperour, that men should Consult the Senate in stead of the people:
And these have some resemblance with the Acts of Counsell.
5. The Edicts Of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles: such as are
the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of England.
6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of those
Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to interpret the Law, and to give
answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice; which Answers, the
Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the Constitutions of the Emperour to
observe; And should be like the Reports of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by
the Law of England bound to observe them. For the Judges of the Common Law of
England, are not properly Judges, but Juris Consulti; of whom the Judges, who
are either the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask
advice.
7. Also, Unwritten Customes, (which in their own nature are an imitation of
Law,) by the tacite consent of the Emperour, in case they be not contrary to the
Law of Nature, are very Lawes.
Another division of Lawes, is into Naturall and Positive. Naturall are those
which have been Lawes from all Eternity; and are called not onely Naturall, but
also Morall Lawes; consisting in the Morall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all
habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity; of which I have already
spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.
Positive, are those which have not been for Eternity; but have been made
Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power over others; and
are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the Will of
their Legislator.
Another Division Of Law
Again, of Positive Lawes some are Humane, some Divine; And of Humane positive
lawes, some are Distributive, some Penal. Distributive are those that determine
the Rights of the Subjects, declaring to every man what it is, by which he
acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of
action; and these speak to all the Subjects. Penal are those, which declare,
what Penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak to the
Ministers and Officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be
informed of the Punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression;
neverthelesse the Command is not addressed to the Delinquent, (who cannot be
supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,) but to publique Ministers appointed
to see the Penalty executed. And these Penal Lawes are for the most part written
together with the Lawes Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements. For
all Lawes are generall judgements, or Sentences of the Legislator; as also every
particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.
Divine Positive Law How Made Known To Be Law
Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes being Eternall, and Universall, are
all Divine,) are those, which being the Commandements of God, (not from all
Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but onely to a certain people,
or to certain persons,) are declared for such, by those whom God hath authorised
to declare them. But this Authority of man to declare what be these Positive
Lawes of God, how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernaturall way,
to deliver Lawes to other men. But because it is of the essence of Law, that he
who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it,
which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, How Can A Man Without
Supernaturall Revelation Be Assured Of The Revelation Received By The Declarer?
and How Can He Be Bound To Obey Them? For the first question, how a man can be
assured of the Revelation of another, without a Revelation particularly to
himselfe, it is evidently impossible: for though a man may be induced to believe
such Revelation, from the Miracles they see him doe, or from seeing the
Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the Extraordinary wisedome,
or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions, all which are marks of Gods
extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidence of speciall Revelation.
Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be
so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this
world, are most often the work of God by Naturall, and ordinary causes. And
therefore no man can infallibly know by naturall reason, that another has had a
supernaturall revelation of Gods will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the
signs thereof shall appear greater, or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.
But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. For
if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is undoubtedly Gods
Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound I say to
obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens beliefe, and interiour
cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God,
ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of Supernaturall Law, is not a fulfilling, but
only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a
gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not a
breach of any of his Lawes; but a rejection of them all, except the Lawes
Naturall. But this that I say, will be made yet cleerer, by the Examples, and
Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The Covenant God made with
Abraham (in a Supernaturall Manner) was thus, (Gen. 17. 10) "This is the
Covenant which thou shalt observe between Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee."
Abrahams Seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a
party to the Covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for
Gods Law; which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed to
their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power, as here in the
case of Abraham) have Soveraign power over their children, and servants. Againe,
where God saith to Abraham, "In thee shall all Nations of the earth be blessed:
For I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the
way of the Lord, and to observe Righteousnesse and Judgement," it is manifest,
the obedience of his Family, who had no Revelation, depended on their former
obligation to obey their Soveraign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God;
the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound to
obey all that Moses declared to them for Gods Law. Upon what ground, but on this
submission of their own, "Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not
God speak to us, lest we dye?" By which two places it sufficiently appeareth,
that in a Common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured Revelation
particularly to himself concerning the Will of God, is to obey for such, the
Command of the Common-wealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for Gods
Commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of
private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods Commandement; and yet
in respect of them, every man would despise the Commandements of the
Common-wealth. I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the
Morall Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all Subjects are bound to
obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes of the
Common-wealth. Which also is evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not
against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the name of them that have the
Soveraign power; and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it,
when tis propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world
where men are permitted to pretend other Commandements of God, than are declared
for such by the Common-wealth. Christian States punish those that revolt from
Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up any Religion by them
forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth, tis Equity
(which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternall Law of God) that every
man equally enjoy his liberty.
Another Division Of Lawes
There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamentall, and Not
Fundamentall: but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamentall Law
signifieth. Neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish Laws in that
manner.
A Fundamentall Law What
For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which being taken
away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose
Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamentall Law is that, by which
Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Soveraign, whether
a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, without which the Common-wealth cannot
stand, such as is the power of War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election of
Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Publique
good. Not Fundamentall is that the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the
dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are the Lawes Concerning Controversies
between subject and subject. Thus much of the Division of Lawes.
Difference Between Law And Right
I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say, Law and Right
Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned Authors;
which neverthelesse ought not to be so. For Right is Liberty, namely that
Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us: But Civill Law is an Obligation; and
takes from us the Liberty which the Law of Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right
to every man to secure himselfe by his own strength, and to invade a suspected
neighbour, by way of prevention; but the Civill Law takes away that Liberty, in
all cases where the protection of the Lawe may be safely stayd for. Insomuch as
Lex and Jus, are as different as Obligation and Liberty.
And Between A Law And A Charter
Likewise Lawes and Charters are taken promiscuously for the same thing. Yet
Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but exemptions from Law.
The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command, and Enjoyn: the phrase of a
Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I Have Given, I Have Granted: but what is given or
granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind
All the Subjects of a Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man,
or some One part of the people. For to say all the people of a Common-wealth,
have Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath
been no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.
CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES, AND EXTENUATIONS
Sinne What
A Sinne, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any Contempt of the
Legislator. For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Lawes at once. And
therefore may consist, not onely in the Commission of a Fact, or in the Speaking
of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the Omission of what the Law commandeth,
but also in the Intention, or purpose to transgresse. For the purpose to breake
the Law, is some degree of Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it
executed. To be delighted in the Imagination onely, of being possessed of
another mans goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from
him by force, or fraud, is no breach of the Law, that sayth, "Thou shalt not
covet:" nor is the pleasure a man my have in imagining, or dreaming of the death
of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage, and displeasure, a
Sinne; but the resolving to put some Act in execution, that tendeth thereto. For
to be pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it were reall,
is a Passion so adhaerent to the Nature both of a man, and every other living
creature, as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man. The
consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to themselves,
and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind, (though checked
with the fear of God) be Sinnes. But I confesse it is safer to erre on that
hand, than on the other.
A Crime What
A Crime, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of that
which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded. So that
every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a Crime. To intend to steale, or
kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth
the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by some thing
done, or said, by which the intention may be Crime; which distinction the Greeks
observed in the word amartema, and egklema, or aitia; wherof the former, (which
is translated Sinne,) signifieth any swarving from the Law whatsoever; but the
two later, (which are translated Crime,) signifie that sinne onely, whereof one
man may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward
act, there is no place for humane accusation. In like manner the Latines by
Peccatum, which is Sinne, signifie all manner of deviation from the Law; but by
crimen, (which word they derive from Cerno, which signifies to perceive,) they
mean onely such sinnes, as my be made appear before a Judge; and therfore are
not meer Intentions.
Where No Civill Law Is, There Is No Crime
From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Civill Law, may
be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sinne ceaseth. But because the Law
of Nature is eternall, Violation of Covenants, Ingratitude, Arrogance, and all
Facts contrary to any Morall vertue, can never cease to be Sinne. Secondly, that
the Civill Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining,
but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own
Judge, and accused onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse
of his own Intention. When therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no
Sinne: if otherwise, his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. Thirdly, That when the
Soveraign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such Power,
there is no protection to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may
protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Soveraign
Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the
safety whereof all Soveraignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely
of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power
that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.
Ignorance Of The Law Of Nature Excuseth No Man
The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding; or some
errour in Reasoning, or some sudden force of the Passions. Defect in the
Understanding, is Ignorance; in Reasoning, Erroneous Opinion. Again, ignorance
is of three sort; of the Law, and of the Soveraign, and of the Penalty.
Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every man that hath
attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to
another, what he would not have done to himselfe. Therefore into what place
soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to that Law, it is a Crime.
If a man come from the Indies hither, and perswade men here to receive a new
Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the Lawes of
this Country, though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he
teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely
because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not
approve in another, namely, that comming from hence, he should endeavour to
alter the Religion there. But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in
a strange Country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civill Law
is binding.
Ignorance Of The Civill Law Excuseth Sometimes
In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so
sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action against the
Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases ignorance of the
Civill Law, Excuseth not.
Ignorance Of The Soveraign Excuseth Not
Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary residence,
Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the Power, by which he hath
been protected there.
Ignorance Of The Penalty Excuseth Not
Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man: For in
breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but
vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because,
whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of
it; but Punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the Lawes, in
every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the Law,
he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment. For
it is reason, that he which does Injury, without other limitation than that of
his own Will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of
his Will whose Law is thereby violated.
Punishments Declared Before The Fact, Excuse From Greater Punishments
After It
But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe, or
hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent is Excused
from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not great enough to
deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare
the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity
of Nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves; and therefore
when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determined, or more than
others were punished for the same Crime; it the Law that tempted, and deceiveth
them.
Nothing Can Be Made A Crime By A Law Made After The Fact
No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if the Fact be
against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a Positive Law
cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be
Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made before the Fact be
done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the Penalty ordained after, in
case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by
Example, for the reason immediatly before alledged.
False Principles Of Right And Wrong Causes Of Crime
From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are prone to
violate the Lawes, three wayes. First, by Presumption of false Principles; as
when men from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust Actions
have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed
them; and that potent men, breaking through the Cob-web Lawes of their Country,
the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been
esteemed the onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds
of their Reasoning, "That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man can
get by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all
Nations cannot be unjust: That examples of former times are good Arguments of
doing the like again;" and many more of that kind: Which being granted, no Act
in it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the
successe of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous, or vicious, as
Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime, Sylla shall make
meritorious, and Caesar (the same Lawes standing) turn again into a Crime, to
the perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.
False Teachers Mis-interpreting The Law Of Nature Secondly, by false
Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby
repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of their
own, or Traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a
Subject.
And False Inferences From True Principles, By Teachers
Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens commonly
to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do;
such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and
believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but onely common
experience, and a good naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided:
whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no lesse difficult, there is
no man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects in
Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extenuate) a
Crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private
businesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge; because they
pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their Excuse.
By Their Passions;
Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one, is
Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of
worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud, or some other naturall
quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the Soveraign Authority.
From whence proceedeth a Presumption that the punishments ordained by the Lawes,
and extended generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with
the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men,
comprehended under the name of the Vulgar.
Presumption Of Riches
Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the
greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping
punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony, or
other rewards.
And Friends
And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men, that have
gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate the Lawes, from
a hope of oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.
Wisedome
And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome, take
upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the Authority of them
that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse, as that
nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own designes require should be so. It
happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such Crimes, as consist in
Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their designes
are too subtile to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption
of their own Wisdome. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance
of Common-wealth, (which can never happen without a Civill Warre,) very few are
left alive long enough, to see their new Designes established: so that the
benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have
wished it: which argues they were not as wise, as they thought they were. And
those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive
themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing
else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children, that think all
hid, by hiding their own eyes.
And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,) are
subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the
ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes that may not be
produced by Anger.
Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, Causes Of Crime
As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what Crimes
they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience and
understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are
infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living
creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by extraordinary use of
Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate,
they find a continuall, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans
patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that
which molesteth him; The former is difficult; the later is many times
impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and Covetousnesse are
Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas Reason is
not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of
impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the
lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the
apprehension of all easie, or uncertain punishments.
Fear Sometimes Cause Of Crime, As When The Danger Is Neither Present,
Nor Corporeall
Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is Fear.
Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing, (when there is
apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,) that makes men keep
them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed through Feare.
For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely of
corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man cannot see how
to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death,
from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him;
If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is supposed at the
making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes,
where the Law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man,
because from his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when
he can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign
Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little
injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had assigned no punishment, nor
thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take notice of,) and
is afraid, unlesse he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently
be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the
Law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private
revenge. This is a Crime; For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and
(though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years
since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man, and one
that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand
in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much
credit given to other men, that tell him of strange Dreams and visions; and
thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers
things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes; And that
which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime.
For (as I have shewn before in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the
fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly
received waking; and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept,
seem to be reall Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon
his own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the
power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the
Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own,
or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any
thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which
if every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of
Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all
Common-wealth would be dissolved.
Crimes Not Equall
From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all Crimes
are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same allay. There is
place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be
none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the Crime, that seemed great, is
made lesse. For though all Crimes doe equally deserve the name of Injustice, as
all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse, which the Stoicks
rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no
more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not
observing, held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill
ones Father.
Totall Excuses
That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of a
Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation
of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law, if he that committed it
be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a Crime.
The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof a
man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the want of
diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; Nor shall any
man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of his own affairs, be
supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature; because they are known by
the reason he pretends to: only Children, and Madmen are Excused from offences
against the Law Naturall.
Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the
power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be
without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth; because he must obey
the enemy, or dye; and consequently such obedience is no Crime: for no man is
obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the
best means he can.
If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against
the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his
own preservation. And supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man would
reason thus, "If I doe it not, I die presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards;
therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained;" Nature therefore compells
him to the fact.
When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and
cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the Law; as if
in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtaine
for mony nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another mans Sword,
he is totally Excused, for the reason next before alledged.
Excuses Against The Author
Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another, are by that
authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to accuse his own
fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not Excused against a
third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the law, bothe the
Author, and Actor are Criminalls. From hence it followeth that when that Man, or
Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is
contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not
to condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly be
condemned by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides,
when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former Law,
the Command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the Law.
If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime any Right
essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the Subject, any
liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, that is to say, with the very
being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse to obey the Command in any
thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is neverthelesse a Sinne, and
contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is
inconsistent with the Soveraignty, because it was erected by his own consent,
and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was
granted through ignorance of the evill consequence thereof. But if he not onely
disobey, but also resist a publique Minister in the execution of it, then it is
a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the Peace,)
upon complaint.
The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by the
malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the Example:
Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the concurrence of
Times, Places, and Persons.
Presumption Of Power, Aggravateth
The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of
strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the Law, is a
greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of
escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by force, is a Root, from whence
springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all Lawes;
whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly,
renders him more obedient for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is
greater than the same Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is
lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his
force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he
that doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the Law.
Evill Teachers, Extenuate
Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an Interpreter
of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose errour
proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles, and reasoning: For
what is taught by one that teacheth by publique Authority, the Common-wealth
teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law, till the same Authority controuleth it;
and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor
are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his
actions, on his private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour
thereof, to stand, or fall.
Examples Of Impunity, Extenuate
The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, as a greater
Crime, than if there have been may precedent Examples of impunity. For those
Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity given by the Soveraign himselfe: And
because he which furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of mercy, as
encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably
charge the offender with the whole.
Praemeditation, Aggravateth
A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the same
ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place for
Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that doth it with
praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law, on the
punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane society; all which in
committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite. But
there is no suddennesse of Passion sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the
time between the first knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall
be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law,
to rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.
Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people read,
and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where men are
left without such instruction, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty,
and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by private men: for in this
case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former
there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the
Soveraign Power.
Tacite Approbation Of The Soveraign, Extenuates
Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by other
manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than the same
facts, condemned both by the Law, and Lawmaker. For seeing the will of the
Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case two contradictory Lawes; which
would totally Excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the Soveraigns
approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command. But because
there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression of his Law, but
also to the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and
therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent. For
example, the Law condemneth Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the
contrary part, he that refuseth Duell, is subject to contempt and scorne,
without remedy; and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have
any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell, considering
all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the
Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part
of the fault may be discharged on the punisher; which I say, not as wishing
liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in
Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid.
The examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more
potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. And though it be our
duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be
performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernaturall
grace to follow that Precept.
Comparison Of Crimes From Their Effects
Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First, the
same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than when it
redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not onely in
the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater Crime, than
if it hurt onely in the present: for the former, is a fertile Crime, and
multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is barren. To maintain doctrines
contrary to the Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a greater fault,
in an authorised Preacher, than in a private person: So also is it, to live
prophanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a
Professor of the Law, to maintain any point, on do any act, that tendeth to the
weakning of the Soveraign Power, as a greater Crime, than in another man: Also
in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are
followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is a
greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not onely commit
Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men. And generally all Crimes are the
greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by becoming stumbling-blocks
to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light
that other men carry before them.
Laesae Majestas
Also Facts of Hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth, are
greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men; For the dammage extends
it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the
secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy; also all attempts upon the
Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a monarch, or an Assembly; and all
endeavours by word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in the
present time, or in succession: which Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina
Laesae Majestatis, and consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall
Law.
Bribery And False Testimony
Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater
Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive mony to give
False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a
man of the like, or a greater summe; because not onely he has wrong, that falls
by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse, and occasion
ministred to force, and private revenges.
Depeculation
Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Revenues, is a
greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man; because to
robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.
Counterfeiting Authority
Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the Counterfeiting of
publique Seales, or publique Coine, than counterfeiting of a private mans
person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the dammage of
many.
Crimes Against Private Men Compared
Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime, is that,
where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. And therefore
To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, that any other injury, life
preserved.
And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.
And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his goods.
And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds, than by
clandestine surreption.
And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.
And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.
And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.
For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and
some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not the
particular, but the generall inclination of mankind.
And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture,
when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of him that is
reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks, Romans, and other
both antient, and moderne Common-wealths; supposing the true cause of such
griefe to consist, not in the contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious
of their own Vertue,) but in the Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.
Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person, time,
and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to kill another:
for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign, (though he have
surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had it originally by Nature.
And to Robbe a poore man, is a greater Crime, than to robbe a rich man; because
'tis to the poore a more sensible dammage.
And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion, is
greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a
greater contempt of the Law.
Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but by these
I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of any other
Crime proposed.
Publique Crimes What
Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely to
some Private man, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when the
accusation is in the name of the Common-wealth, is called Publique Crime; and
when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the Pleas according
thereunto called Publique, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the Crown; or Private
Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be a Private man, the plea
is a Private plea; if the accuser be the Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.
CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS
The Definition Of Punishment
"A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath
done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a
Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better
be disposed to obedience."
Right To Punish Whence Derived
Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to be
answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or Authority of
Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man
is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it
cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon
his person. In the making of a Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of
defending another; but not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to
assist him that hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another; but of
himselfe not. But to covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another,
unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give
him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the
Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish, is not
grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects. But I have also shewed
formerly, that before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a right to
every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation;
subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the
foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every
Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely
in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should think fit,
for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and
to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by naturall Law) as entire, as
in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one against his
neighbour.
Private Injuries, And Revenges No Punishments
From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither private
revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishment;
because they proceed not from publique Authority.
Nor Denyall Of Preferment
Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique favour, is
not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man Inflicted; he is
onely left in the estate he was in before.
Nor Pain Inflicted Without Publique Hearing
Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without precedent
publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but of an
hostile act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first to be
Judged by publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.
Nor Pain Inflicted By Usurped Power
Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges without
Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility;
because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the person condemned;
and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.
Nor Pain Inflicted Without Respect To The Future Good
Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or possibility
of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes,
is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an end, no hurt
done is contained under that name.
Naturall Evill Consequences, No Punishments
Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers
hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain,
or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull
act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of Nature, it may be
said to be inflicted, and therefore a Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned
in the name of Punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the
Authority of man.
Hurt Inflicted, If Lesse Than The Benefit Of Transgressing,
Is Not Punishment
Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment
that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the
definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a
Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the disposing
of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse that the benefit of the
transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.
Where The Punishment Is Annexed To The Law, A Greater Hurt Is Not
Punishment, But Hostility
Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it selfe,
and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment inflicted, the
excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aym of
Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the terrour of a great Punishment
unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the unexpected addition is
no part of the Punishment. But where there is no Punishment at all determined by
the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punishment. For he
that goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined,
expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.
Hurt Inflicted For A Fact Done Before The Law, No Punishment
Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that forbad
it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there is no
transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact judged, to have been a
transgression of the Law; Therefore Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not
Punishment, but an act of Hostility.
The Representative Of The Common-wealth Unpunishable
Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth, is not
Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature of Punishment,
to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the Authority only of the
Representative it self.
Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By Right Of War, Not
By Way Of Punishment
Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the
name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to the Law,
and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and
professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all
the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in
declared Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull. From whence it
followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly
deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever
penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to
suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes
such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an
enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the
Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to
Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects,
deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.
The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into Divine, and
Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient
place hereafter.
Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement of Man;
and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or Imprisonment, or Exile,
or mixt of these.
Punishments Corporall
Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and
according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or
wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully
enjoyed.
Capitall
And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capitall, is the
Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse than
Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall Paine, not in its
own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death follow not
in the Intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not be bee esteemed
Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; in
which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.
Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of
a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods which are usually bought
and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be
made with design to gather mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is
not properly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the
Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not
able to pay the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for
in that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it. As
where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in
vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to sweare,
but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable. In like manner
if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd, to him that has been Injured; this
is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of
the party injured, not the crime of the offender.
Ignominy
Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable; or the
deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth. For there
be some things Honorable by Nature; as the effects of Courage, Magnanimity,
Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable
by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any other singular marke of
the Soveraigns favour. The former, (though they may faile by nature, or
accident,) cannot be taken away by a Law; and therefore the losse of them is not
Punishment. But the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made
them Honorable, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men condemned,
of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in
time to come.
Imprisonment
Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived of liberty; and
may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man
accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned. The former is
not Punishment; because no man is supposed to be Punisht, before he be
Judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is
made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above
that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But
the Later is Punishment, because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority, for
somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law.
Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an
externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the generall name of a
Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where
men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in
these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.
Exile
Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart out of
the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part thereof; and during
a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own
nature, without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an escape,
or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes,
there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a
refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to
enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no
punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which all
Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of mens wils to the
observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage of the Common-wealth. For
a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Common-wealth that banished him; as
being no more a Member of the same. But if he be withall deprived of his Lands,
or Goods, then the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned
amongst Punishments Pecuniary.
The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects Is Contrary To The Law Of Nature
All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against
the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of Transgression of the Law, and
therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a
violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their
Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no
good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which
forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is originally given by
the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they
are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a
rendring of Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that
is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is
not observed.
But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So
But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a
Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of
any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not
Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some
precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable
to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature to make warre;
wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent
and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it
conduceth to the good of his own People. And upon this ground it is, that also
in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth
established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, but
also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently
innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this
offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the
condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer
not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.
Reward, Is Either Salary, Or Grace
REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract, it is called
Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. When
of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the Grace of them that bestow it, to
encourage, or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the Soveraign of
a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary to any publique Office, he that receiveth
it, is bound in Justice to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in
honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall. For though men have
no lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to
serve the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound thereto,
by the Law of Nature, nor by the institution of the Common-wealth, unlesse the
service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the Soveraign may make
use of all their means, insomuch as the most common Souldier, may demand the
wages of his warrefare, as a debt.
Benefits Bestowed For Fear, Are Not Rewards
The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some
power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not properly
Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this case no contract
supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Common-wealth
disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted by feare, which ought
not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but are rather Sacrifices, which the
Soveraign (considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of the
Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more
potent than himselfe; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to
the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.
Salaries Certain And Casuall
And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique
Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the execution of
the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later is in some cases hurtfull
to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. For where the benefit of the
Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes
that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow two
Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater
benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about
Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can. But in
offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their
employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much
shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were,
the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth.
Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions
have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together with the great
power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out
of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set
forth the great power of Leviathan, called him King of the Proud. "There is
nothing," saith he, "on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not be
afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of
pride." But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly
creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that
he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the
next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality;
and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.
CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF
A COMMON-WEALTH
Dissolution Of Common-wealths Proceedeth From Imperfect Institution
Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use
of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from
perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they
are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as
Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be
dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not
in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of
them. For men, as they become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing
one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one
firme and lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws, to
square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude
and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot
without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a
crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall
upon the heads of their posterity.
Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the
first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble the
diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.
Want Of Absolute Power
Of which, this is one, "That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes content
with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is
necessarily required." From whence it commeth to passe, that when the exercise
of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety to be resumed, it hath the
resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when
occasion is presented) to rebell; In the same manner as the bodies of children,
gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge
the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into
biles and scabbs. And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it
is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the
office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at
their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to
their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign Common-wealths; who
in order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few occasions to Weaken the
estate of their Neighbours. So was Thomas Beckett Archbishop of Canterbury,
supported against Henry the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of
Ecclesiastiques to the Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by William the
Conqueror at his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of
the Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to have
their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother, to himselfe,)
encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, maintained in
their Rebellion against King John, by the French. Nor does this happen in
Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Common-wealth, was,
The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People pretended to the
whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius
Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others; and afterwards the warres between the
Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and
Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.
The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action; which was,
that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the
Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he
was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad-man, and in verse,
propounded it to the People that flocked about him, they had had an enemy
perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of their Citie; such dammage, or
shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to, that have their Power never so little
limited.
Private Judgement Of Good and Evill
In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed
from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, "That every private man
is Judge of Good and Evill actions." This is true in the condition of meer
Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in
such cases as are not determined by the Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that
the measure of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the
Legislator, who is alwayes Representative of the Common-wealth. From this false
doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands
of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their
private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted
and Weakened.
Erroneous Conscience
Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that "Whatsoever a man does
against his Conscience, is Sinne;" and it dependeth on the presumption of making
himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the
same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous.
Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does
against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own
reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law
is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.
Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but
private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to
obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.
Pretence Of Inspiration
It hath been also commonly taught, "That Faith and Sanctity, are not to be
attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion,"
which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his Faith; or why
every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or why any man should take the Law
of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And
thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill;
or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally
Inspired, to the Dissolution of all Civill Government. Faith comes by hearing,
and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that
speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not
supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them that concurre to every
effect, unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet
they are not Miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline,
correction, and other naturall wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, as
such time as he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and
Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues,
and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together,
otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that
Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together.
Subjecting The Soveraign Power To Civill Lawes
A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this, "That
he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes." It is true,
that Soveraigns are all subjects to the Lawes of Nature; because such lawes be
Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. But to those Lawes
which the Soveraign himselfe, that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not
subject. For to be subject to Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that
is to the Soveraign Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not
subjection, but freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the
Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish
him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same reason a third, to
punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and
Dissolution of the Common-wealth.
Attributing Of Absolute Propriety To The Subjects
A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth, is,
"That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as
excludeth the Right of the Soveraign." Every man has indeed a Propriety that
excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it onely from the
Soveraign Power; without the protection whereof, every other man should have
equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he
cannot performe the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both
from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently
there is no longer a Common-wealth.
And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Soveraign
Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices of Judicature, or
Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign himselfe.
Dividing Of The Soveraign Power
There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a
Common-wealth; and 'tis this, "That the Soveraign Power may be divided." For
what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for
Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are
chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Lawes,
endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the
Legislative Power.
Imitation Of Neighbour Nations
And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different
Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the forme
already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to reject God, and to
call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after the manner of the Nations; So
also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of
the Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every
Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians.
And I doubt not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in
England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no
more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme of their
Government. For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to
desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the
neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost
impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite them to change;
and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of
disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with
their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.
Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans
And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most frequent
causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories of the
antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are
unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull
impression, of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of their
Armies, receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and
imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of
particular men, but from the vertue of their popular form of government: Not
considering the frequent Seditions, and Civill Warres, produced by the
imperfection of their Policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have
undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers, in their
books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so
to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide,
that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is
lawfull. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an
opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in
a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive
such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no
such matter. In summe, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall
to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without
present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away
their Venime; Which Venime I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad
Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For
as he that is so bitten, has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth
water; and is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him
into a Dogge: So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those
Democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth
nothing more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain
Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they
abhorre.
As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man; so there
be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more Soveraigns,) than
one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Soveraignty; Canons
against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civill; working on mens
minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signifie nothing, but
bewray (by their obscurity) that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another
Kingdome, as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is
manifest, that the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the same
thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons, and granting
Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Soveraign,
another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another make Canons; there must
needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome
divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant
distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdomes, and every
Subject is subject to two Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the
Right to declare what is Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is
Law, (Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the
Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey two
Masters, who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law; which is
impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill, which is the Power
of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be
subordinate to the Temporall and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporall.
When therefore these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but
be in great danger of Civill warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill Authority
being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot
choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: And
the Spirituall, though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions, and
hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other
fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a
Common-wealth. And this is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared to the
Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse (which the Jewes took to be one kind of
possession by Spirits) in the Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an
unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves,
and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should
have from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and
irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that
is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into
the fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the Body Politique, when
the Spirituall power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of
punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by
the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be
moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates the people, and either
Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a
Civill warre.
Mixt Government
Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than one Soule:
As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has
depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the
Motive Faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the
Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also
of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to
good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to
Life, and Motion. For although few perceive, that such government, is not
government, but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it
mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth,
but three independent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the
Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity
in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity of
opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King bear the person of the
People, and the generall Assembly bear also the person of the People, and
another assembly bear the person of a Part of the people, they are not one
Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.
To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this
irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had
another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast, and stomach,
of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his other side, the
comparison might then have been exact.
Want Of Mony
Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the
greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which
neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising
Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of
warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a
Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use
of the same. From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power, which
foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage
of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,)
whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in
their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot
longer, struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain little summes,
which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present
supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth
the people to their due temper; or else the Common-wealth must perish. Insomuch
as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy
parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by
their naturall course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to
be) supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold
contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong
endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do
that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole of
a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the
parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too
weak) the Patient dyeth.
Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans
Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth the
Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of
its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few
private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same
manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast,
breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.
Popular Men
Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth have
very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because the people
(which should receive their motion from the Authority of the Soveraign,) by the
flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their
obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they
have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government,
than in a Monarchy; as it may easily be made believe, they are the People. By
this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the
Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master,
both of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is
plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.
Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town, Multitude Of Corporations
Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town,
when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of a
great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many
lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles
of a naturall man.
Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power
To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power, by
pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most part in the
Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are perpetually medling
with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the
little Wormes, which Physicians call Ascarides.
We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging
Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from the enemy;
And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burthen, and with
lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of
Riot and Vain Expence.
Dissolution Of The Common-wealth
Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies got a final
Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer)
there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty; then is the
Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such
courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Soveraign, is the
publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the
Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed
(though Immortal) Soule. For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be
extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For
he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it, is obliged
(without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,) to
protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of an Assembly
is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly; because the
Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the
Soveraignty to re-enter.
CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE
The Procuration Of The Good Of The People
The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth in
the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the
procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he is obliged by the Law of
Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to
none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all
other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger,
or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.
By Instruction & Lawes
And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls,
further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a
generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction, both of Doctrine, and
Example; and in the making, and executing of good Lawes, to which individuall
persons may apply their own cases.
Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish Any Essentiall Right
of Soveraignty Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them
And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before in the
eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved, and
every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a warre with every other
man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen in this life;) it is the
Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently
against his duty, First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any
of them. For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth
the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the
Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making
Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the
Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as in his
own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers
both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what
Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the
people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or
mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights;
because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the
Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.
And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently, and
truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of
legal punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is
all resistance to the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill
Law) any obligation, but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth
the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot
know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they
take it but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength
enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.
Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles Of Reason For
Absolute Soveraignty
As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance; and
that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not onely in
the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is his own, which I have
already shewed to be false: So there be also that maintain, that there are no
grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to sustain those essentiall Rights, which
make Soveraignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in
some place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any
Common-wealth, where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein
they argue as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were
any grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as
the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and Industry,
produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building, is derived
from Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied
the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long
after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun
to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there
may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make use
of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at
this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not such Principles
of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I
shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God,
(administred by Moses,) over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.
Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar
But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common people
are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should be glad, that
the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or those that are accounted the
most Learned, were no lesse incapable than they. But all men know, that the
obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty
of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men,
digest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power to bridle their affections; and
Learned men, any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth
their Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with
dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors,
are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be
imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be brought to Acquiesce in the great
Mysteries of Christian Religion, which are above Reason; and millions of men be
made believe, that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the
same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their
teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is
so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it,
than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in
the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of
Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,)
but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in
the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to
cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also,
and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall
Person, from Rebellion.
Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they
ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour
Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they
behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For
the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall
assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the
Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a
Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him.
Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of
the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be
dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme
the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish
daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their
decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him,
together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of
change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God
says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations;
and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.
Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with
admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever he
stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Common-wealth; nor of any
Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,) so as to deferre to them any
obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in their
particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but
such as is conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign,
cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them,
but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their
loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to
proclaime Marriage with them In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing
the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of
the second of the ten Commandements.
Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great fault
it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether One man, or an
Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or any way to use his Name
irreverently, whereby he may be brought into Contempt with his People, and their
Obedience (in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which
doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.
And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught, remember
it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the Soveraign Power
is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain
times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; It is
necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble
together, and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of
Soveraigns) hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as
generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the
Authority that maketh them Lawes. To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a
Sabbath, in which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof
they were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world in
six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their
labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile,
and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoyced in
God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation. So that the first
Table of the Commandements, is spent all, in setting down the summe of Gods
absolute Power; not onely as God, but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the
Jewes; and may therefore give light, to those that have the Soveraign Power
conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to
teach their Subjects.
And To Honour Their Parents
And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care of their
Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are
under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude
requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes
of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that originally the Father of
every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death;
and that the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they
resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the
honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right, was not
necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there be any reason,
why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and
instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than
from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth Commandement.
And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:
Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which (consisting
in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to cause men to be
taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence, or fraud, of any thing which
by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that
are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most
men,) those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of
living. Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one
anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and
from forcibly rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods. For which
purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false
Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction
of propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things
are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.
And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the
designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are Injustice;
which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of
the act. And this is the intention of the tenth Commandement, and the summe of
the Second Table; which is reduced all to this one Commandement of mutuall
Charity, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe:" as the summe of the first
Table is reduced to "the love of God;" whom they had then newly received as
their King.
The Use Of Universities
As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this
Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions, contrary to the
peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so
deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have in the precedent Chapter
specified: as That men shall Judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the
Law it selfe, but by their own private Judgements; That Subjects sinne in
obeying the Commands of the Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first
judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to
exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is
lawfull for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign
Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the People
by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their
trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth
carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the
greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from the deep meditation, which the
learning of truth, not onely in the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all
other Sciences necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly
from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or
familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and
plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than
themselves. And the Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive
their knowledge from the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from the
Books, which by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have been
published. It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people,
dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are
not (may some men say) the Universities of England learned enough already to do
that? or is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet
to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of Henry
the Eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of the
Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that the doctrines
maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign Power of the King, and by
so many Lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient
argument, that though the Universities were not authors of those false
doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction
of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently
instructed; and 'tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile
liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to
the later question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No:
for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have the
Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees of People;
that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be
righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of
impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort,
than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth
Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as
much subject, as any of the meanest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are
offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also against
private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may without breach
of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe,
according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man, cannot in
Equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable
satisfaction.
The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power; and
therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that is to say, in
a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings, and their Subjects, in
the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of great Persons, is to be valued
for their beneficence, and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not
at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not
extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have
least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the
great, proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and
Hatred, an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse,
though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.
Equall Taxes
To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes; the
equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the Equality of
the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his defence. It is not
enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight,
(if need be,) for the securing of his labour. They must either do as the Jewes
did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one
hand, and hold the Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight
for them. For the Impositions that are layd on the People by the Soveraign
Power, are nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword,
to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings. Seeing
then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life,
which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them
that defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his;
saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely
for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of
Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of
the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there, that
he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little,
should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth
all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection from the Common-wealth, then
the other? But when the Impositions, are layd upon those things which men
consume, every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth
defrauded, by the luxurious waste of private men.
Publique Charity
And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity of private
persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the necessities of Nature
require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in
any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,
to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.
Prevention Of Idlenesse
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to be
forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment, there ought
to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as Navigation,
Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that requires labour. The
multitude of poor, and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be
transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse,
they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit
closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find;
but to court each little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance
in due season. And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the
last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or
Death.
Good Lawes What
To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But what is
a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law: for no Law can be Unjust. The
Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done by such Power, is
warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will
have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in
the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none
of them. A good Law is that, which is Needfull, for the Good Of The People, and
withall Perspicuous.
Such As Are Necessary
For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind the
People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion,
as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or
indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the
way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law,
is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good, when it is for the benefit of
the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For
the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is a weak
Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth
Power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps
for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are
superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend the
People.
Such As Are Perspicuous
The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe, as
in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it,
that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the meaning of the Legislator
known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words,
are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of
the Law, is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much
diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the
Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when I consider how
short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still
longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of the
Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their
circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth
therefore to the Office of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the
Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason
Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as short,
but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.
Punishments
It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right application
of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and
discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his
example; the severest Punishments are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are
of most Danger to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to
the Government established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those
that provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem
Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men
in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and
Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them; as
in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was
driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved. But Crimes of
Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great
fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not,
there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth;
and Lenity when there is such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature.
The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore
seduced People, when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their
example. To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in
great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better
instructed.
Rewards
In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to
apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the
Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done, when
they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with as little expence of the
Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be
encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the
arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or
Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from
making ill impressions in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of
Reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a
signe of Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the
Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules
with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was
vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornnesse of
one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example)
that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of
Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a
Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes
still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against
the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward
those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and
not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than
after a longer time with greater.
Counsellours
Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours; I mean
such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Common-wealth. For
this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from Considium, is a large
signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit together, not
onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts
past, and of Law for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely: And
in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor
Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are members of the person
Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the
Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are
the most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able
Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill Counsell,
and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the
Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique
troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the
people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates
are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be
observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most
knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need
them a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any
Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be
assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught to
understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art, are, much
conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good Counsell comes not by
Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good
Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the
dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the
study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to
be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the
two. Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain
persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance; it is
derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many absolute Lords
joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not enter in to the
Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time
following, between their Posterity, and the posterity of their Subjects; which
Priviledges being inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the
Soveraign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right, they
must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than
adhaereth naturally to their abilities.
And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit of their
Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and reasons of it
apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of Orations; and when they
have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have
more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be
carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions
arising from the difference of opinion.
The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but onely
the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that look onely inward,
is to be taken from the generall informations, and complaints of the people of
each Province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought
therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall Rights of
Soveraignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those Essentiall
Rights, (as I have often before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.
Commanders
A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be beloved,
nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently cannot performe that
office with good successe. He must therefore be Industrious, Valiant, Affable,
Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of
loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both
desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the
severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent
Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of the
Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power; especially when
it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the
safety of the People, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull subjects,
to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.
But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and beloved
of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of a Subject. For
Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their Captain; though
they love him, against their Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but
also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed
the Power of their Lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his
place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save
the People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign
Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own
part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able
absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a
disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind,
has never hetherto been well contented with the present.
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in
that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing
in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same
thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his
People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own
Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government,
what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the
same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and
Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the
Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as
oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are
Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes. But
of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also of a peculiar People,
I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.
CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE
The Scope Of The Following Chapters
That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty, such
as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and the
condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men are guided to avoyd that
condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign
Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to
Soveraigns, simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not
repugnant to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have
already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill duty, to
know what are those Lawes of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is
commanded any thing by the Civill Power, whether it be contrary to the Law of
God, or not: and so, either by too much civill obedience, offends the Divine
Majesty, or through feare of offending God, transgresses the commandements of
the Common-wealth. To avoyd both these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are
the Lawes Divine. And seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth on the
knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall say something in that which followeth,
of the KINGDOME OF GOD.
Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God
"God is King, let the Earth rejoice," saith the Psalmist. (Psal. 96. 1). And
again, "God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the
Cherubins, though the earth be moved." (Psal. 98. 1). Whether men will or not,
they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or
Providence of God, men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call
this Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onely to Man, but also to
Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a
metaphoricall use of the word. For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that
governs his Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey
it, and by threatning them with Punishment that obey it not. Subjects therefore
in the Kingdome of God, are not Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall;
because they understand no Precepts as his: Nor Atheists; nor they that believe
not that God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no
Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings. They
therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given
Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind, are Gods
Subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.
A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy
To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known; for else
they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a sufficient, and clear
Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of Ignorance; which in the Lawes
of men is but of one onely kind, and that is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by
the voyce of man. But God declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of
Naturall Reason, By Revelation, and by the Voyce of some Man, to whom by the
operation of Miracles, he procureth credit with the rest. From hence there
ariseth a triple Word of God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which
Correspondeth a triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith. As
for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there
have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not in that
manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things.
A Twofold Kingdome Of God, Naturall And Prophetique From the difference
between the other two kinds of Gods Word, Rationall, and Prophetique, there may
be attributed to God, a two-fold Kingdome, Naturall, and Prophetique: Naturall,
wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the
naturall Dictates of Right Reason; And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out
one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but
them, not onely by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by
the mouths of his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend to
speak in this Chapter.
The Right Of Gods Soveraignty Is Derived From His Omnipotence The Right of
Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his Lawes,
is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if he required obedience, as of
Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power. I have formerly
shewn, how the Soveraign Right ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may
arise from Nature, requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken
away. Seeing all men by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every one
to reigne over all the rest. But because this Right could not be obtained by
force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men
(with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas
if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had been no reason, why
he should not by that Power have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them,
according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible,
the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and
consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right of
afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as
Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent. And though Punishment be due for Sinne
onely, because by that word is understood Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of
Afflicting, is not alwayes derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.
Sinne Not The Cause Of All Affliction
This question, "Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer Adversity,"
has been much disputed by the Antient, and is the same with this of ours, "By
what Right God dispenseth the Prosperities and Adversities of this life;" and is
of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of
Philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine
Providence. "How Good," saith David, "is the God of Israel to those that are
Upright in Heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh
slipt; for I was grieved at the Wicked, when I saw the Ungodly in such
Prosperity." And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many
Afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in
the case of Job, is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job's
Sinne, but his own Power. For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments
from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by the conscience of
his Innocence, God himselfe taketh up the matter, and having justified the
Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power, such as this "Where was thou when
I layd the foundations of the earth," and the like, both approved Job's
Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous doctrine of his friends. Conformable to
this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born
Blind, in these words, "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that
the works of God might be made manifest in him." And though it be said "That
Death entred into the world by sinne," (by which is meant that if Adam had never
sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soule
from his body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted
him, though he had not Sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures,
that cannot sinne.
Divine Lawes
Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded onely on Nature;
we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, or Dictates of Naturall
Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of one man to another, or
the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign. The first are the same Lawes
of Nature, of which I have spoken already in the 14. and 15. Chapters of this
Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, Mercy, Humility, and the rest of the Morall
Vertues. It remaineth therefore that we consider, what Praecepts are dictated to
men, by their Naturall Reason onely, without other word of God, touching the
Honour and Worship of the Divine Majesty.
Honour And Worship What
Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and
Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his
Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the externall signes
appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one
part of that which the Latines understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus
signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any
thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things whereof we make
benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the
labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us,
but answer our labour, according to their own Wills. In the first sense the
labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a
Culture of their mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought
to our purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much as
Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by
acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we
look for any benefit. And this is properly Worship: in which sense Publicola, is
understood for a Worshipper of the People, and Cultus Dei, for the Worship of
God.
Severall Signes Of Honour
From internall Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and Goodnesse,
arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodnesse; and Hope, and
Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of externall worship; Praise,
Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being Goodnesse; the subject of
Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity. Praise,
and Magnifying are significant both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say
a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey
his Power. The opinion of the Happinesse of another, can onely be expressed by
words.
Worship Naturall And Arbitrary
There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that be
Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Liberall, and the like; and
amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are so by Institution,
or Custome of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others
Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation,
Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The
former is Naturall; the later Arbitrary Worship.
Worship Commanded And Free
And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For sometimes it is a
Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such as hee
requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks
fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gestures, but the obedience is the
Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders:
for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous,
and tending to contumely; they are not Worship; because a signe is not a signe
to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.
Worship Publique And Private
Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the Worship
that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Private, is that which a Private
person exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; but
in respect of Particular men it is not so. Private, is in secret Free; but in
the sight of the multitude, it is never without some Restraint, either from the
Lawes, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.
The End Of Worship
The End of Worship amongst men, is Power. For where a man seeth another
worshipped he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey him; which
makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds
from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity, by those rules of
Honour, that Reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in
hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good already
received from them.
Attributes Of Divine Honour
That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of Nature, I
will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is manifest, we ought to
attribute to him Existence: For no man can have the will to honour that, which
he thinks not to have any Beeing.
Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the
World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, is
understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there
is no cause of it, that is, no God.
Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that which
is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.
Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take from
him the care of Mankind; take from him his Honour: for it takes away mens love,
and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.
Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is
Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour God,
to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we can; because
to Finite, it is easie to adde more.
Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is
Finite:
Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our mind: for
whatsoever we conceive is Finite:
Not to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes onely of
things Finite:
Nor to say he is this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is bounded,
and Finite:
Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to him
Place:
Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all Finite: for
there cannot be more than one Infinite: Nor to ascribe to him (unlesse
Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect) Passions that partake
of Griefe; as Repentance, Anger, Mercy: or of Want; as Appetite, Hope, Desire;
or of any Passive faculty: For Passion, is Power limited by somewhat else.
And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood, as
that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which he effecteth
every thing.
Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense; as also
Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the
mind, raised by externall things that presse the organicall parts of mans body:
For there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on naturall
causes, cannot be attributed to him.
Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by naturall
Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes, as Infinite, Eternall,
Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High, Most Great, and the like; or
Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator; and in such sense, as if he meant not
to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of
our Fancy,) but how much wee admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him;
which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much as we can: For
there is but one Name to signifie our Conception of his Nature, and that is, I
AM: and but one Name of his Relation to us, and that is God; in which is
contained Father, King, and Lord.
Actions That Are Signes Of Divine Honour
Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a most generall Precept of
Reason, that they be signes of the Intention to Honour God; such as are, First,
Prayers: For not the Carvers, when they made Images, were thought to make them
Gods; but the People that Prayed to them.
Secondly, Thanksgiving; which differeth from Prayer in Divine Worship, no
otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks succeed the benefit; the end
both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God, for Author of all
benefits, as well past, as future.
Thirdly, Gifts; that is to say, Sacrifices, and Oblations, (if they be of the
best,) are signes of Honour: for they are Thanksgivings.
Fourthly, Not to swear by any but God, is naturally a signe of Honour: for it
is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that no mans wit, or
strength can protect a man against Gods vengence on the perjured.
Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak Considerately of God;
for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession of his Power. Hence
followeth, That the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose; for
that is as much, as in Vain: And it is to no purpose; unlesse it be by way of
Oath, and by order of the Common-wealth, to make Judgements certain; or between
Common-wealths, to avoyd Warre. And that disputing of Gods nature is contrary to
his Honour: For it is supposed, that in this naturall Kingdome of God, there is
no other way to know any thing, but by naturall Reason; that is, from the
Principles of naturall Science; which are so farre from teaching us any thing of
Gods nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the
smallest creature living. And therefore, when men out of the Principles of
naturall Reason, dispute of the Attributes of God, they but dishonour him: For
in the Attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification
of Philosophicall Truth; but the signification of Pious Intention, to do him the
greatest Honour we are able. From the want of which consideration, have
proceeded the volumes of disputation about the Nature of God, that tend not to
his Honour, but to the honour of our own wits, and learning; and are nothing
else but inconsiderate, and vain abuses of his Sacred Name.
Sixthly, in Prayers, Thanksgivings, Offerings and Sacrifices, it is a Dictate
of naturall Reason, that they be every one in his kind the best, and most
significant of Honour. As for example, that Prayers, and Thanksgiving, be made
in Words and Phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor Plebeian; but beautifull and
well composed; For else we do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore
the Heathens did absurdly, to worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in
Verse, and with Musick, both of Voyce, and Instruments, was reasonable. Also
that the Beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts they offered, and their
actions in Worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits
received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour
him.
Seventhly, Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret; but also, and
especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men: For without that, (that which
in honour is most acceptable) the procuring others to honour him, is lost.
Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the Lawes of
Nature,) is the greatest worship of all. For as Obedience is more acceptable to
God than sacrifice; so also to set light by his Commandements, is the greatest
of all contumelies. And these are the Lawes of that Divine Worship, which
naturall Reason dictateth to private men.
Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity
But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to exhibite to
God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited
by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof,
is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different
men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of
Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it
cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of
any Religion at all.
All Attributes Depend On The Lawes Civill
And because words (and consequently the Attributes of God) have their
signification by agreement, and constitution of men; those Attributes are to be
held significative of Honour, that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be
done by the wills of particular men, where there is no Law but Reason, may be
done by the will of the Common-wealth, by Lawes Civill. And because a
Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but those that are made by the
Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power; it followeth, that those
Attributes which the Soveraign ordaineth, in the Worship of God, for signes of
Honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their publique
Worship.
Not All Actions
But because not all Actions are signes by Constitution; but some are
Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, these later (which are those
that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence) cannot be made
by humane power a part of Divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent,
modest, humble Behaviour) ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an
infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them
as the Common-wealth shall ordain to be Publiquely and Universally in use, as
signes of Honour, and part of Gods Worship, are to be taken and used for such by
the Subjects. And that which is said in the Scripture, "It is better to obey God
than men," hath place in the kingdome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.
Naturall Punishments
Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and his Naturall
Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of his Naturall
Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning
of so long a chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough, to
give a man a prospect to the end. And in this Chayn, there are linked together
both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do any
thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to
it; and these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are
the beginning of more Harme that Good. And hereby it comes to passe, that
Intemperance, is naturally punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with Mischances;
Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with
Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with
Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes;
Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of
Nature; and therfore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.
The Conclusion Of The Second Part
And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right of Soveraigns;
and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the Principles of Naturall
Reason. And now, considering how different this Doctrine is, from the Practise
of the greatest part of the world, especially of these Western parts, that have
received their Morall learning from Rome, and Athens; and how much depth of
Morall Philosophy is required, in them that have the Administration of the
Soveraign Power; I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, and
the Common-wealth of Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for
the disorders of State, and change of Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be
taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers. But when I consider again, that the
Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and
their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sciences
Mathematicall, (as by Plato they are,) further, than by good Lawes to encourage
men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher
hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the
Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern,
and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of
mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe,
(for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interested, or
envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting
the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility
of Practice.
PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH
CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES
The Word Of God Delivered By Prophets Is The Main Principle
Of Christian Politiques
I have derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of Subjects
hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; such as Experience has found
true, or Consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that is to say, from
the nature of Men, known to us by Experience, and from Definitions (of such
words as are Essentiall to all Politicall reasoning) universally agreed on. But
in that I am next to handle, which is the Nature and Rights of a CHRISTIAN
COMMON-WEALTH, whereof there dependeth much upon Supernaturall Revelations of
the Will of God; the ground of my Discourse must be, not only the Naturall Word
of God, but also the Propheticall.
Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor (that
which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason. For they are the
talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of
our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in the Napkin of an
Implicate Faith, but employed in the purchase of Justice, Peace, and true
Religion, For though there be many things in Gods Word above Reason; that is to
say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet
there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in
our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination.
Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination,
wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the Words; and not to labour in
sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logick, of such mysteries as are not
comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of naturall science. For it is with the
mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed
whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again
without effect.
What It Is To Captivate The Understanding
But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission of the
Intellectual faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of the Will to
Obedience, where obedience is due. For Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, and
Opinion are not in our power to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as
the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not
effects of our Will, but our Will of them. We then Captivate our Understanding
and Reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull
Authority) we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is
Trust, and Faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of
any Notion at all from the words spoken.
How God Speaketh To Men
When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of
another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately. How God
speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those well enough, to whom
he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if
not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him
supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily
perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it. It is true,
that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or
word to declare I beleeve him not; but not to think any otherwise then my reason
perswades me. But if one that hath not such authority over me, shall pretend the
same, there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe, or obedience.
For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to say
God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the Prophets, or of the
Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian
men. To say he hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more than to say he dreamed
that God spake to him; which is not of force to win beleef from any man, that
knows dreams are for the most part naturall, and may proceed from former
thoughts; and such dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance,
and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks
he hath merited the favour of extraordinary Revelation. To say he hath seen a
Vision, or heard a Voice, is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and
waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a
vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by
supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some
strong opinion of himself, for which he can alledge no naturall and sufficient
reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man, by Dreams, Visions,
Voice, and Inspiration; yet he obliges no man to beleeve he hath so done to him
that pretends it; who (being a man), may erre, and (which is more) may lie.
By What Marks Prophets Are Known
How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil immediately (saving
by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not to obey his Word,
delivered by him, that sayes he is a Prophet? (1 Kings 22) Of 400 Prophets, of
whom the K. of Israel asked counsel, concerning the warre he made against Ramoth
Gilead, only Micaiah was a true one.(1 Kings 13) The Prophet that was sent to
prophecy against the Altar set up by Jeroboam, though a true Prophet, and that
by two miracles done in his presence appears to be a Prophet sent from God, was
yet deceived by another old Prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of
God, to eat and drink with him. If one Prophet deceive another, what certainty
is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of Reason? To which
I answer out of the Holy Scripture, that there be two marks, by which together,
not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the
other is the not teaching any other Religion than that which is already
established. Asunder (I say) neither of these is sufficient. (Deut. 13 v.
1,2,3,4,5 ) "If a Prophet rise amongst you, or a Dreamer of dreams, and shall
pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us
follow strange Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him,
&c. But that Prophet and Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he
hath spoken to you to Revolt from the Lord your God." In which words two things
are to be observed, First, that God wil not have miracles alone serve for
arguments, to approve the Prophets calling; but (as it is in the third verse)
for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of
the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were great
miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir
up revolt against the King, or him that governeth by the Kings authority, he
that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make
triall of their allegiance. For these words, "revolt from the Lord your God,"
are in this place equivalent to "revolt from your King." For they had made God
their King by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who ruled them by Moses only; for
he only spake with God, and from time to time declared Gods Commandements to the
people. In like manner, after our Saviour Christ had made his Disciples
acknowledge him for the Messiah, (that is to say, for Gods anointed, whom the
nation of the Jews daily expected for their King, but refused when he came,) he
omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. "There shall arise,"
(saith he) "false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall doe great wonders and
miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very Elect." (Mat.
24. 24) By which it appears, that false Prophets may have the power of miracles;
yet are wee not to take their doctrin for Gods Word. St. Paul says further to
the Galatians, that "if himself, or an Angell from heaven preach another Gospel
to them, than he had preached, let him be accursed." (Gal. 1. 8) That Gospel
was, that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the King
received, in consequence to these words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech
is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already received Jesus for the
Christ, that is to say, for King of the Jews.
The Marks Of A Prophet In The Old Law, Miracles, And Doctrine
Conformable To The Law
And as Miracles, without preaching that Doctrine which God hath established;
so preaching the true Doctrine, without the doing of Miracles, is an
unsufficient argument of immediate Revelation. For if a man that teacheth not
false Doctrine, should pretend to bee a Prophet without shewing any Miracle, he
is never the more to bee regarded for his pretence, as is evident by Deut. 18.
v. 21, 22. "If thou say in thy heart, How shall we know that the Word (of the
Prophet) is not that which the Lord hath spoken. When the Prophet shall have
spoken in the name of the Lord, that which shall not come to passe, that's the
word which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet has spoken it out of the
pride of his own heart, fear him not." But a man may here again ask, When the
Prophet hath foretold a thing, how shal we know whether it will come to passe or
not? For he may foretel it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time,
longer then the time of mans life; or indefinitely, that it will come to passe
one time or other: in which case this mark of a Prophet is unusefull; and
therefore the miracles that oblige us to beleeve a Prophet, ought to be
confirmed by an immediate, or a not long deferr'd event. So that it is manifest,
that the teaching of the Religion which God hath established, and the showing of
a present Miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture
would have a true Prophet, that is to say immediate Revelation to be
acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to
regard what he saith.
Miracles Ceasing, Prophets Cease, The Scripture Supplies Their Place
Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to
acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man; nor
obligation to give ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is conformable to the
Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour, supply the want of all
other Prophecy; and from which, by wise and careful ratiocination, all rules and
precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without
Enthusiasme, or supernaturall Inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this
Scripture is it, out of which I am to take the Principles of my Discourse,
concerning the Rights of those that are the Supream Govenors on earth, of
Christian Common-wealths; and of the duty of Christian Subjects towards their
Soveraigns. And to that end, I shall speak in the next Chapter, or the Books,
Writers, Scope and Authority of the Bible.
CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER, ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY,
AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURES
Of The Books Of Holy Scripture
By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought to be the
Canon, that is to say, the Rules of Christian life. And because all Rules of
life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are Laws; the question of
the Scripture, is the question of what is Law throughout all Christendome, both
Naturall, and Civill. For though it be not determined in Scripture, what Laws
every Christian King shall constitute in his own Dominions; yet it is determined
what laws he shall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that
Soveraigns in their own Dominions are the sole Legislators; those Books only are
Canonicall, that is, Law, in every nation, which are established for such by the
Soveraign Authority. It is true, that God is the Soveraign of all Soveraigns;
and therefore, when he speaks to any Subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever
any earthly Potentate command to the contrary. But the question is not of
obedience to God, but of When, and What God hath said; which to Subjects that
have no supernaturall revelation, cannot be known, but by that naturall reason,
which guided them, for the obtaining of Peace and Justice, to obey the authority
of their severall Common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull Soveraigns.
According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no other Books of the Old
Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which have been commanded to be
acknowledged for such, by the Authority of the Church of England. What Books
these are, is sufficiently known, without a Catalogue of them here; and they are
the same that are acknowledged by St. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the
Wisdome of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and second of
Maccabees, (though he had seen the first in Hebrew) and the third and fourth of
Esdras, for Apocrypha. Of the Canonicall, Josephus a learned Jew, that wrote in
the time of the Emperor Domitian, reckoneth Twenty Two, making the number agree
with the Hebrew Alphabet. St. Jerome does the same, though they reckon them in
different manner. For Josephus numbers Five Books of Moses, Thirteen of
Prophets, that writ the History of their own times (which how it agrees with the
Prophets writings contained in the Bible wee shall see hereafter), and Four of
Hymnes and Morall Precepts. But St. Jerome reckons Five Books of Moses, Eight of
Prophets, and Nine of other Holy writ, which he calls of Hagiographa. The
Septuagint, who were 70. learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy King of
Egypt, to translate the Jewish Law, out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left
us no other for holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are
received in the Church of England.
As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged for
Canon by all Christian Churches, and by all sects of Christians, that admit any
Books at all for Canonicall.
Their Antiquity
Who were the originall writers of the severall Books of Holy Scripture, has
not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other History, (which is
the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any arguments of naturall
Reason; for Reason serves only to convince the truth (not of fact, but) of
consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in this question, must be
that which is held out unto us from the Bookes themselves: And this light,
though it show us not the writer of every book, yet it is not unusefull to give
us knowledge of the time, wherein they were written.
The Pentateuch Not Written By Moses
And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were
written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses; no more than
these titles, The Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, The Book of Ruth, and the
Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by
Joshua, by the Judges, by Ruth, and by the Kings. For in titles of Books, the
subject is marked, as often as the writer. The History Of Livy, denotes the
Writer; but the History Of Scanderbeg, is denominated from the subject. We read
in the last Chapter of Deuteronomie, Ver. 6. concerning the sepulcher of Moses,
"that no man knoweth of his sepulcher to this day," that is, to the day wherein
those words were written. It is therefore manifest, that those words were
written after his interrement. For it were a strange interpretation, to say
Moses spake of his own sepulcher (though by Prophecy), that it was not found to
that day, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps be alledged, that the
last Chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other man, but
the rest not: Let us therefore consider that which we find in the Book of
Genesis, Chap. 12. Ver. 6 "And Abraham passed through the land to the place of
Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanite was then in the land;" which
must needs bee the words of one that wrote when the Canaanite was not in the
land; and consequently, not of Moses, who dyed before he came into it. Likewise
Numbers 21. Ver. 14. the Writer citeth another more ancient Book, Entituled, The
Book of the Warres of the Lord, wherein were registred the Acts of Moses, at the
Red-sea, and at the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that
the five Books of Moses were written after his time, though how long after it be
not so manifest.
But though Moses did not compile those Books entirely, and in the form we
have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have written: as for
example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as it seemeth in the 11 of
Deuteronomie, and the following Chapters to the 27. which was also commanded to
be written on stones, in their entry into the land of Canaan. (Deut. 31. 9) And
this did Moses himself write, and deliver to the Priests and Elders of Israel,
to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at their assembling in the feast of
Tabernacles. And this is that Law which God commanded, that their Kings (when
they should have established that form of Government) should take a copy of from
the Priests and Levites to lay in the side of the Arke; (Deut. 31. 26) and the
same which having been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and
sent to King Josias, who causing it to be read to the People, renewed the
Covenant between God and them. (2 King. 22. 8 & 23. 1,2,3)
The Book of Joshua Written After His Time
That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua, may
be gathered out of many places of the Book it self. Joshua had set up twelve
stones in the middest of Jordan, for a monument of their passage; (Josh 4. 9) of
which the Writer saith thus, "They are there unto this day;" (Josh 5. 9) for
"unto this day", is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of
man. In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord, that he had rolled off from
the people the Reproach of Egypt, the Writer saith, "The place is called Gilgal
unto this day;" which to have said in the time of Joshua had been improper. So
also the name of the Valley of Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the
Camp, (Josh. 7. 26) the Writer saith, "remaineth unto this day;" which must
needs bee therefore long after the time of Joshua. Arguments of this kind there
be many other; as Josh. 8. 29. 13. 13. 14. 14. 15. 63.
The Booke Of Judges And Ruth Written Long After The Captivity
The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Judges, chap. 1. 21,26
6.24 10.4 15.19 17.6 and Ruth 1. 1. but especially Judg. 18. 30. where it is
said, that Jonathan "and his sonnes were Priests to the Tribe of Dan, untill the
day of the captivity of the land."
The Like Of The Bookes Of Samuel
That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are the
like arguments, 1 Sam. 5.5. 7.13,15. 27.6. & 30.25. where, after David had
adjudged equall part of the spoiles, to them that guarded the Ammunition, with
them that fought, the Writer saith, "He made it a Statute and an Ordinance to
Israel to this day." (2. Sam. 6.4.) Again, when David (displeased, that the Lord
had slain Uzzah, for putting out his hand to sustain the Ark,) called the place
Perez-Uzzah, the Writer saith, it is called so "to this day": the time therefore
of the writing of that Book, must be long after the time of the fact; that is,
long after the time of David.
The Books Of The Kings, And The Chronicles
As for the two Books of the Kings, and the two books of the Chronicles,
besides the places which mention such monuments, as the Writer saith, remained
till his own days; such as are 1 Kings 9.13. 9.21. 10. 12. 12.19. 2 Kings 2.22.
8.22. 10.27. 14.7. 16.6. 17.23. 17.34. 17.41. 1 Chron. 4.41. 5.26. It is
argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in Babylon, that the
History of them is continued till that time. For the Facts Registred are alwaies
more ancient than such Books as make mention of, and quote the Register; as
these Books doe in divers places, referring the Reader to the Chronicles of the
Kings of Juda, to the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel, to the Books of the
Prophet Samuel, or the Prophet Nathan, of the Prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of
Jehdo, to the Books of the Prophet Serveiah, and of the Prophet Addo.
Ezra And Nehemiah
The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after their return
from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the walls and houses
of Jerusalem, the renovation of the Covenant, and ordination of their policy are
therein contained.
Esther
The History of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity; and therefore
the Writer must have been of the same time, or after it.
Job
The Book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written: and
though it appear sufficiently (Exekiel 14.14, and James 5.11.) that he was no
fained person; yet the Book it self seemeth not to be a History, but a Treatise
concerning a question in ancient time much disputed, "why wicked men have often
prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted;" and it is the most
probably, because from the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter,
where the complaint of Job beginneth, the Hebrew is (as St. Jerome testifies) in
prose; and from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in Hexameter
Verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose. So that the dispute is all
in verse; and the prose is added, but as a Preface in the beginning, and an
Epilogue in the end. But Verse is no usuall stile of such, as either are
themselves in great pain, as Job; or of such as come to comfort them, as his
friends; but in Philosophy, especially morall Philosophy, in ancient time
frequent.
The Psalter
The Psalmes were written the most part by David, for the use of the Quire. To
these are added some songs of Moses, and other holy men; and some of them after
the return from the Captivity; as the 137. and the 126. whereby it is manifest
that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the
return of the Jews from Babylon.
The Proverbs
The Proverbs, being a Collection of wise and godly Sayings, partly of
Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh; and partly of the Mother of King
Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by Solomon, rather
then by Agur, or the Mother of Lemues; and that, though the sentences be theirs,
yet the collection or compiling them into this one Book, was the work of some
other godly man, that lived after them all.
Ecclesiastes And The Canticles
The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not
Solomons, except it be the Titles, or Inscriptions. For "The Words of the
Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem;" and, "the Song of Songs, which
is Solomon's," seem to have been made for distinctions sake, then, when the
Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the Law; to the end, that not
the Doctrine only, but the Authors also might be extant.
The Prophets
Of the Prophets, the most ancient, are Sophoniah, Jonas, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah
and Michaiah, who lived in the time of Amaziah, and Azariah, otherwise Ozias,
Kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonas is not properly a Register of his
Prophecy, (for that is contained in these few words, "Fourty dayes and Ninivy
shall be destroyed,") but a History or Narration of his frowardenesse and
disputing Gods commandements; so that there is small probability he should be
the Author, seeing he is the subject of it. But the Book of Amos is his
Prophecy.
Jeremiah, Abdias, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecyed in the time of Josiah.
Ezekiel, Daniel, Aggeus, and Zacharias, in the Captivity.
When Joel and Malachi prophecyed, is not evident by their Writings. But
considering the Inscriptions, or Titles of their Books, it is manifest enough,
that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in the form we have
it, after the return of the Jews from their Captivity in Babylon, and before the
time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, that caused it to bee translated into Greek by
seventy men, which were sent him out of Judea for that purpose. And if the Books
of Apocrypha (which are recommended to us by the Church, though not for
Canonicall, yet for profitable Books for our instruction) may in this point be
credited, the Scripture was set forth in the form wee have it in, by Esdras; as
may appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, chapt. 14. verse
21, 22, &c. where speaking to God, he saith thus, "Thy law is burnt; therefore
no man knoweth the things which thou has done, or the works that are to begin.
But if I have found Grace before thee, send down the holy Spirit into me, and I
shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the beginning, which
were written in thy Law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will
live in the later days, may live." And verse 45. "And it came to passe when the
forty dayes were fulfilled, that the Highest spake, saying, 'The first that thou
hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep
the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them onely to such as be wise among
the people.'" And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the Bookes of
the Old Testament.
The New Testament
The Writers of the New Testament lived all in lesse then an age after Christs
Ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his Disciples, except
St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever was written by them, is as
ancient as the time of the Apostles. But the time wherein the Books of the New
Testament were received, and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing,
is not altogether so ancient. For, as the Bookes of the Old Testament are
derived to us, from no higher time then that of Esdras, who by the direction of
Gods Spirit retrived them, when they were lost: Those of the New Testament, of
which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private mans
hand, cannot bee derived from a higher time, that that wherein the Governours of
the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us, as the writings of
those Apostles and Disciples; under whose names they go. The first enumeration
of all the Bookes, both of the Old, and New Testament, is in the Canons of the
Apostles, supposed to be collected by Clement the first (after St. Peter) Bishop
of Rome. But because that is but supposed, and by many questioned, the Councell
of Laodicea is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then
Christian Churches, for the Writings of the Prophets and Apostles: and this
Councell was held in the 364. yeer after Christ. At which time, though ambition
had so far prevailed on the great Doctors of the Church, as no more to esteem
Emperours, though Christian, for the Shepherds of the people, but for Sheep; and
Emperours not Christian, for Wolves; and endeavoured to passe their Doctrine,
not for Counsell, and Information, as Preachers; but for Laws, as absolute
Governours; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more
obedient to Christian Doctrine, to be pious; yet I am perswaded they did not
therefore falsifie the Scriptures, though the copies of the Books of the New
Testament, were in the hands only of the Ecclesiasticks; because if they had had
an intention so to doe, they would surely have made them more favorable to their
power over Christian Princes, and Civill Soveraignty, than they are. I see not
therefore any reason to doubt, but that the Old, and New Testament, as we have
them now, are the true Registers of those things, which were done and said by
the Prophets, and Apostles. And so perhaps are some of those Books which are
called Apocrypha, if left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of Doctrine
with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the
conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews, that were
not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy Interpreters that converted the
Bible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works of
Philo and Josephus both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not
the Writer, but the authority of the Church, that maketh a Book Canonicall.
Their Scope
And although these Books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest the
Writers were all indued with one and the same Spirit, in that they conspire to
one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the Rights of the Kingdome
of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the Book of Genesis, deriveth the
Genealogy of Gods people, from the creation of the World, to the going into
Egypt: the other four Books of Moses, contain the Election of God for their
King, and the Laws which hee prescribed for their Government: The Books of
Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the time of Saul, describe the acts of Gods
people, till the time they cast off Gods yoke, and called for a King, after the
manner of their neighbour nations; The rest of the History of the Old Testament,
derives the succession of the line of David, to the Captivity, out of which line
was to spring the restorer of the Kingdome of God, even our blessed Saviour God
the Son, whose coming was foretold in the Bookes of the Prophets, after whom the
Evangelists writt his life, and actions, and his claim to the Kingdome, whilst
he lived one earth: and lastly, the Acts, and Epistles of the Apostles, declare
the coming of God, the Holy Ghost, and the Authority he left with them, and
their successors, for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the
Gentiles. In summe, the Histories and the Prophecies of the old Testament, and
the Gospels, and Epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same scope,
to convert men to the obedience of God; 1. in Moses, and the Priests; 2. in the
man Christ; and 3. in the Apostles and the successors to Apostolicall power. For
these three at several times did represent the person of God: Moses, and his
successors the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ
himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors,
from the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Ghost descended on them) to this day.
The Question Of The Authority Of The Scriptures Stated.
It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian
Religion, From Whence The Scriptures Derive Their Authority; which question is
also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, How Wee Know Them To Be The Word
Of God, or, Why We Beleeve Them To Be So: and the difficulty of resolving it,
ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein the question it self
is couched. For it is beleeved on all hands, that the first and originall Author
of them is God; and consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it
is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians
beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and
therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our Knowledge of it. Lastly,
when the question is propounded of our Beleefe; because some are moved to
beleeve for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one
generall answer for them all. The question truly stated is, By What Authority
They Are Made Law.
Their Authority And Interpretation
As far as they differ not from the Laws of Nature, there is no doubt, but
they are the Law of God, and carry their Authority with them, legible to all men
that have the use of naturall reason: but this is no other Authority, then that
of all other Morall Doctrine consonant to Reason; the Dictates whereof are Laws,
not Made, but Eternall.
If they be made Law by God himselfe, they are of the nature of written Law,
which are Laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently published them, as
no man can excuse himself, by saying, he know not they were his.
He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that they are
his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not obliged to
obey them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands have already the force of
Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority, then that of the Common-wealth,
residing in the Soveraign, who only has the Legislative power. Again, if it be
not the Legislative Authority of the Common-wealth, that giveth them the force
of Laws, it must bee some other Authority derived from God, either private, or
publique: if private, it obliges onely him, to whom in particular God hath been
pleased to reveale it. For if every man should be obliged, to take for Gods Law,
what particular men, on pretence of private Inspiration, or Revelation, should
obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out of pride, and ignorance,
take their own Dreams, and extravagant Fancies, and Madnesse, for testimonies of
Gods Spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such Divine testimonies, falsely,
and contrary to their own consciences,) it were impossible that any Divine Law
should be acknowledged. If publique, it is the Authority of the Common-wealth,
or of the Church. But the Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a
Common-wealth of Christians; called a Common-wealth, because it consisteth of
men united in one person, their Soveraign; and a Church, because it consisteth
in Christian men, united in one Christian Soveraign. But if the Church be not
one person, then it hath no authority at all; it can neither command, nor doe
any action at all; nor is capable of having any power, or right to any thing;
nor has any Will, Reason, nor Voice; for all these qualities are personall. Now
if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they
are not one person; nor is there an Universall Church that hath any authority
over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws, by the Universall
Church: or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all Christian Monarchs, and States
are private persons, and subject to bee judged, deposed, and punished by an
Universall Soveraigne of all Christendome. So that the question of the Authority
of the Scriptures is reduced to this, "Whether Christian Kings, and the
Soveraigne Assemblies in Christian Common-wealths, be absolute in their own
Territories, immediately under God; or subject to one Vicar of Christ,
constituted over the Universall Church; to bee judged, condemned, deposed, and
put to death, as hee shall think expedient, or necessary for the common good."
Which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular consideration
of the Kingdome of God; from whence also, wee are to judge of the Authority of
Interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a lawfull power over any
Writing, to make it Law, hath the power also to approve, or disapprove the
interpretation of the same.
CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION IN
THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE
Body And Spirit How Taken In The Scripture
Seeing the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the constant
Signification of words; which in the Doctrine following, dependeth not (as in
naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common conversation) on
vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture; It is necessary,
before I proceed any further, to determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of
such words, as by their ambiguity, may render what I am to inferre upon them,
obscure, or disputable. I will begin with the words BODY, and SPIRIT, which in
the language of the Schools are termed, Substances, Corporeall, and
Incorporeall.
The Word Body, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that which
filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on
the imagination, but is a reall part of that we call the Universe. For the
Universe, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that
is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not also part of (that
Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe. The same also, because Bodies are subject
to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living
creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, Subject, to various accidents,
as sometimes to be Moved, sometimes to stand Still; and to seem to our senses
sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smel, Tast, or Sound,
somtimes of another. And this diversity of Seeming, (produced by the diversity
of the operation of bodies, on the organs of our sense) we attribute to
alterations of the Bodies that operate, & call them Accidents of those Bodies.
And according to this acceptation of the word, Substance and Body, signifie the
same thing; and therefore Substance Incorporeall are words, which when they are
joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an Incorporeall
Body.
But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is called Body, but
only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of Feeling, to resist
their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to hinder them from a farther
prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, Aire, and Aeriall Substances,
use not to be taken for Bodies, but (as often as men are sensible of their
effects) are called Wind, or Breath, or (because the some are called in the
Latine Spiritus) Spirits; as when they call that aeriall substance, which in the
body of any living creature, gives it life and motion, Vitall and Animall
Spirits. But for those Idols of the brain, which represent Bodies to us, where
they are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a Distempered brain
waking, they are (as the Apostle saith generally of all Idols) nothing; Nothing
at all, I say, there where they seem to bee; and in the brain it self, nothing
but tumult, proceeding either from the action of the objects, or from the
disorderly agitation of the Organs of our Sense. And men, that are otherwise
imployed, then to search into their causes, know not of themselves, what to call
them; and may therefore easily be perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much
reverence, some to call them Bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a
power supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some to call
them Spirits, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the place where
they appear, to resist their fingers: So that the proper signification of Spirit
in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body, or a Ghost, or
other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination. But for metaphoricall
significations, there be many: for sometimes it is taken for Disposition or
Inclination of the mind; as when for the disposition to controwl the sayings of
other men, we say, A Spirit Contradiction; For A Disposition to Uncleannesse, An
Unclean Spirit; for Perversenesse, A Froward Spirit; for Sullennesse, A Dumb
Spirit, and for Inclination To Godlinesse, And Gods Service, the Spirit of God:
sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the
mind, as when Great Wisdome is called the Spirit Of Wisdome; and Mad Men are
said to be Possessed With A Spirit.
Other signification of Spirit I find no where any; and where none of these
can satisfie the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth not under
humane Understanding; and our Faith therein consisteth not in our Opinion, but
in our Submission; as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where
by the Spirit of God, is meant God himselfe. For the nature of God is
incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of What He Is, but only
That He Is; and therefore the Attributes we give him, are not to tell one
another, What He Is, Nor to signifie our opinion of his Nature, but our desire
to honor him with such names as we conceive most honorable amongst our selves.
Spirit Of God Taken In The Scripture Sometimes For A Wind, Or Breath
Gen. 1. 2. "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters." Here if by
the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is Motion attributed to God, and
consequently Place, which are intelligible only of Bodies, and not of substances
incorporeall; and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive
nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever
has dimension, is Body. But the meaning of those words is best understood by the
like place, Gen. 8. 1. Where when the earth was covered with Waters, as in the
beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land,
useth like words, "I will bring my Spirit upon the Earth, and the waters shall
be diminished:" in which place by Spirit is understood a Wind, (that is an Aire
or Spirit Moved,) which might be called (as in the former place) the Spirit of
God, because it was Gods Work.
Secondly, For Extraordinary Gifts Of The Understanding
Gen. 41. 38. Pharaoh calleth the Wisdome of Joseph, the Spirit of God. For
Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and to set him
over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, "Can we find such a man as this is, in
whom is the Spirit of God?" and Exod. 28.3. "Thou shalt speak (saith God) to all
that are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the Spirit of Wisdome, to make
Aaron Garments, to consecrate him." Where extraordinary Understanding, though
but in making Garments, as being the Gift of God, is called the Spirit of God.
The same is found again, Exod. 31.3,4,5,6. and 35.31. And Isaiah 11.2,3. where
the Prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, "The Spirit of the Lord shall abide
upon him, the Spirit of wisdome and understanding, the Spirit of counsell, and
fortitude; and the Spirit of the fear of the Lord." Where manifestly is meant,
not so many Ghosts, but so many eminent Graces that God would give him.
Thirdly, For Extraordinary Affections
In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary Zeal, and Courage in the defence of
Gods people, is called the Spirit of God; as when it excited Othoniel, Gideon,
Jeptha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude, Judg. 3.10. 6.34. 11.29.
13.25. 14.6,19. And of Saul, upon the newes of the insolence of the Ammonites
towards the men of Jabeth Gilead, it is said (1 Sam.11.6.) that "The Spirit of
God came upon Saul, and his Anger (or, as it is in the Latine, His Fury) was
kindled greatly." Where it is not probable was meant a Ghost, but an
extraordinary Zeal to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like manner by the
Spirit of God, that came upon Saul, when hee was amongst the Prophets that
praised God in Songs, and Musick (1 Sam.19.20.) is to be understood, not a
Ghost, but an unexpected and sudden Zeal to join with them in their devotions.
Fourthly, For The Gift Of Prediction By Dreams And Visions
The false Prophet Zedekiah, saith to Micaiah (1 Kings 22.24.) "Which way went
the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?" Which cannot be understood of
a Ghost; for Micaiah declared before the Kings of Israel and Judah, the event of
the battle, as from a Vision, and not as from a Spirit, speaking in him.
In the same manner it appeareth, in the Books of the Prophets, that though
they spake by the Spirit of God, that is to say, by a speciall grace of
Prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a Ghost within them,
but by some supernaturall Dream or Vision.
Fiftly, For Life
Gen. 2.7. It is said, "God made man of the dust of the Earth, and breathed
into his nostrills (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and man was made a
living soul." There the Breath of Life inspired by God, signifies no more, but
that God gave him life; And (Job 27.3.) "as long as the Spirit of God is in my
nostrils;" is no more then to say, "as long as I live." So in Ezek. 1.20. "the
Spirit of life was in the wheels," is equivalent to, "the wheels were alive."
And (Ezek. 2.30.) "the spirit entred into me, and set me on my feet," that is,
"I recovered my vitall strength;" not that any Ghost, or incorporeal substance
entred into, and possessed his body.
Sixtly, For A Subordination To Authority
In the 11 chap. of Numbers. verse 17. "I will take (saith God) of the Spirit,
which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear the burthen
of the people with thee;" that is, upon the seventy Elders: whereupon two of the
seventy are said to prophecy in the campe; of whom some complained, and Joshua
desired Moses to forbid them; which Moses would not doe. Whereby it appears;
that Joshua knew not they had received authority so to do, and prophecyed
according to the mind of Moses, that is to say, by a Spirit, or Authority
subordinate to his own.
In the like sense we read (Deut. 34.9.) that "Joshua was full of the Spirit
of wisdome," because Moses had laid his hands upon him: that is, because he was
Ordained by Moses, to prosecute the work hee had himselfe begun, (namely, the
bringing of Gods people into the promised land), but prevented by death, could
not finish.
In the like sense it is said, (Rom. 8.9.) "If any man have not the Spirit of
Christ, he is none of his:" not meaning thereby the Ghost of Christ, but a
Submission to his Doctrine. As also (1 John 4.2.) "Hereby you shall know the
Spirit of God; Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the
flesh, is of God;" by which is meant the Spirit of unfained Christianity, or
Submission to that main Article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the Christ;
which cannot be interpreted of a Ghost.
Likewise these words (Luke 4.1.) "And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost" (that is,
as it is exprest, Mat. 4.1. and Mar. 1.12. "of the Holy Spirit",) may be
understood, for Zeal to doe the work for which hee was sent by God the Father:
but to interpret it of a Ghost, is to say, that God himselfe (for so our Saviour
was,) was filled with God; which is very unproper, and unsignificant. How we
came to translate Spirits, by the word Ghosts, which signifieth nothing, neither
in heaven, nor earth, but the Imaginary inhabitants of mans brain, I examine
not: but this I say, the word Spirit in the text signifieth no such thing; but
either properly a reall Substance, or Metaphorically, some extraordinary Ability
of Affection of the Mind, or of the Body.
Seventhly, For Aeriall Bodies
The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (Mat. 14.26. and
Marke 6.49.) supposed him to be a Spirit, meaning thereby an Aeriall Body, and
not a Phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him; which cannot be understood of
the delusions of the brain, (which are not common to many at once, as visible
Bodies are; but singular, because of the differences of Fancies), but of Bodies
only. In like manner, where he was taken for a Spirit, by the same Apostles
(Luke 24.3,7.): So also (Acts 12.15) when St. Peter was delivered out of Prison,
it would not be beleeved; but when the Maid said he was at the dore, they said
it was his Angel; by which must be meant a corporeall substance, or we must say,
the Disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both Jews and
Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not Imaginary, but Reall; and such as
needed not the fancy of man for their Existence: These the Jews called Spirits,
and Angels, Good or Bad; as the Greeks called the same by the name of Daemons.
And some such apparitions may be reall, and substantiall; that is to say,
subtile Bodies, which God can form by the same power, by which he formed all
things, and make use of, as of Ministers, and Messengers (that is to say,
Angels) to declare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in
extraordinary and supernaturall manner. But when hee hath so formed them they
are Substances, endued with dimensions, and take up roome, and can be moved from
place to place, which is peculiar to Bodies; and therefore are not Ghosts
Incorporeall, that is to say, Ghosts that are in No Place; that is to say, that
are No Where; that is to say, that seeming to be Somewhat, are Nothing. But if
corporeall be taken in the most vulgar manner, for such Substances as are
perceptible by our externall Senses; then is Substance Incorporeall, a thing not
Imaginary, but Reall; namely, a thin Substance Invisible, but that hath the same
dimensions that are in grosser Bodies.
Angel What
By the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a Messenger; and most often, a
Messenger of God: And by a Messenger of God, is signified, any thing that makes
known his extraordinary Presence; that is to say, the extraordinary
manifestation of his power, especially by a Dream, or Vision.
Concerning the creation of Angels, there is nothing delivered in the
Scriptures. That they are Spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of Spirit,
is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews, and Gentiles,
sometimes thin Bodies; as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits Vitall, and Animall,
of living creatures; and sometimes the Images that rise in the fancy in Dreams,
and Visions; which are not reall Substances, but accidents of the brain; yet
when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signifie his Will, they are not
unproperly termed Gods Messengers, that is to say, his Angels.
And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the Imagery of the brain, for
things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy; and out
of them framed their opinions of Daemons, Good and Evill; which because they
seemed to subsist really, they called Substances; and because they could not
feel them with their hands, Incorporeall: so also the Jews upon the same ground,
without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto, had
generally an opinion, (except the sect of the Sadduces,) that those apparitions
(which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancie of men, for his own
service, and therefore called them his Angels) were substances, not dependent on
the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought were
good to them, they esteemed the Angels of God, and those they thought would hurt
them, they called Evill Angels, or Evill Spirits; such as was the Spirit of
Python, and the Spirits of Mad-men, of Lunatiques, and Epileptiques: For they
esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases, Daemoniaques.
But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where Angels are
mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be
understood by the word Angel, but some image raised (supernaturally) in the
fancy, to signifie the presence of God in the execution of some supernaturall
work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not exprest, it may be
understood in the same manner.
For we read Gen. 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely an Angel,
but God; where that which (verse 7.) is called the Angel of the Lord, in the
tenth verse, saith to Agar, "I will multiply thy seed exceedingly;" that is,
speaketh in the person of God. Neither was this apparition a Fancy figured, but
a Voice. By which it is manifest, that Angel signifieth there, nothing but God
himself, that caused Agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice supernaturall,
testifying Gods speciall presence there. Why therefore may not the Angels that
appeared to Lot, and are called Gen. 19.13. Men; and to whom, though they were
but two, Lot speaketh (ver. 18.) as but one, and that one, as God, (for the
words are, "Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord") be understood of images of
men, supernaturally formed in the Fancy; as well as before by Angel was
understood a fancyed Voice? When the Angel called to Abraham out of heaven, to
stay his hand (Gen. 22.11.) from slaying Isaac, there was no Apparition, but a
Voice; which neverthelesse was called properly enough a Messenger, or Angel of
God, because it declared Gods will supernaturally, and saves the labour of
supposing any permanent Ghosts. The Angels which Jacob saw on the Ladder of
Heaven (Gen. 28.12.) were a Vision of his sleep; therefore onely Fancy, and a
Dream; yet being supernaturall, and signs of Gods Speciall presence, those
apparitions are not improperly called Angels. The same is to be understood
(Gen.31.11.) where Jacob saith thus, "The Angel of the Lord appeared to mee in
my sleep." For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that which all men
call a Dreame, whether such Dreame be naturall, or supernaturall: and that which
there Jacob calleth an Angel, was God himselfe; for the same Angel saith (verse
13.) "I am the God of Bethel."
Also (Exod.14.9.) the Angel that went before the Army of Israel to the Red
Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19.) the Lord himself; and he appeared
not in the form of a beautifull man, but in form (by day) of a Pillar Of Cloud
and (by night) in form of a Pillar Of Fire; and yet this Pillar was all the
apparition, and Angel promised to Moses (Exod. 14.9.) for the Armies guide: For
this cloudy pillar, is said, to have descended, and stood at the dore of the
Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.
There you see Motion, and Speech, which are commonly attributed to Angels,
attributed to a Cloud, because the Cloud served as a sign of Gods presence; and
was no lesse an Angel, then if it had had the form of a Man, or Child of never
so great beauty; or Wings, as usually they are painted, for the false
instruction of common people. For it is not the shape; but their use, that makes
them Angels. But their use is to be significations of Gods presence in
supernaturall operations; As when Moses (Exod. 33.14.) had desired God to goe
along with the Campe, (as he had done alwaies before the making of the Golden
Calfe,) God did not answer, "I will goe," nor "I will send an Angel in my
stead;" but thus, "my presence shall goe with thee."
To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel is
found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I say, there
is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the Church of England
holdeth for Canonicall, from which we can conclude, there is, or hath been
created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of Spirit or Angel,) that
hath not quantity; and that may not be, by the understanding divided; that is to
say, considered by parts; so as one part may bee in one place, and the next part
in the next place to it; and, in summe, which is not (taking Body for that,
which is some what, or some where) Corporeall; but in every place, the sense
will bear the interpretation of Angel, for Messenger; as John Baptist is called
an Angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the same
Analogy) the Dove, and the Fiery Tongues, in that they were signes of Gods
speciall presence, might also be called Angels. Though we find in Daniel two
names of Angels, Gabriel, and Michael; yet is cleer out of the text it selfe,
(Dan. 12.1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an Angel, but as a Prince:
and that Gabriel (as the like apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep)
was nothing but a supernaturall phantasme, by which it seemed to Daniel, in his
dream, that two Saints being in talke, one of them said to the other, "Gabriel,
let us make this man understand his Vision:" For God needeth not, to distinguish
his Celestiall servants by names, which are usefull onely to the short memories
of Mortalls. Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it can be
proved, that Angels (except when they are put for such men, as God hath made the
Messengers, and Ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent, and
withall incorporeall. That they are permanent, may bee gathered from the words
of our Saviour himselfe, (Mat. 25.41.) where he saith, it shall be said to the
wicked in the last day, "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the
Devil and his Angels:" which place is manifest for the permanence of Evill
Angels, (unlesse wee might think the name of Devill and his Angels may be
understood of the Churches Adversaries and their Ministers;) but then it is
repugnant to their Immateriality; because Everlasting fire is no punishment to
impatible substances, such as are all things Incorporeall. Angels therefore are
not thence proved to be Incorporeall. In like manner where St. Paul sayes (1
Cor. 6.3.) "Knew ye not that wee shall judge the Angels?" And (2 Pet. 2.4.) "For
if God spared not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down into Hell." And
(Jude 1,6.) "And the Angels that kept not their first estate, but left their
owne habitation, hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto
the Judgement of the last day;" though it prove the Permanence of Angelicall
nature, it confirmeth also their Materiality. And (Mat. 22.30.) In the
resurrection men doe neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as the Angels
of God in heaven:" but in the resurrection men shall be Permanent, and not
Incorporeall; so therefore also are the Angels.
There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion.
To men that understand the signification of these words, Substance, and
Incorporeall; as Incorporeall is taken not for subtile body, but for Not Body,
they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an Angel, or Spirit is (in that
sense) an Incorporeall Substance, is to say in effect, there is no Angel nor
Spirit at all. Considering therefore the signification of the word Angel in the
Old Testament, and the nature of Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the
ordinary way of Nature; I was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing
but supernaturall apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall and
extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and commandements
known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New
Testament, and our Saviours own words, and in such texts, wherein is no
suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble Reason,
an acknowledgement, and beleef, that there be also Angels substantiall, and
permanent. But to beleeve they be in no place, that is to say, no where, that is
to say, nothing, as they (though indirectly) say, that will have them
Incorporeall, cannot by Scripture bee evinced.
Inspiration What
On the signification of the word Spirit, dependeth that of the word
INSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing but the
blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind, in such manner as a man
filleth a bladder with his breath; or if Spirits be not corporeal, but have
their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a
Phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible; for Phantasmes are not, but
only seem to be somewhat. That word therefore is used in the Scripture
metaphorically onely: As (Gen. 2.7.) where it is said, that God Inspired into
man the breath of life, no more is meant, then that God gave unto him vitall
motion. For we are not to think that God made first a living breath, and then
blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath were reall, or seeming;
but only as it is (Acts 17.25.) "that he gave him life and breath;" that is,
made him a living creature. And where it is said (2 Tim. 3.16.) "all Scripture
is given by Inspiration from God," speaking there of the Scripture of the Old
Testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie, that God enclined the spirit or
mind of those Writers, to write that which should be usefull, in teaching,
reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. But
where St. Peter (2 Pet. 1.21.) saith, that "Prophecy came not in old time by the
will of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy
Spirit," by the Holy Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a Dream, or Vision
supernaturall, which is not Inspiration; Nor when our Saviour breathing on his
Disciples, said, "Receive the Holy Spirit," was that Breath the Spirit, but a
sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them. And though it be said of many,
and of our Saviour himself, that he was full of the Holy Spirit; yet that
Fulnesse is not to be understood for Infusion of the substance of God, but for
accumulation of his gifts, such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues,
and the like, whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in
all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise where God sayes (Joel 2.28.) "I
will powre out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your Sons and your Daughters shall
prophecy, your Old men shall dream Dreams, and your Young men shall see
Visions," wee are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit
were like water, subject to effusion, or infusion; but as if God had promised to
give them Propheticall Dreams, and Visions. For the proper use of the word
Infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces
are Vertues, not Bodies to be carryed hither and thither, and to be powred into
men, as into barrels.
In the same manner, to take Inspiration in the proper sense, or to say that
Good Spirits entred into men to make them prophecy, or Evill Spirits into those
that became Phrenetique, Lunatique, or Epileptique, is not to take the word in
the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there is taken for the power of God,
working by causes to us unknown. As also (Acts 2.2.) the wind, that is there
said to fill the house wherein the Apostles were assembled on the day of
Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy Spirit, which is the Deity it
self; but for an Externall sign of Gods speciall working on their hearts, to
effect in them the internall graces, and holy vertues hee thought requisite for
the performance of their Apostleship.
CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOME OF GOD, OF
HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT
Kingdom Of God Taken By Divines Metaphorically But In The Scriptures
Properly
The Kingdome of God in the Writings of Divines, and specially in Sermons, and
Treatises of Devotion, is taken most commonly for Eternall Felicity, after this
life, in the Highest Heaven, which they also call the Kingdome of Glory; and
sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity) Sanctification, which they terme
the Kingdome of Grace, but never for the Monarchy, that is to say, the Soveraign
Power of God over any Subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the
proper signification of Kingdome.
To the contrary, I find the KINGDOME OF GOD, to signifie in most places of
Scripture, a Kingdome Properly So Named, constituted by the Votes of the People
of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their King by Covenant
made with him, upon Gods promising them the possession of the land of Canaan;
and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for Dominion Over Sinne;
(and only in the New Testament;) because such a Dominion as that, every Subject
shall have in the Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.
From the very Creation, God not only reigned over all men Naturally by his
might; but also had Peculiar Subjects, whom he commanded by a Voice, as one man
speaketh to another. In which manner he Reigned over Adam, and gave him
commandement to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of Good and Evill; which
when he obeyed not, but tasting thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging
between Good and Evill, not by his Creators commandement, but by his own sense,
his punishment was a privation of the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had
at first created him: And afterwards God punished his posterity, for their
vices, all but eight persons, with an universall deluge; And in these eight did
consist the then Kingdome Of God.
The Originall Of The Kingdome Of God
After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17.7,8.) to make a
Covenant with him in these words, "I will establish my Covenant between me, and
thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting Covenant,
to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; And I will give unto thee, and
to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of
Canaan for an everlasting possession." And for a memoriall, and a token of this
Covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11.) the Sacrament of Circumcision. This is it
which is called the Old Covenant, or Testament; and containeth a Contract
between God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity,
in a peculiar manner to be subject to Gods positive Law; for to the Law Morall
he was obliged before, as by an Oath of Allegiance. And though the name of King
be not yet given to God, nor of Kingdome to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing
is the same; namely, an Institution by pact, of Gods peculiar Soveraignty over
the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same Covenant by Moses, at
Mount Sinai, is expressely called a peculiar Kingdome of God over the Jews: and
it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4.11.) that he is the
"Father of the Faithfull," that is, of those that are loyall, and doe not
violate their Allegiance sworn to God, then by Circumcision, and afterwards in
the New Covenant by Baptisme.
That The Kingdome Of God Is Properly His Civill Soveraignty Over
A Peculiar People By Pact
This Covenant, at the Foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses (Exod. 19.5.)
where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner, "If you
will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, then yee shall be a peculiar
people to me, for all the Earth is mine; and yee shall be unto me a Sacerdotall
Kingdome, and an holy Nation." For a "Peculiar people" the vulgar Latine hath,
Peculium De Cunctis Populis: the English translation made in the beginning of
the Reign of King James, hath, a "Peculiar treasure unto me above all Nations;"
and the Geneva French, "the most precious Jewel of all Nations." But the truest
Translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself (Tit.
2.14.) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour "gave
himself for us, that he might purifie us to himself, a peculiar (that is, an
extraordinary) people:" for the word is in the Greek periousios, which is
opposed commonly to the word epiousios: and as this signifieth Ordinary,
Quotidian, or (as in the Lords Prayer) Of Daily Use; so the other signifieth
that which is Overplus, and Stored Up, and Enjoyed In A Speciall Manner; which
the Latines call Peculium; and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the
reason God rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, "For
all the Earth is mine," as if he should say, "All the Nations of the world are
mine;" but it is not so that you are mine, but in a Speciall Manner: For they
are all mine, by reason of my Power; but you shall be mine, by your own Consent,
and Covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations.
The same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same Text, "Yee shall be
to me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation." The Vulgar Latine hath it,
Regnum Sacerdotale, to which agreeth the Translation of that place (1 Pet. 2.9.)
Sacerdotium Regale, A Regal Priesthood; as also the Institution it self, by
which no man might enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum, that is to say, no man
might enquire Gods will immediately of God himselfe, but onely the High Priest.
The English Translation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, "a
Kingdome of Priests;" which is either meant of the succession of one High Priest
after another, or else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise of
the High Priesthood; For there was never any but the High Priest onely, that was
to informe the People of Gods Will; nor any Convocation of Priests ever allowed
to enter into the Sanctum Sanctorum.
Again, the title of a Holy Nation confirmes the same: For Holy signifies,
that which is Gods by speciall, not by generall Right. All the Earth (as is said
in the text) is Gods; but all the Earth is not called Holy, but that onely which
is set apart for his especiall service, as was the Nation of the Jews. It is
therefore manifest enough by this one place, that by the Kingdome of God, is
properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were
to be subject thereto) for their Civill Government, and the regulating of their
behaviour, not onely towards God their King, but also towards one another in
point of justice, and towards other Nations both in peace and warre; which
properly was a Kingdome, wherein God was King, and the High priest was to be
(after the death of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant.
But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (1 Sam.
8.7.) when the Elders of Israel (grieved with the corruption of the Sons of
Samuel) demanded a King, Samuel displeased therewith, prayed unto the Lord; and
the Lord answering said unto him, "Hearken unto the voice of the People, for
they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign
over them." Out of which it is evident, that God himself was then their King;
and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which God
from time to time appointed him.
Again, (1 Sam. 12.12.) where Samuel saith to the People, "When yee saw that
Nahash King of the Children of Ammon came against you, ye said unto me, Nay, but
a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your King:" It is
manifest that God was their King, and governed the Civill State of their
Common-wealth.
And after the Israelites had rejected God, the Prophets did foretell his
restitution; as (Isaiah 24.23.) "Then the Moon shall be confounded, and the Sun
ashamed when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem;"
where he speaketh expressely of his Reign in Zion, and Jerusalem; that is, on
Earth. And (Micah 4.7.) "And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion:" This
Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the Earth. And (Ezek. 20.33.) "As I live, saith
the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arme, and with fury
powred out, I wil rule over you; and (verse 37.) I will cause you to passe under
the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the Covenant;" that is, I will
reign over you, and make you to stand to that Covenant which you made with me by
Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your
election of another King.
And in the New testament, the Angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke
1.32,33) "He shall be great, and be called the Son of the Most High, and the
Lord shall give him the throne of his Father David; and he shall reign over the
house of Jacob for ever; and of his Kingdome there shall be no end." This is
also a Kingdome upon Earth; for the claim whereof, as an enemy to Caesar, he was
put to death; the title of his crosse, was, Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews;
hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of Thornes; and for the proclaiming of
him, it is said of the Disciples (Acts 17.7.) "That they did all of them
contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another King, one Jesus. The
Kingdome therefore of God, is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome; and so
taken, not onely in the Old Testament, but the New; when we say, "For thine is
the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory," it is to be understood of Gods Kingdome, by
force of our Covenant, not by the Right of Gods Power; for such a Kingdome God
alwaies hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, "Thy Kingdome
come," unlesse it be meant of the Restauration of that Kingdome of God by
Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the election
of Saul. Nor had it been proper to say, "The Kingdome of Heaven is at hand," or
to pray, "Thy Kingdome come," if it had still continued.
There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it were
a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives too much
light to Christian Kings to see their right of Ecclesiastical Government. This
they have observed, that in stead of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, translate, a
Kingdome of Priests: for they may as well translate a Royall Priesthood, (as it
is in St. Peter) into a Priesthood of Kings. And whereas, for a Peculiar People,
they put a Pretious Jewel, or Treasure, a man might as well call the speciall
Regiment, or Company of a Generall, the Generalls pretious Jewel, or his
Treasure.
In short, the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; which consisted, first in
the obligation of the people of Israel to those Laws, which Moses should bring
unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the High Priest of the time
being, should deliver to them from before the Cherubins in the Sanctum
Sanctorum; and which kingdome having been cast off, in the election of Saul, the
Prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ; and the Restauration whereof we
daily pray for, when we say in the Lords Prayer, "Thy Kingdome come;" and the
Right whereof we acknowledge, when we adde, "For thine is the Kingdome, the
Power, and Glory, for ever and ever, Amen;" and the Proclaiming whereof, was the
Preaching of the Apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the Teachers of the
Gospel; to embrace which Gospel, (that is to say, to promise obedience to Gods
government) is, to bee in the Kingdome of Grace, because God hath gratis given
to such the power to bee the subjects (that is, Children) of God hereafter, when
Christ shall come in Majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his owne
people, which is called the Kingdome of Glory. If the Kingdome of God (called
also the Kingdome of Heaven, from the gloriousnesse, and admirable height of
that throne) were not a Kingdome which God by his Lieutenant, or Vicars, who
deliver his Commandements to the people, did exercise on Earth; there would not
have been so much contention, and warre, about who it is, by whom God speaketh
to us; neither would many Priests have troubled themselves with Spirituall
Jurisdiction, nor any King have denied it them.
Out of this literall interpretation of the Kingdome of God, ariseth also the
true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in Gods Kingdome
answereth to that, which men in their Kingdomes use to call Publique, or the
Kings.
The King of any Countrey is the Publique Person, or Representative of all his
own Subjects. And God the King of Israel was the Holy One of Israel. The Nation
which is subject to one earthly Soveraign, is the Nation of that Soveraign, that
is, of the Publique Person. So the Jews, who were Gods Nation, were called
(Exod. 19.6.) "a Holy Nation." For by Holy, is alwaies understood, either God
himselfe, or that which is Gods in propriety; as by Publique is alwaies meant,
either the Person of the Common-wealth it self, or something that is so the
Common-wealths, as no private person can claim any propriety therein.
Therefore the Sabbath (Gods day) is a Holy Day; the Temple, (Gods house) a
Holy House; Sacrifices, Tithes, and Offerings (Gods tribute) Holy Duties;
Priests, Prophets, and anointed Kings, under Christ (Gods ministers) Holy Men;
The Coelestiall ministring Spirits (Gods Messengers) Holy Angels; and the like:
and wheresoever the word Holy is taken properly, there is still something
signified of Propriety, gotten by consent. In saying "Hallowed be thy name," we
do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandement, of "having no other
Gods but Him." Mankind is Gods Nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a
Holy Nation. Why, but because they became his Propriety by covenant.
Sacred What
And the word Profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with
Common; and consequently their contraries, Holy, and Proper, in the Kingdome of
God must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also are called Holy,
that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designes, and
wholly devoted, and given themselves to God. In the proper sense, that which is
made Holy by Gods appropriating or separating it to his own use, is said to be
Sanctified by God, as the Seventh day in the fourth Commandement; and as the
Elect in the New Testament were said to bee Sanctified, when they were endued
with the Spirit of godlinesse. And that which is made Holy by the dedication of
men, and given to God, so as to be used onely in his publique service, is called
also SACRED, and said to be consecrated, as Temples, and other Houses of
Publique Prayer, and their Utensils, Priests, and Ministers, Victimes,
Offerings, and the externall matter of Sacraments.
Degrees of Sanctity
Of Holinesse there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for the
service of God, there may bee some set apart again, for a neerer and more
especial service. The whole Nation of the Israelites were a people Holy to God;
yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a Holy tribe; and amongst the
Levites, the Priests were yet more Holy; and amongst the Priests, the High
Priest was the most Holy. So the Land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the Holy
City wherein God was to be worshipped, was more Holy; and again, the Temples
more Holy than the City; and the Sanctum Sanctorum more Holy than the rest of
the Temple.
Sacrament
A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common use; and a
consecration of it to Gods service, for a sign, either of our admission into the
Kingdome of God, to be of the number of his peculiar people, or for a
Commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament, the sign of Admission was
Circumcision; in the New Testament, Baptisme. The Commemoration of it in the Old
Testament, was the Eating (at a certain time, which was Anniversary) of the
Paschall Lamb; by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were
delivered out of their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the
celebrating of the Lords Supper; by which, we are put in mind, of our
deliverance from the bondage of sin, by our Blessed Saviours death upon the
crosse. The Sacraments of Admission, are but once to be used, because there
needs but one Admission; but because we have need of being often put in mind of
our deliverance, and of our Allegeance, The Sacraments of Commemoration have
need to be reiterated. And these are the principall Sacraments, and as it were
the solemne oathes we make of our Alleageance. There be also other
Consecrations, that may be called Sacraments, as the word implyeth onely
Consecration to Gods service; but as it implies an oath, or promise of
Alleageance to God, there were no other in the Old Testament, but Circumcision,
and the Passover; nor are there any other in the New Testament, but Baptisme,
and the Lords Supper.
CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD, AND OF PROPHETS
Word What
When there is mention of the Word of God, or of Man, it doth not signifie a
part of Speech, such as Grammarians call a Nown, or a Verb, or any simple voice,
without a contexture with other words to make it significative; but a perfect
Speech or Discourse, whereby the speaker Affirmeth, Denieth, Commandeth,
Promiseth, Threateneth, Wisheth, or Interrogateth. In which sense it is not
Vocabulum, that signifies a Word; but Sermo, (in Greek Logos) that is some
Speech, Discourse, or Saying.
The Words Spoken By God And Concerning God, Both Are Called Gods Word
In Scripture
Again, if we say the Word of God, or of Man, it may bee understood sometimes
of the Speaker, (as the words that God hath spoken, or that a Man hath spoken):
In which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St. Matthew, we understand St.
Matthew to be the Writer of it: and sometimes of the Subject: In which sense,
when we read in the Bible, "The words of the days of the Kings of Israel, or
Judah," 'tis meant, that the acts that were done in those days, were the Subject
of those Words; And in the Greek, which (in the Scripture) retaineth many
Hebraismes, by the Word of God is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by
God, but concerning God, and his government; that is to say, the Doctrine of
Religion: Insomuch, as it is all one, to say Logos Theou, and Theologia; which
is, that Doctrine which wee usually call Divinity, as is manifest by the places
following (Acts 13.46.) "Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, It was
necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing
you put it from you, and judge your selves unworthy of everlasting life, loe, we
turn to the Gentiles." That which is here called the Word of god, was the
Doctrine of Christian Religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes
before. And (Acts 5.20.) where it is said to the Apostles by an Angel, "Go stand
and speak in the Temple, all the Words of this life;" by the Words of this life,
is meant, the Doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they did in the
Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same Chap. "Daily in the
Temple, and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Jesus:" In
which place it is manifest, that Jesus Christ was the subject of this Word of
Life; or (which is all one) the subject of the Words of this Life Eternall, that
our saviour offered them. So (Acts 15.7.) the Word of God, is called the Word of
the Gospel, because it containeth the Doctrine of the Kingdome of Christ; and
the same Word (Rom. 10.8,9.) is called the Word of Faith; that is, as is there
expressed, the Doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also (Mat. 13.
19.) "When any one heareth the Word of the Kingdome;" that is, the Doctrine of
the Kingdome taught by Christ. Again, the same Word, is said (Acts 12. 24.) "to
grow and to be multiplied;" which to understand of the Evangelicall Doctrine is
easie, but of the Voice, or Speech of God, hard and strange. In the same sense
the Doctrine of Devils, signifieth not the Words of any Devill, but the Doctrine
of Heathen men concerning Daemons, and those Phantasms which they worshipped as
Gods. (1 Tim. 4.1.)
Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is taken in
Scripture, it is manifest in this later sense (where it is taken for the
Doctrine of the Christian Religion,) that the whole scripture is the Word of
God: but in the former sense not so. For example, though these words, "I am the
Lord thy God, &c." to the end of the Ten Commandements, were spoken by God to
Moses; yet the Preface, "God spake these words and said," is to be understood
for the Words of him that wrote the holy History. The Word of God, as it is
taken for that which he hath spoken, is understood sometimes Properly, sometimes
Metaphorically. Properly, as the words, he hath spoken to his Prophets;
Metaphorically, for his Wisdome, Power, and eternall Decree, in making the
world; in which sense, those Fiats, "Let there be light," "Let there be a
firmament," "Let us make man," &c. (Gen. 1.) are the Word of God. And in the
same sense it is said (John 1.3.) "All things were made by it, and without it
was nothing made that was made; And (Heb. 1.3.) "He upholdeth all things by the
word of his Power;" that is, by the Power of his Word; that is, by his Power;
and (Heb. 11.3.) "The worlds were framed by the Word of God;" and many other
places to the same sense: As also amongst the Latines, the name of Fate, which
signifieth properly The Word Spoken, is taken in the same sense.
Secondly, For The Effect Of His Word
Secondly, for the effect of his Word; that is to say, for the thing it self,
which by his Word is Affirmed, Commanded, Threatned, or Promised; as (Psalm
105.19.) where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison, "till his Word was
come;" that is, till that was come to passe which he had (Gen. 40.13.) foretold
to Pharaohs Butler, concerning his being restored to his office: for there by
His Word Was Come, is meant, the thing it self was come to passe. So also (1
King. 18.36.) Elijah saith to God, "I have done all these thy Words," in stead
of "I have done all these things at thy Word," or commandement: and (Jer.
17.15.) "Where is the Word of the Lord," is put for, "Where is the Evill he
threatened:" And (Ezek. 12.28.) "There shall none of my Words be prolonged any
more:" by "Words" are understood those Things, which God promised to his people.
And in the New Testament (Mat. 24.35.) "heaven and earth shal pass away, but my
Words shall not pass away;" that is, there is nothing that I have promised or
foretold, that shall not come to passe. And in this sense it is, that St. John
the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John onely calleth our Saviour himself as in
the flesh "the Word of God (as Joh. 1.14.) the Word was made Flesh;" that is to
say, the Word, or Promise that Christ should come into the world, "who in the
beginning was with God;" that is to say, it was in the purpose of God the
Father, to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of
Eternall life, but it was not till then put in execution, and actually
incarnate; So that our Saviour is there called "the Word," not because he was
the promise, but the thing promised. They that taking occasion from this place,
doe commonly call him the Verbe of God, do but render the text more obscure.
They might as well term him the Nown of God: for as by Nown, so also by Verbe,
men understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither
affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance
corporeall, or spirituall; and therefore it cannot be said to bee either God, or
Man; whereas our Saviour is both. And this Word which St. John in his Gospel
saith was with God, is (in his 1 Epistle, verse 1.) called "the Word of Life;"
and (verse 2.) "The eternall life, which was with the Father:" so that he can be
in no other sense called the Word, then in that, wherein he is called Eternall
life; that is, "he that hath procured us Eternall life," by his comming in the
flesh. So also (Apocalypse 19.13.) the Apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a
garment dipt in bloud, saith; his name is "the Word of God;" which is to be
understood, as if he had said his name had been, "He that was come according to
the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his Word and promises
delivered by the Prophets." So that there is nothing here of the Incarnation of
a Word, but of the Incarnation of God the Son, therefore called the Word,
because his Incarnation was the Performance of the Promise; In like manner as
the Holy Ghost is called The Promise. (Acts 1.4. Luke 24.49.)
Thirdly, For The Words Of Reason And Equity
There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the Word of God, is
signified such Words as are consonant to reason, and equity, though spoken
sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was an
Idolator; yet his Words to the good King Josiah, in which he advised him by
Messengers, not to oppose him in his march against Carchemish, are said to have
proceeded from the mouth of God; and that Josiah not hearkning to them, was
slain in the battle; as is to be read 2 Chron. 35. vers. 21,22,23. It is true,
that as the same History is related in the first book of Esdras, not Pharaoh,
but Jeremiah spake these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord. But wee
are to give credit to the Canonicall Scripture, whatsoever be written in the
Apocrypha.
The Word of God, is then also to be taken for the Dictates of reason, and
equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to bee written in mans heart; as
Psalm 36.31. Jerem. 31.33. Deut.30.11, 14. and many other like places.
Divers Acceptions Of The Word Prophet
The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes Prolocutor; that is,
he that speaketh from God to Man, or from man to God: And sometimes Praedictor,
or a foreteller of things to come; And sometimes one that speaketh incoherently,
as men that are distracted. It is most frequently used in the sense of speaking
from God to the People. So Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others
were Prophets. And in this sense the High Priest was a Prophet, for he only went
into the Sanctum Sanctorum, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to
the people. And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one man
should die for the people, St. John saith (chap. 11.51.) that "He spake not this
of himselfe, but being High Priest that year, he prophesied that one man should
dye for the nation." Also they that in Christian Congregations taught the
people, (1 Cor. 14.3.) are said to Prophecy. In the like sense it is, that God
saith to Moses (Exod. 4.16.) concerning Aaron, "He shall be thy Spokes-man to
the People; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt be to him in stead
of God;" that which here is Spokesman, is (chap.7.1.) interpreted Prophet; "See
(saith God) I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother shall be
thy Prophet." In the sense of speaking from man to God, Abraham is called a
Prophet (Genes. 20.7.) where God in a Dream speaketh to Abimelech in this
manner, "Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a Prophet, and shall
pray for thee;" whereby may be also gathered, that the name of Prophet may be
given, not unproperly to them that in Christian Churches, have a Calling to say
publique prayers for the Congregation. In the same sense, the Prophets that came
down from the High place (or Hill of God) with a Psaltery, and a Tabret, and a
Pipe, and a Harp (1 Sam. 10.5,6.) and (vers. 10.) Saul amongst them, are said to
Prophecy, in that they praised God, in that manner publiquely. In the like
sense, is Miriam (Exod. 15.20.) called a Prophetesse. So is it also to be taken
(1 Cor. 11.4,5.) where St. Paul saith, "Every man that prayeth or prophecyeth
with his head covered, &c. and every woman that prayeth or prophecyeth with her
head uncovered: For Prophecy in that place, signifieth no more, but praising God
in Psalmes, and Holy Songs; which women might doe in the Church, though it were
not lawfull for them to speak to the Congregation. And in this signification it
is, that the Poets of the Heathen, that composed Hymnes and other sorts of Poems
in the honor of their Gods, were called Vates (Prophets) as is well enough known
by all that are versed in the Books of the Gentiles, and as is evident (Tit.
1.12.) where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a Prophet of their owne said,
they were Liars; not that St. Paul held their Poets for Prophets, but
acknowledgeth that the word Prophet was commonly used to signifie them that
celebrated the honour of God in Verse
Praediction Of Future Contingents, Not Alwaies Prophecy
When by Prophecy is meant Praediction, or foretelling of future Contingents;
not only they were Prophets, who were Gods Spokesmen, and foretold those things
to others, which God had foretold to them; but also all those Imposters, that
pretend by the helpe of familiar spirits, or by superstitious divination of
events past, from false causes, to foretell the like events in time to come: of
which (as I have declared already in the 12. chapter of this Discourse) there be
many kinds, who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men, a greater
reputation of Prophecy, by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their
purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings. Prophecy is not an
art, nor (when it is taken for Praediction) a constant Vocation; but an
extraordinary, and temporary Employment from God, most often of Good men, but
sometimes also of the Wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a
familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a Phantasme of Samuel, and foretold
Saul his death, was not therefore a Prophetesse; for neither had she any
science, whereby she could raise such a Phantasme; nor does it appear that God
commanded the raising of it; but onely guided that Imposture to be a means of
Sauls terror and discouragement; and by consequent, of the discomfiture, by
which he fell. And for Incoherent Speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for
one sort of Prophecy, because the Prophets of their Oracles, intoxicated with a
spirit, or vapour from the cave of the Pythian Oracle at Delphi, were for the
time really mad, and spake like mad-men; of whose loose words a sense might be
made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies are said to be made of
Materia prima. In the Scripture I find it also so taken (1 Sam. 18. 10.) in
these words, "And the Evill spirit came upon Saul, and he Prophecyed in the
midst of the house."
The Manner How God Hath Spoken To The Prophets
And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word
Prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to whom
God speaketh immediately, that which the Prophet is to say from him, to some
other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be asked, in what
manner God speaketh to such a Prophet. Can it (may some say) be properly said,
that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said, he hath a
tongue, or other organs, as a man? The Prophet David argueth thus, "Shall he
that made the eye, not see? or he that made the ear, not hear?" But this may be
spoken, not (as usually) to signifie Gods nature, but to signifie our intention
to honor him. For to See, and Hear, are Honorable Attributes, and may be given
to God, to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive) his Almighty power. But
if it were to be taken in the strict, and proper sense, one might argue from his
making of all parts of mans body, that he had also the same use of them which we
have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the greatest
contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are to interpret
Gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God
makes them understand his will: And the wayes whereby he doth this, are many;
and to be sought onely in the Holy Scripture: where though many times it be
said, that God spake to this, and that person, without declaring in what manner;
yet there be again many places, that deliver also the signes by which they were
to acknowledge his presence, and commandement; and by these may be understood,
how he spake to many of the rest.
To The Extraordinary Prophets Of The Old Testament He Spake
By Dreams, Or Visions
In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is not
expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of his own
countrey to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then (Gen. 12.7.) God is said to
have Appeared to him. So there is one way, whereby God made his presence
manifest; that is, by an Apparition, or Vision. And again, (Gen. 15.1.) The Word
of the Lord came to Abraham in a Vision; that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of
Gods presence, appeared as Gods Messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord
appeared to Abraham (Gen. 18. 1.) by an apparition of three Angels; and to
Abimelech (Gen. 20. 3.) in a dream: To Lot (Gen. 19. 1.) by an apparition of Two
Angels: And to Hagar (Gen. 21. 17.) by the apparition of one Angel: And to
Abraham again (Gen. 22. 11.) by the apparition of a voice from heaven: And (Gen.
26. 24.) to Isaac in the night; (that is, in his sleep, or by dream): And to
Jacob (Gen. 18. 12.) in a dream; that is to say (as are the words of the text)
"Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder, &c." And (Gen. 32. 1.) in a Vision of
Angels: And to Moses (Exod. 3.2.) in the apparition of a flame of fire out of
the midst of a bush: And after the time of Moses, (where the manner how God
spake immediately to man in the Old Testament, is expressed) hee spake alwaies
by a Vision, or by a Dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah,
Ezekiel, and the rest of the Prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to
Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the
Apocalypse.
Onely to Moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount Sinai, and
in the Tabernacle; and to the High Priest in the Tabernacle, and in the Sanctum
Sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the High Priests were Prophets
of a more eminent place, and degree in Gods favour; And God himself in express
words declareth, that to other Prophets hee spake in Dreams and Visions, but to
his servant Moses, in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are
these (Numb. 12. 6,7,8.) "If there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make
my self known to him in a Vision, and will speak unto him in a Dream. My servant
Moses is not so, who is faithfull in all my house; with him I will speak mouth
to mouth, even apparently, not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord
shall he behold." And (Exod. 33. 11.) "The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as
a man speaketh to his friend." And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by
mediation of an Angel, or Angels, as appears expressely, Acts 7. ver. 35. and
53. and Gal. 3. 19. and was therefore a Vision, though a more cleer Vision than
was given to other Prophets. And conformable hereunto, where God saith (Deut.
13. 1.) "If there arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer of Dreams," the later
word is but the interpretation of the former. And (Joel 2. 28.) "Your sons and
your daughters shall Prophecy; your old men shall dream Dreams, and your young
men shall see Visions:" where again, the word Prophecy is expounded by Dream,
and Vision. And in the same manner it was, that God spake to Solomon, promising
him Wisdome, Riches, and Honor; for the text saith, (1 Kings 3. 15.) "And
Solomon awoak, and behold it was a Dream:" So that generally the Prophets
extraordinary in the old Testament took notice of the Word of God no otherwise,
than from their Dreams, or Visions, that is to say, from the imaginations which
they had in their sleep, or in an Extasie; which imaginations in every true
Prophet were supernaturall; but in false Prophets were either naturall, or
feigned.
The same Prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the Spirit; as (Zach.
7. 12.) where the Prophet speaking of the Jewes, saith, "They made their hearths
hard as Adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of
Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former Prophets." By which it is manifest,
that speaking by the Spirit, or Inspiration, was not a particular manner of Gods
speaking, different from Vision, when they that were said to speak by the
Spirit, were extraordinary Prophets, such as for every new message, were to have
a particular Commission, or (which is all one) a new Dream, or Vision.
To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, And Supreme, God Spake In The Old
Testament From The Mercy Seat, In A Manner Not Expressed In The Scripture. Of
Prophets, that were so by a perpetuall Calling in the Old Testament, some were
Supreme, and some Subordinate: Supreme were first Moses; and after him the High
Priest, every one for his time, as long as the Priesthood was Royall; and after
the people of the Jews, had rejected God, that he should no more reign over
them, those Kings which submitted themselves to Gods government, were also his
chief Prophets; and the High Priests office became Ministeriall. And when God
was to be consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord,
as the King commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the King
thought fit. For King Saul (1 Sam. 13. 9.) commanded the burnt offering to be
brought, and (1 Sam. 14. 18.) he commands the Priest to bring the Ark neer him;
and (ver. 19.) again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage upon his
enemies. And in the same chapter Saul asketh counsell of God. In like manner
King David, after his being anointed, though before he had possession of the
Kingdome, is said to "enquire of the Lord" (1 Sam. 23. 2.) whether he should
fight against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse 10.) David commandeth the
Priest to bring him the Ephod, to enquire whether he should stay in Keilah, or
not. And King Solomon (1 Kings 2. 27.) took the Priesthood from Abiathar, and
gave it (verse 35.) to Zadoc. Therefore Moses, and the High Priests, and the
pious Kings, who enquired of God on all extraordinary occasions, how they were
to carry themselves, or what event they were to have, were all Soveraign
Prophets. But in what manner God spake unto them, is not manifest. To say that
when Moses went up to God in Mount Sinai, it was a Dream, or Vision, such as
other Prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between
Moses, and other Prophets, Numb. 12. 6,7,8. To say God spake or appeared as he
is in his own nature, is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility,
Incomprehensibility. To say he spake by Inspiration, or Infusion of the Holy
Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equall with
Christ, in whom onely the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh Col. 2.9.) dwelleth
bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it signifieth the
graces, or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him
supernaturall. For God disposeth men to Piety, Justice, Mercy, Truth, Faith, and
all manner of Vertue, both Morall, and Intellectuall, by doctrine, example, and
by severall occasions, naturall, and ordinary.
And as these ways cannot be applyed to God, in his speaking to Moses, at
Mount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his speaking to the High
Priests, from the Mercy-Seat. Therefore in what manner God spake to those
Soveraign Prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it was to enquire of him,
is not intelligible. In the time of the New Testament, there was no Soveraign
Prophet, but our Saviour; who was both God that spake, and the Prophet to whom
he spake.
To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, But Subordinate, God Spake By The Spirit.
To subordinate Prophets of perpetuall Calling, I find not any place that proveth
God spake to them supernaturally; but onely in such manner, as naturally he
inclineth men to Piety, to Beleef, to Righteousnesse, and to other vertues all
other Christian Men. Which way, though it consist in Constitution, Instruction,
Education, and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian vertues; yet
it is truly attributed to the operation of the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit
(which we in our language call the Holy Ghost): For there is no good
inclination, that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not
alwaies supernaturall. When therefore a Prophet is said to speak in the Spirit,
or by the Spirit of God, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks
according to Gods will, declared by the supreme Prophet. For the most common
acceptation of the word Spirit, is in the signification of a mans intention,
mind, or disposition.
In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that Prophecyed
in the Campe of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to them, is declared in
the 11 of Numbers, verse 25. "The Lord came down in a cloud, and spake unto
Moses, and took of the Spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy
Elders. And it came to passe, when the Spirit rested upon them, they Prophecyed,
and did not cease," By which it is manifest, first, that their Prophecying to
the people, was subservient, and subordinate to the Prophecying of Moses; for
that God took of the Spirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they Prophecyed
as Moses would have them: otherwise they had not been suffered to Prophecy at
all. For there was (verse 27.) a complaint made against them to Moses; and
Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but said to
Joshua, Bee not jealous in my behalf. Secondly, that the Spirit of God in that
place, signifieth nothing but the Mind and Disposition to obey, and assist Moses
in the administration of the Government. For if it were meant they had the
substantial Spirit of God; that is, the Divine nature, inspired into them, then
they had it in no lesse manner than Christ himself, in whom onely the Spirit of
God dwelt bodily. It is meant therefore of the Gift and Grace of God, that
guided them to co-operate with Moses; from whom their Spirit was derived. And it
appeareth (verse 16.) that, they were such as Moses himself should appoint for
Elders and Officers of the People: For the words are, "Gather unto me seventy
men, whom thou knowest to be Elders and Officers of the people:" where, "thou
knowest," is the same with "thou appointest," or "hast appointed to be such."
For we are told before (Exod. 18.) that Moses following the counsell of Jethro
his Father-in-law, did appoint Judges, and Officers over the people, such as
feared God; and of these, were those Seventy, whom God by putting upon them
Moses spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the Kingdome: and
in this sense the Spirit of God is said (1 Sam. 16. 13, 14.) presently upon the
anointing of David, to have come upon David, and left Saul; God giving his
graces to him he chose to govern his people, and taking them away from him, he
rejected. So that by the Spirit is meant Inclination to Gods service; and not
any supernaturall Revelation.
God Sometimes Also Spake By Lots
God spake also many times by the event of Lots; which were ordered by such as
he had put in Authority over his people. So wee read that God manifested by the
Lots which Saul caused to be drawn (1 Sam. 14. 43.) the fault that Jonathan had
committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the oath taken by the people. And
(Josh. 18. 10.) God divided the land of Canaan amongst the Israelite, by the
"lots that Joshua did cast before the Lord in Shiloh." In the same manner it
seemeth to be, that God discovered (Joshua 7.16., &c.) the crime of Achan. And
these are the wayes whereby God declared his Will in the Old Testament.
All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary, by a
Vision of an Angel: To Joseph in a Dream: again to Paul in the way to Damascus
in a Vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the Vision of a sheet let down from
heaven, with divers sorts of flesh, of clean and unclean, beasts; and in prison,
by Vision of an Angel: And to all the Apostles, and Writers of the New
Testament, by the graces of his Spirit; and to the Apostles again (at the
choosing of Matthias in the place of Judas Iscariot) by lot.
Every Man Ought To Examine The Probability Of A Pretended Prophets
Calling
Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream, (which two, when they be
naturall, are the same,) or some especiall gift of God, so rarely observed in
mankind, as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well such gifts, as the
most extraordinary Dreams, and Visions, may proceed from God, not onely by his
supernaturall, and immediate, but also by his naturall operation, and by
mediation of second causes; there is need of Reason and Judgement to discern
between naturall, and supernaturall Gifts, and between naturall, and
supernaturall Visions, or Dreams. And consequently men had need to be very
circumspect, and wary, in obeying the voice of man, that pretending himself to
be a Prophet, requires us to obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth
us to be the way to happinesse. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so
great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over
them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy
to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and consequently, ought to be
examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience; unlesse he
have yeelded it them already, in the institution of a Common-wealth; as when the
Prophet is the Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized. And if
this examination of Prophets, and Spirits, were not allowed to every one of the
people, it had been to no purpose, to set out the marks, by which every man
might be able, to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom
they ought not to follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out (Deut. 13.
1,&c.) to know a Prophet by; and (1 John 4.1.&C) to know a Spirit by: and seeing
there is so much Prophecying in the Old Testament; and so much Preaching in the
New Testament against Prophets; and so much greater a number ordinarily of false
Prophets, then of true; every one is to beware of obeying their directions, at
their own perill. And first, that there were many more false than true Prophets,
appears by this, that when Ahab (1 Kings 12.) consulted four hundred Prophets,
they were all false Imposters, but onely one Michaiah. And a little before the
time of the Captivity, the Prophets were generally lyars. "The Prophets" (saith
the Lord by Jerem. cha. 14. verse 14.) "prophecy Lies in my name. I sent them
not, neither have I commanded them, nor spake unto them, they prophecy to you a
false Vision, a thing of naught; and the deceit of their heart." In so much as
God commanded the People by the mouth of the Prophet Jeremiah (chap. 23. 16.)
not to obey them. "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of
the Prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they speak a Vision of
their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord."
All Prophecy But Of The Soveraign Prophet Is To Be Examined
By Every Subject
Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrells
amongst the Visionary Prophets, one contesting with another, and asking When
departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee? as between Michaiah, and the rest of
the four hundred; and such giving of the Lye to one another, (as in Jerem.
14.14.) and such controversies in the New Testament at this day, amongst the
Spirituall Prophets: Every man then was, and now is bound to make use of his
Naturall Reason, to apply to all Prophecy those Rules which God hath given us,
to discern the true from the false. Of which rules, in the Old Testament, one
was, conformable doctrine to that which Moses the Soveraign Prophet had taught
them; and the other the miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to
passe, as I have already shown out of Deut. 13. 1. &c. and in the New Testament
there was but one onely mark; and that was the preaching of this Doctrine, That
Jesus Is The Christ, that is, the King of the Jews, promised in the Old
Testament. Whosoever denyed that Article, he was a false Prophet, whatsoever
miracles he might seem to work; and he that taught it was a true Prophet. For
St. John (1 Epist, 4. 2, &c) speaking expressely of the means to examine
Spirits, whether they be of God, or not; after he hath told them that there
would arise false Prophets, saith thus, "Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every
Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God;" that
is, is approved and allowed as a Prophet of God: not that he is a godly man, or
one of the Elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus
to be the Christ; but for that he is a Prophet avowed. For God sometimes
speaketh by Prophets, whose persons he hath not accepted; as he did by Baalam;
and as he foretold Saul of his death, by the Witch of Endor. Again in the next
verse, "Every Spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh,
is not of Christ. And this is the Spirit of Antichrist." So that the rule is
perfect on both sides; that he is a true Prophet, which preacheth the Messiah
already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denyeth him come,
and looketh for him in some future Imposter, that shall take upon him that
honour falsely, whom the Apostle there properly calleth Antichrist. Every man
therefore ought to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet; that is to say, who it
is, that is Gods Viceregent on earth; and hath next under God, the Authority of
Governing Christian men; and to observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which in the
name of God, hee commanded to bee taught; and thereby to examine and try out the
truth of those Doctrines, which pretended Prophets with miracles, or without,
shall at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that Rule, to doe as
they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there were some that
Prophecyed in the Campe, whose Authority so to doe they doubted of; and leave to
the Soveraign, as they did to Moses to uphold, or to forbid them, as hee should
see cause; and if hee disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he
approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a part of the
Spirit of their Soveraigne. For when Christian men, take not their Christian
Soveraign, for Gods Prophet; they must either take their owne Dreams, for the
prophecy they mean to bee governed by, and the tumour of their own hearts for
the Spirit of God; or they must suffer themselves to bee lead by some strange
Prince; or by some of their fellow subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander
of the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their
calling, then sometimes an extraordinary successe, and Impunity; and by this
means destroying all laws, both divine, and humane, reduce all Order,
Government, and Society, to the first Chaos of Violence, and Civill warre.
CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND THEIR USE
A Miracle Is A Work That Causeth Admiration
By Miracles are signified the Admirable works of God: & therefore they are
also called Wonders. And because they are for the most part, done, for a
signification of his commandement, in such occasions, as without them, men are
apt to doubt, (following their private naturall reasoning,) what he hath
commanded, and what not, they are commonly in Holy Scripture, called Signes, in
the same sense, as they are called by the Latines, Ostenta, and Portenta, from
shewing, and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to
passe.
And Must Therefore Be Rare, Whereof There Is No Naturall Cause Known
To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand what
works they are, which men wonder at, and call Admirable. And there be but two
things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it be strange, that is
to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been produced: The
other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by
naturall means, but onely by the immediate hand of God. But when wee see some
possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely soever the like has been done; or if
the like have been often done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall
means thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle.
Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it were a Miracle; because both
the thing is strange, & the Naturall cause difficult to imagin: So also were it,
to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production of some new shape of a
living creature. But when a man, or other Animal, engenders his like, though we
know no more how this is done, than the other; yet because 'tis usuall, it is no
Miracle. In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed into a stone, or into a
pillar, it is a Miracle; because strange: but if a peece of wood be so changed;
because we see it often, it is no Miracle: and yet we know no more, by what
operation of God, the one is brought to passe, than the other.
The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because the
first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed in
heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more an universall destruction
of the world by Water. But at this day, because they are frequent, they are not
Miracles, neither to them that know their naturall causes, nor to them who know
them not. Again, there be many rare works produced by the Art of man: yet when
we know they are done; because thereby wee know also the means how they are
done, we count them not for Miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand
of God, but by mediation of humane Industry.
That Which Seemeth A Miracle To One Man, May Seem Otherwise To Another
Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to the knowledge and
experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some lesse; it followeth, that
the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and not to another. And thence it is,
that ignorant, and superstitious men make great Wonders of those works, which
other men, knowing to proceed from Nature, (which is not the immediate, but the
ordinary work of God,) admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of the Sun and Moon
have been taken for supernaturall works, by the common people; when
neverthelesse, there were others, could from their naturall causes, have
foretold the very hour they should arrive: Or, as when a man, by confederacy,
and secret intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an
ignorant, unwary man, thereby tells him, what he has done in former time; it
seems to him a Miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such
Miracles as those, cannot easily be done.
The End Of Miracles
Again, it belongeth to the nature of a Miracle, that it be wrought for the
procuring of credit to Gods Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets, that thereby
men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the
better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the creation of the world,
and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universall deluge,
were admirable works; yet because they were not done to procure credit to any
Prophet, or other Minister of God, they use not to be called Miracles. For how
admirable soever any work be, the Admiration consisteth not in that it could be
done, because men naturally beleeve the Almighty can doe all things, but because
he does it at the Prayer, or Word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt, by
the hand of Moses, were properly Miracles; because they were done with intention
to make the people of Israel beleeve, that Moses came unto them, not out of any
design of his owne interest, but as sent from God. Therefore after God had
commanded him to deliver the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage, when he said
(Exod 4.1. &c.) "They will not beleeve me, but will say, the Lord hath not
appeared unto me," God gave him power, to turn the Rod he had in his hand into a
Serpent, and again to return it into a Rod; and by putting his hand into his
bosome, to make it leprous; and again by pulling it out to make it whole, to
make the Children of Israel beleeve (as it is verse 5.) that the God of their
Fathers had appeared unto him; And if that were not enough, he gave him power to
turn their waters into bloud. And when hee had done these Miracles before the
people, it is said (verse 41.) that "they beleeved him." Neverthelesse, for fear
of Pharaoh, they durst not yet obey him. Therefore the other works which were
done to plague Pharaoh and the Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites
beleeve in Moses, and were properly Miracles. In like manner if we consider all
the Miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the Prophets, till
the Captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his Apostles afterward; we shall
find, their end was alwaies to beget, or confirm beleefe, that they came not of
their own motion, but were sent by God. Wee may further observe in Scripture,
that the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef, not universally in all men,
elect, and reprobate; but in the elect only; that is to say, is such as God had
determined should become his Subjects. For those miraculous plagues of Egypt,
had not for end, the conversion of Pharaoh; For God had told Moses before, that
he would harden the heart of Pharaoh, that he should not let the people goe: And
when he let them goe at last, not the Miracles perswaded him, but the plagues
forced him to it. So also of our Saviour, it is written, (Mat. 13. 58.) that he
wrought not many Miracles in his own countrey, because of their unbeleef; and
(in Marke 6.5.) in stead of, "he wrought not many," it is, "he could work none."
It was not because he wanted power; which to say, were blasphemy against God;
nor that the end of Miracles was not to convert incredulous men to Christ; for
the end of all the Miracles of Moses, of Prophets, of our Saviour, and of his
Apostles was to adde men to the Church; but it was, because the end of their
Miracles, was to adde to the Church (not all men, but) such as should be saved;
that is to say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore our Saviour sent from
his Father, hee could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom his
Father had rejected. They that expounding this place of St. Marke, say, that his
word, "Hee could not," is put for, "He would not," do it without example in the
Greek tongue, (where Would Not, is put sometimes for Could Not, in things
inanimate, that have no will; but Could Not, for Would Not, never,) and thereby
lay a stumbling block before weak Christians; as if Christ could doe no
Miracles, but amongst the credulous.
The Definition Of A Miracle
From that which I have here set down, of the nature, and use of a Miracle, we
may define it thus, "A MIRACLE, is a work of God, (besides his operation by the
way of Nature, ordained in the Creation,) done for the making manifest to his
elect, the mission of an extraordinary Minister for their salvation."
And from this definition, we may inferre; First, that in all Miracles, the
work done, is not the effect of any vertue in the Prophet; because it is the
effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God hath done it, without
using the Prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.
Secondly, that no Devil, Angel, or other created Spirit, can do a Miracle.
For it must either be by vertue of some naturall science, or by Incantation,
that is, vertue of words. For if the Inchanters do it by their own power
independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from God; which all men
deny: and if they doe it by power given them, then is the work not from the
immediate hand of God, but naturall, and consequently no Miracle.
There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of working
wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles, wrought by God himself,) to
certain Arts of Magick, and Incantation. As for example, when we read that after
the Rod of Moses being cast on the ground became a Serpent, (Exod. 7. 11.) "the
Magicians of Egypt did the like by their Enchantments;" and that after Moses had
turned the waters of the Egyptian Streams, Rivers, Ponds, and Pooles of water
into blood, (Exod. 7. 22.) "the Magicians of Egypt did so likewise, with their
Enchantments;" and that after Moses had by the power of God brought frogs upon
the land, (Exod. 8. 7.) "the Magicians also did so with their Enchantments, and
brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt;" will not a man be apt to attribute
Miracles to Enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of the sound of Words;
and think the same very well proved out of this, and other such places? and yet
there is no place of Scripture, that telleth us what on Enchantment is. If
therefore Enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of strange effects by
spells, and words; but Imposture, and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and
so far from supernaturall, as the Impostors need not the study so much as of
naturall causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of
mankind, to doe them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of Magick,
Witchcraft, and Enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first sight
they seem to bear.
That Men Are Apt To Be Deceived By False Miracles
For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those that
understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the intentions, or
passions of them that speak; and thereby produce, hope, fear, or other passions,
or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a Rod seemeth a Serpent, or the
Water Bloud, or any other Miracle seemeth done by Enchantment; if it be not to
the edification of Gods people, not the Rod, nor the Water, nor any other thing
is enchanted; that is to say, wrought upon by the Words, but the Spectator. So
that all the Miracle consisteth in this, that the Enchanter has deceived a man;
which is no Miracle, but a very easie matter to doe.
For such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men, but
especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes, and of the
nature, and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused.
What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a Science of the
course of the Stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people,
This hour, or day the Sun should be darkned? A juggler by the handling of his
goblets, and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be
thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the Devil. A man that hath
practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in antient
time were called Ventriloqui,) and so make the weaknesse of his voice seem to
proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of Speech, but from distance
of place, is able to make very many men beleeve it is a voice from Heaven,
whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into
the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another
of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter;
and yet there be many, that by such means as that, obtain the reputation of
being Conjurers. But it is too long a businesse, to reckon up the severall sorts
of those men, which the Greeks called Thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of
things wonderfull; and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity.
But if we looke upon the Impostures wrought by Confederacy, there is nothing how
impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to bee beleeved. For two men
conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charme, will deceive
many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the
rest to bear witnesse; will deceive many more.
Cautions Against The Imposture Of Miracles
In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended Miracles,
there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than that which God hath
prescribed, first by Moses, (as I have said before in the precedent chapter,) in
the beginning of the 13. and end of the 18. of Deuteronomy; That wee take not
any for Prophets, that teach any other Religion, then that which Gods
Lieutenant, (which at that time was Moses,) hath established; nor any, (though
he teach the same Religion,) whose Praediction we doe not see come to passe.
Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron, and his successors in their times, and
the Soveraign Governour of Gods people, next under God himself, that is to say,
the Head of the Church in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he hath
established, before wee give credit to a pretended Miracle, or Prophet. And when
that is done, the thing they pretend to be a Miracle, we must both see it done,
and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not onely
so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his naturall power, but
that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have
recourse to Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull cases, wee have submitted
our private judgments. For Example; if a man pretend, that after certain words
spoken over a peece of bread, that presently God hath made it not bread, but a
God, or a man, or both, and neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever
it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done; nor consequently
to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his Vicar, or Lieutenant, whether it be
done, or not. If he say not, then followeth that which Moses saith, (Deut. 18.
22.) "he hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him." If he say 'tis
done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if wee see not, but onely hear
tell of a Miracle, we are to consult the Lawful Church; that is to say, the
lawful Head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And
this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian
Soveraigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such
wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man
endued but with a mediocrity of reason, would think supernaturall: and the
question is no more, whether what wee see done, be a Miracle; whether the
Miracle we hear, or read of, were a reall work, and not the Act of a tongue, or
pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lye. In which question
we are not every one, to make our own private Reason, or Conscience, but the
Publique Reason, that is, the reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and
indeed we have made him Judge already, if wee have given him a Soveraign power,
to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence. A private man has
alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in
his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he
shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or
countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But
when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the
Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of God,
and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place thereafter.
CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE,
HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND REDEMPTION
The maintenance of Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on the
power of Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments, residing in
them that have the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth; It is impossible a
Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power of
giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments than
Death. Now seeing Eternall Life is a greater reward, than the Life Present; and
Eternall Torment a greater punishment than the Death of Nature; It is a thing
worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire (by obeying Authority) to
avoid the calamities of Confusion, and Civill war, what is meant in Holy
Scripture, by Life Eternall, and Torment Eternall; and for what offences,
against whom committed, men are to be Eternally Tormented; and for what actions,
they are to obtain Eternall Life.
Place Of Adams Eternity If He Had Not Sinned, The Terrestrial Paradise
And first we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had
he not broken the commandement of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden
Everlastingly. For there was the Tree of Life; whereof he was so long allowed to
eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of Knowledge of Good an Evill;
which was not allowed him. And therefore as soon as he had eaten of it, God
thrust him out of Paradise, "lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of
the tree of life, and live for ever." (Gen. 3. 22.) By which it seemeth to me,
(with submission neverthelesse both in this, and in all questions, whereof the
determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible
authorized by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am,) that Adam if he had not
sinned, had had an Eternall Life on Earth: and that Mortality entred upon
himself, and his posterity, by his first Sin. Not that actuall Death then
entred; for Adam then could never have had children; whereas he lived long
after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he dyed. But where it is said, "In the
day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," it must needs bee meant of
his Mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then Eternall life was lost by
Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancell that forfeiture was
to recover thereby, that Life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for the
sins of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers, that
ETERNALL LIFE, which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in this sense it is, that
the comparison of St. Paul holdeth (Rom. 5.18, 19.) "As by the offence of one,
Judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousnesse of
one, the free gift came upon all men to Justification of Life." Which is again
(1 Cor. 15.21,22) more perspicuously delivered in these words, "For since by man
came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all
die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."
Texts Concerning The Place Of Life Eternall For Beleevers
Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall Life, which Christ
hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged seem to make it on Earth.
For if as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise, and Eternall Life
on Earth; even so in Christ all shall be made alive; then all men shall be made
to live on Earth; for else the comparison were not proper. Hereunto seemeth to
agree that of the Psalmist, (Psal. 133.3.) "Upon Zion God commanded the
blessing, even Life for evermore;" for Zion, is in Jerusalem, upon Earth: as
also that of S. Joh. (Rev. 2.7.) "To him that overcommeth I will give to eat of
the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God." This was the
tree of Adams Eternall life; but his life was to have been on Earth. The same
seemeth to be confirmed again by St. Joh. (Rev. 21.2.) where he saith, "I John
saw the Holy City, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared
as a Bride adorned for her husband:" and again v. 10. to the same effect: As if
he should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again of
Christ, should come down to Gods people from Heaven, and not they goe up to it
from Earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in white
clothing (that is, the two Angels) said to the Apostles, that were looking upon
Christ ascending (Acts 1.11.) "This same Jesus, who is taken up from you into
Heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into Heaven." Which soundeth
as if they had said, he should come down to govern them under his Father,
Eternally here; and not take them up to govern them in Heaven; and is
conformable to the Restauration of the Kingdom of God, instituted under Moses;
which was a Political government of the Jews on Earth. Again, that saying of our
Saviour (Mat. 22.30.) "that in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are
given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven," is a description of
an Eternall Life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of
Marriage. For seeing Adam, and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on Earth
Eternally, in their individuall persons; it is manifest, they should not
continually have procreated their kind. For if Immortals should have generated,
as Mankind doth now; the Earth in a small time, would not have been able to
afford them a place to stand on. The Jews that asked our Saviour the question,
whose wife the woman that had married many brothers, should be, in the
resurrection, knew not what were the consequences of Immortality; that there
shal be no Generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is
Marriage, or generation among the Angels. The comparison between that Eternall
life which Adam lost, and our Saviour by his Victory over death hath recovered;
holdeth also in this, that as Adam lost Eternall Life by his sin, and yet lived
after it for a time; so the faithful Christian hath recovered Eternal Life by
Christs passion, though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time;
namely, till the Resurrection. For as Death is reckoned from the Condemnation of
Adam, not from the Execution; so life is reckoned from the Absolution, not from
the Resurrection of them that are elected in Christ.
Ascension Into Heaven
That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the Resurrection, is
the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts of the world, which are the most
remote from Earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in another Higher
Heaven, called Caelum Empyreum, (whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor
ground in Reason) is not easily to be drawn from any text that I can find. By
the Kingdome of Heaven, is meant the Kingdome of the King that dwelleth in
Heaven; and his Kingdome was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the Prophets
his Lieutenants, first Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the Soveraign Priests,
till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortall man for their
King, after the manner of other Nations. And when our Saviour Christ, by the
preaching of his Ministers, shall have perswaded the Jews to return, and called
the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new Kingdome of Heaven,
because our King shall then be God, whose Throne is Heaven; without any
necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happinesse any
higher than Gods Footstool the Earth. On the contrary, we find written (Joh.
3.13.) that "no man hath ascended into Heaven, but he that came down from
Heaven, even the Son of man, that is in Heaven." Where I observe by the way,
that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the words of our
Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not in Heaven, but upon
the Earth. The like is said of David (Acts 2.34.) where St. Peter, to prove the
Ascension of Christ, using the words of the Psalmist, (Psal. 16.10.) "Thou wilt
not leave my soule in Hell, nor suffer thine Holy one to see corruption," saith,
they were spoken (not of David, but) of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this
Reason, "For David is not ascended into Heaven." But to this a man may easily
answer, and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the generall
day of Judgment, yet their souls were in Heaven as soon as they were departed
from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our
Saviour (Luke 20.37,38.) who proving the Resurrection out of the word of Moses,
saith thus, "That the dead are raised, even Moses shewed, at the bush, when he
calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of
Jacob. For he is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living; for they all live to
him." But if these words be to be understood only of the Immortality of the
Soul, they prove not at all that which our Saviour intended to prove, which was
the Resurrection of the Body, that is to say, the Immortality of the Man.
Therefore our Saviour meaneth, that those Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a
property consequent to the essence, and nature of mankind, but by the will of
God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow Eternall Life upon the
faithfull. And though at that time the Patriarchs and many other faithfull men
were Dead, yet as it is in the text, they Lived To God; that is, they were
written in the Book of Life with them that were absolved of their sinnes, and
ordained to Life eternall at the Resurrection. That the Soul of man is in its
own nature Eternall, and a living Creature independent on the Body; or that any
meer man is Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection in the last day,
(except Enos and Elias,) is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole 14.
Chapter of Job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himselfe, is a
complaint of this Mortality of Nature; and yet no contradiction of the
Immortality at the Resurrection. "There is hope of a tree," (saith hee verse 7.)
"if it be cast down, Though the root thereof wax old, and the stock thereof die
in the ground, yet when it scenteth the water it will bud, and bring forth
boughes like a Plant. But man dyeth, and wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the
Ghost, and where is he?" and (verse 12.) "man lyeth down, and riseth not, till
the heavens be no more." But when is it, that the heavens shall be no more? St.
Peter tells us, that it is at the generall Resurrection. For in his 2. Epistle,
3. Chapter, and 7. verse, he saith, that "the Heavens and the Earth that are
now, are reserved unto fire against the day of Judgment, and perdition of
ungodly men," and (verse 12.) "looking for, and hasting to the comming of God,
wherein the Heavens shall be on fire, and shall be dissolved, and the Elements
shall melt with fervent heat. Neverthelesse, we according to the promise look
for new Heavens, and a new Earth, wherein dwelleth righteousnesse." Therefore
where Job saith, man riseth not till the Heavens be no more; it is all one, as
if he had said, the Immortall Life (and Soule and Life in the Scripture, do
usually signifie the same thing) beginneth not in man, till the Resurrection,
and day of Judgment; and hath for cause, not his specificall nature, and
generation; but the Promise. For St. Peter saies not, "Wee look for new heavens,
and a new earth, (from Nature) but from Promise."
Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of
Scripture, in the 35. chapter of this book, that the Kingdom of God is a Civil
Common-wealth, where God himself is Soveraign, by vertue first of the Old, and
since of the New Covenant, wherein he reigneth by his Vicar, or Lieutenant; the
same places do therefore also prove, that after the comming again of our Saviour
in his Majesty, and glory, to reign actually, and Eternally; the Kingdom of God
is to be on Earth. But because this doctrine (though proved out of places of
Scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but
propound it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of Religion; but
attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority, (not
yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee
approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech, and writing,
(whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must by all men, that mean to be
protected by their Laws, be obeyed. For the points of doctrine concerning the
Kingdome (of) God, have so great influence on the Kingdome of Man, as not to be
determined, but by them, that under God have the Soveraign Power.
The Place After Judgment, Of Those Who Were Never In The Kingdome
Of God, Or Having Been In, Are Cast Out
As the Kingdome of God, and Eternall Life, so also Gods Enemies, and their
Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture, to have their place on Earth.
The name of the place, where all men remain till the Resurrection, that were
either buryed, or swallowed up of the Earth, is usually called in Scripture, by
words that signifie Under Ground; which the Latines read generally Infernus, and
Inferni, and the Greeks Hades; that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and
containeth as well the Grave, as any other deeper place. But for the place of
the damned after the Resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old, nor
New Testament, by any note of situation; but onely by the company: as that it
shall bee, where such wicked men were, as God in former times in extraordinary,
and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the Earth: As for
Example, that they are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in the bottomelesse pit;
because Corah, Dathan, and Abirom, were swallowed up alive into the earth. Not
that the Writers of the Scripture would have us beleeve, there could be in the
globe of the Earth, which is not only finite, but also (compared to the height
of the Stars) of no considerable magnitude, a pit without a bottome; that is, a
hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in their Daemonologie (that is to
say, in their doctrine concerning Daemons,) and after them, the Romans called
Tartarus; of which Virgill sayes,
Bis patet in praeceps, tantem tenditque sub umbras,
Quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus Olympum:
for that is a thing the proportion of Earth to Heaven cannot bear: but that
wee should beleeve them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on whom God
inflicted that Exemplary punnishment.
The Congregation Of Giants
Again, because those mighty men of the Earth, that lived in the time of Noah,
before the floud, (which the Greeks called Heroes, and the Scripture Giants, and
both say, were begotten, by copulation of the children of God, with the children
of men,) were for their wicked life destroyed by the generall deluge; the place
of the Damned, is therefore also sometimes marked out, by the company of those
deceased Giants; as Proverbs 21.16. "The man that wandreth out of the way of
understanding, shall remain in the congregation of the Giants," and Job 26.5.
"Behold the Giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them." Here the
place of the Damned, is under the water. And Isaiah 14.9. "Hell is troubled how
to meet thee," (that is, the King of Babylon) "and will displace the Giants for
thee:" and here again the place of the Damned, (if the sense be literall,) is to
be under water.
Lake Of Fire
Thirdly, because the Cities of Sodom, and Gomorrah, by the extraordinary
wrath of God, were consumed for their wickednesse with Fire and Brimstone, and
together with them the countrey about made a stinking bituminous Lake; the place
of the Damned is sometimes expressed by Fire, and a Fiery Lake: as in the
Apocalypse ch.21.8. "But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and
Murderers, and Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and Idolators, and all Lyars, shall
have their part in the Lake that burneth with Fire, and Brimstone; which is the
second Death." So that it is manifest, that Hell Fire, which is here expressed
by Metaphor, from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any certain kind, or
place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for Destruction, as it is in
the 20. Chapter, at the 14. verse; where it is said, that "Death and Hell were
cast into the Lake of Fire;" that is to say, were abolished, and destroyed; as
if after the day of Judgment, there shall be no more Dying, nor no more going
into Hell; that is, no more going to Hades (from which word perhaps our word
Hell is derived,) which is the same with no more Dying.
Utter Darknesse
Fourthly, from the Plague of Darknesse inflicted on the Egyptians, of which
it is written (Exod. 10.23.) "They saw not one another, neither rose any man
from his place for three days; but all the Children of Israel had light in their
dwellings;" the place of the wicked after Judgment, is called Utter Darknesse,
or (as it is in the originall) Darknesse Without. And so it is expressed (Mat.
22.13.) where the King commandeth his Servants, "to bind hand and foot the man
that had not on his Wedding garment, and to cast him out," Eis To Skotos To
Exoteron, Externall Darknesse, or Darknesse Without: which though translated
Utter Darknesse, does not signifie How Great, but Where that darknesse is to be;
namely, Without The Habitation of Gods Elect.
Gehenna, And Tophet
Lastly, whereas there was a place neer Jerusalem, called the Valley of the
Children of Hinnon; in a part whereof, called Tophet, the Jews had committed
most grievous Idolatry, sacrificing their children to the Idol Moloch; and
wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments; and
wherein Josias had burnt the Priests of Moloch upon their own Altars, as
appeareth at large in the 2 of Kings chap. 23. the place served afterwards, to
receive the filth, and garbage which was carried thither, out of the City; and
there used to be fires made, from time to time, to purifie the aire, and take
away the stench of Carrion. From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after
to call the place of the Damned, by the name of Gehenna, or Valley of Hinnon.
And this Gehenna, is that word, which is usually now translated HELL; and from
the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of Everlasting,
and Unquenchable Fire.
Of The Literall Sense Of The Scripture Concerning Hell
Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that after the
day of Judgment, the wicked are all Eternally to be punished in the Valley of
Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after under ground, or
under water; or that after the Resurrection, they shall no more see one another;
nor stir from one place to another; it followeth, me thinks, very necessarily,
that that which is thus said concerning Hell Fire, is spoken metaphorically; and
that therefore there is a proper sense to bee enquired after, (for of all
Metaphors there is some reall ground, that may be expressed in proper words)
both of the Place of Hell, and the nature of Hellish Torment, and Tormenters.
Satan, Devill, Not Proper Names, But Appellatives
And first for the Tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties, exactly
and properly delivered by the names of, The Enemy, or Satan; The Accuser, or
Diabolus; The Destroyer, or Abbadon. Which significant names, Satan, Devill,
Abbadon, set not forth to us any Individuall person, as proper names use to doe;
but onely an office, or quality; and are therefore Appellatives; which ought not
to have been left untranslated, as they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles;
because thereby they seem to be the proper names of Daemons; and men are the
more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of Devills; which at that time was
the Religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses, and of Christ.
And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer, is meant, the Enemy of
them that shall be in the Kingdome of God; therefore if the Kingdome of God
after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth, (as in the former Chapter I have
shewn by Scripture it seems to be,) The Enemy, and his Kingdome must be on Earth
also. For so also was it, in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For Gods
Kingdome was in Palestine; and the Nations round about, were the Kingdomes of
the Enemy; and consequently by Satan, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.
Torments Of Hell
The Torments of Hell, are expressed sometimes, by "weeping, and gnashing of
teeth," as Mat. 8.12. Sometimes, by "the worm of Conscience;" as Isa.66.24. and
Mark 9.44, 46, 48; sometimes, by Fire, as in the place now quoted, "where the
worm dyeth not, and the fire is not quenched," and many places beside: sometimes
by "Shame, and contempt," as Dan. 12.2. "And many of them that sleep in the dust
of the Earth, shall awake; some to Everlasting life; and some to shame, and
everlasting contempt." All which places design metaphorically a grief, and
discontent of mind, from the sight of that Eternall felicity in others, which
they themselves through their own incredulity, and disobedience have lost. And
because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their
own actuall miseries; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily paines,
and calamities, as are incident to those, who not onely live under evill and
cruell Governours, but have also for Enemy, the Eternall King of the Saints, God
Almighty. And amongst these bodily paines, is to be reckoned also to every one
of the wicked a second Death. For though the Scripture bee clear for an
universall Resurrection; yet wee do not read, that to any of the Reprobate is
promised an Eternall life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15.42, 43.) to the
question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith, that "the body
is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; It is sown in dishonour,
it is raised in glory; it is sown in weaknesse, it is raised in power;" Glory
and Power cannot be applyed to the bodies of the wicked: Nor can the name of
Second Death, bee applyed to those that can never die but once: And although in
Metaphoricall speech, a Calamitous life Everlasting, may bee called an
Everlasting Death yet it cannot well be understood of a Second Death. The fire
prepared for the wicked, is an Everlasting Fire: that is to say, the estate
wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the
Resurrection, shall endure for ever; and in that sense the Fire shall be
unquenchable, and the torments Everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred,
that hee who shall be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments,
shall endure, and resist them so, as to be eternally burnt, and tortured, and
yet never be destroyed, nor die. And though there be many places that affirm
Everlasting Fire, and Torments (into which men may be cast successively one
after another for ever;) yet I find none that affirm there shall bee an Eternall
Life therein of any individuall person; but on the contrary, an Everlasting
Death, which is the Second Death: (Apoc. 20. 13,14.) "For after Death, and the
Grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be
judged according to his works; Death and the Grave shall also be cast into the
Lake of Fire. This is the Second Death." Whereby it is evident, that there is to
bee a Second Death of every one that shall bee condemned at the day of
Judgement, after which hee shall die no more.
The Joyes Of Life Eternall, And Salvation The Same Thing,
Salvation From Sin, And From Misery, All One
The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all under the name
of SALVATION, or Being Saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either
respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely against all Evill,
comprehending Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self. And because man was created in
a condition Immortall, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing
that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happinesse by
the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be Saved From Sin, is to be saved from
all the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath brought upon us. And therefore in
the Holy Scripture, Remission of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is
the same thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, who having cured a
man sick of the Palsey, by saying, (Mat. 9.2.) "Son be of good cheer, thy Sins
be forgiven thee;" and knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy, that a man
should pretend to forgive Sins, asked them (v.5.) "whether it were easier to
say, Thy Sinnes be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk;" signifying thereby, that
it was all one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, "Thy Sins are forgiven,"
and "Arise and walk;" and that he used that form of speech, onely to shew he had
power to forgive Sins. And it is besides evident in reason, that since Death and
Misery, were the punishments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be a
discharge of Death and Misery; that is to say, Salvation absolute, such as the
faithfull are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and favour of
Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.
Concerning Particular Salvations, such as are understood, 1 Sam. 14.39. "as
the Lord liveth that saveth Israel," that is, from their temporary enemies, and
2 Sam. 22.4. "Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from violence;" and 2 Kings
13.5. "God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the
hand of the Assyrians," and the like, I need say nothing; there being neither
difficulty, nor interest, to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.
The Place Of Eternall Salvation
But concerning the Generall Salvation, because it must be in the Kingdome of
Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place. On one side, by Kingdome
(which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetuall security against
enemies, and want) it seemeth that this Salvation should be on Earth. For by
Salvation is set forth unto us, a glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest; not a
safety by Escape: and therefore there where we look for Salvation, we must look
also for Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory; and before Victory, for
Battell; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in Heaven. But how good soever
this reason may be, I will not trust to it, without very evident places of
Scripture. The state of Salvation is described at large, Isaiah, 33. ver.
20,21,22,23,24.
"Look upon Zion, the City of our solemnities, thine eyes shall see Jerusalem
a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of the
stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the cords thereof be
broken.
But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers, and
streams; wherein shall goe no Gally with oares; neither shall gallant ship passe
thereby.
For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our King, he
will save us.
Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they
could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame
take the prey.
And the Inhabitant shall not say, I am sicke; the people that shall dwell
therein shall be forgiven their Iniquity."
In which words wee have the place from whence Salvation is to proceed,
"Jerusalem, a quiet habitation;" the Eternity of it, "a tabernacle that shall
not be taken down," &c. The Saviour of it, "the Lord, their Judge, their
Lawgiver, their King, he will save us;" the Salvation, "the Lord shall be to
them as a broad mote of swift waters," &c. the condition of their Enemies,
"their tacklings are loose, their masts weake, the lame shal take the spoil of
them." The condition of the Saved, "The Inhabitants shall not say, I am sick:"
And lastly, all this is comprehended in Forgivenesse of sin, "The people that
dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity." By which it is evident, that
Salvation shall be on Earth, then, when God shall reign, (at the coming again of
Christ) in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the Salvation of the
Gentiles that shall be received into Gods Kingdome; as is also more expressely
declared by the same Prophet, Chap. 66.20, 21. "And they," (that is, the
Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage) "shall bring all your brethren, for an
offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and in charets, and in
litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem,
saith the Lord, as the Children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessell
into the House of the Lord. And I will also take of them for Priests and for
Levites, saith the Lord:" Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of Gods
Kingdome (which is the Place, from whence the Salvation of us that were
Gentiles, shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem; And the same is also confirmed by
our Saviour, in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place of
Gods worship; to whom he saith, John 4.22. that the Samaritans worshipped they
know not what, but the Jews worship what they knew, "For Salvation is of the
Jews (Ex Judais, that is, begins at the Jews): as if he should say, you worship
God, but know not by whom he wil save you, as we doe, that know it shall be one
of the tribe of Judah, a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not
impertinently answered him again, "We know the Messias shall come." So that
which our saviour saith, "Salvation is from the Jews," is the same that Paul
sayes (Rom. 1.16,17.) "The Gospel is the power of God to Salvation to every one
that beleeveth; To the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the
righteousnesse of God revealed from faith to faith;" from the faith of the Jew,
to the faith of the Gentile. In the like sense the Prophet Joel describing the
day of Judgment, (chap. 2.30,31.) that God would "shew wonders in heaven, and in
earth, bloud, and fire, and pillars of smoak. The Sun should be turned to
darknesse, and the Moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day of the
Lord come," he addeth verse 32. "and it shall come to passe, that whosoever
shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. For in Mount Zion, and in
Jerusalem shall be Salvation." And Obadiah verse 17 saith the same, "Upon Mount
Zion shall be Deliverance; and there shall be holinesse, and the house of Jacob
shall possesse their possessions," that is, the possessions of the Heathen,
which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by
the Mount of Esau, the Land of the Philistines, the Fields of Ephraim, of
Samaria, Gilead, and the Cities of the South, and concludes with these words,
"the Kingdom shall be the Lords." All these places are for Salvation, and the
Kingdome of God (after the day of Judgement) upon Earth. On the other side, I
have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any Ascension of
the Saints into Heaven; that is to say, into any Coelum Empyreum, or other
aetheriall Region; saving that it is called the Kingdome of Heaven; which name
it may have, because God, that was King of the Jews, governed them by his
commands, sent to Moses by Angels from Heaven, to reduce them to their
obedience; and shall send him thence again, to rule both them, and all other
faithfull men, from the day of Judgment, Everlastingly: or from that, that the
Throne of this our Great King is in Heaven; whereas the Earth is but his
Footstoole. But that the Subjects of God should have any place as high as his
throne, or higher than his Footstoole, it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of
a King, nor can I find any evident text for it in holy Scripture.
From this that hath been said of the Kingdom of God, and of Salvation, it is
not hard to interpret, what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There are three
worlds mentioned in Scripture, the Old World, the Present World, and the World
to Come. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. 2.5.) "If God spared not the
Old World, but saved Noah the eighth person, a Preacher of righteousnesse,
bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly," &c. So the First World, was
from Adam to the generall Flood. Of the present World, our Saviour speaks (John
18.36.) "My Kingdome is not of this World." For he came onely to teach men the
way of Salvation, and to renew the Kingdome of his Father, by his doctrine. Of
the World to come, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. 3. 13.) "Neverthelesse we according
to his promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth." This is that WORLD,
wherein Christ coming down from Heaven, in the clouds, with great power, and
glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather together his elect, from the four
winds, and from the uttermost parts of the Earth, and thence forth reign over
them, (under his Father) Everlastingly.
Redemption
Salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that is once
guilty of Sin, is obnoxious to the Penalty of the same; and must pay (or some
other for him) such Ransome, as he that is offended, and has him in his power,
shall require. And seeing the person offended, is Almighty God, in whose power
are all things; such Ransome is to be paid before Salvation can be acquired, as
God hath been pleased to require. By this Ransome, is not intended a
satisfaction for Sin, equivalent to the Offence, which no sinner for himselfe,
nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another; The dammage a man does
to another, he may make amends for by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot
be taken away by recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing
vendible. But sins may bee pardoned to the repentant, either Gratis, or upon
such penalty, as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in
the Old Testament, was some Sacrifice, or Oblation. To forgive sin is not an act
of Injustice, though the punishment have been threatned. Even amongst men,
though the promise of Good, bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say,
promises, of Evill, bind them not; much lesse shall they bind God, who is
infinitely more mercifull then men. Our Saviour Christ therefore to Redeem us,
did not in that sense satisfie for the Sins of men, as that his Death, of its
own vertue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with Eternall death;
but did make that Sacrifice, and Oblation of himself, at his first coming, which
God was pleased to require, for the Salvation at his second coming, of such as
in the mean time should repent, and beleeve in him. And though this act of our
Redemption, be not alwaies in Scripture called a Sacrifice, and Oblation, but
sometimes a Price, yet by Price we are not to understand any thing, by the value
whereof, he could claim right to a pardon for us, from his offended Father, but
that Price which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.
CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH
Church The Lords House
The word Church, (Ecclesia) signifieth in the Books of Holy Scripture divers
things. Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for Gods House, that is to say,
for a Temple, wherein Christians assemble to perform holy duties publiquely; as,
1 Cor. 14. ver. 34. "Let your women keep silence in the Churches:" but this is
Metaphorically put, for the Congregation there assembled; and hath been since
used for the Edifice it self, to distinguish between the Temples of Christians,
and Idolaters. The Temple of Jerusalem was Gods House, and the House of Prayer;
and so is any Edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ, Christs
House: and therefore the Greek Fathers call it Kuriake, The Lords House; and
thence, in our language it came to be called Kyrke, and Church.
Ecclesia Properly What
Church (when not taken for a House) signifieth the same that Ecclesia
signified in the Grecian Common-wealths; that is to say, a Congregation, or an
Assembly of Citizens, called forth, to hear the Magistrate speak unto them; and
which in the Common-wealth of Rome was called Concio, as he that spake was
called Ecclesiastes, and Concionator. And when they were called forth by lawfull
Authority, (Acts 19.39.) it was Ecclesia Legitima, a Lawfull Church, Ennomos
Ecclesia. But when they were excited by tumultuous, and seditious clamor, then
it was a confused Church, Ecclesia Sugkechumene.
It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the
Congregation, though not actually assembled; that is to say, for the whole
multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as (Act. 8.3.)
where it is said, that "Saul made havock of the Church:" And in this sense is
Christ said to be Head of the Church. And sometimes for a certain part of
Christians, as (Col. 4.15.) "Salute the Church that is in his house." Sometimes
also for the Elect onely; as (Ephes. 5.27.) "A Glorious Church, without spot, or
wrinkle, holy, and without blemish;" which is meant of the Church Triumphant,
or, Church To Come. Sometimes, for a Congregation assembled, of professors of
Christianity, whether their profession be true, or counterfeit, as it is
understood, Mat. 18.17. where it is said, "Tell it to the Church, and if hee
neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a Gentile, or Publican."
In What Sense The Church Is One Person Church Defined
And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one
Person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to pronounce,
to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to doe any other action whatsoever;
For without authority from a lawfull Congregation, whatsoever act be done in a
concourse of people, it is the particular act of every one of those that were
present, and gave their aid to the performance of it; and not the act of them
all in grosse, as of one body; much lesse that act of them that were absent, or
that being present, were not willing it should be done. According to this sense,
I define a CHURCH to be, "A company of men professing Christian Religion, united
in the person of one Soveraign; at whose command they ought to assemble, and
without whose authority they ought not to assemble." And because in all
Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from the Civil
Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in any
Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawfull Assembly.
A Christian Common-wealth, And A Church All One
It followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universall Church as all
Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on Earth, to which all
other Common-wealths are subject: There are Christians, in the Dominions of
severall Princes and States; but every one of them is subject to that
Common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be
subject to the commands of any other Person. And therefore a Church, such as one
as is capable to Command, to Judge, Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is
the same thing with a Civil Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is
called a Civill State, for that the subjects of it are Men; and a Church, for
that the subjects thereof are Christians. Temporall and Spirituall Government,
are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake
their Lawfull Soveraign. It is true, that the bodies of the faithfull, after the
Resurrection shall be not onely Spirituall, but Eternall; but in this life they
are grosse, and corruptible. There is therefore no other Government in this
life, neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any
doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governour both of the State, and of
the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must be one; or else
there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth, between the
Church and State; between Spiritualists, and Temporalists; between the Sword Of
Justice, and the Shield Of Faith; and (which is more) in every Christian mans
own brest, between the Christian, and the Man. The Doctors of the Church, are
called Pastors; so also are Civill Soveraignes: But if Pastors be not
subordinate one to another, so as that there may bee one chief Pastor, men will
be taught contrary Doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who
that one chief Pastor is, according to the law of Nature, hath been already
shewn; namely, that it is the Civill Soveraign; And to whom the Scripture hath
assigned that Office, we shall see in the Chapters following.
CHAPTER XL
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, HIGH PRIESTS,
AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH
The Soveraign Rights Of Abraham
The Father of the Faithfull, and first in the Kingdome of God by Covenant,
was Abraham. For with him was the Covenant first made; wherein he obliged
himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God;
not onely such, as he could take notice of, (as Morall Laws,) by the light of
Nature; but also such, as God should in speciall manner deliver to him by Dreams
and Visions. For as to the Morall law, they were already obliged, and needed not
have been contracted withall, by promise of the Land of Canaan. Nor was there
any Contract, that could adde to, or strengthen the Obligation, by which both
they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: And therefore
the Covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the Commandement of
God, that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a Dream, or Vision, and
to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same.
Abraham Had The Sole Power Of Ordering The Religion Of His Own People
In this Contract of God with Abraham, wee may observe three points of
important consequence in the government of Gods people. First, that at the
making of this Covenant, God spake onely to Abraham; and therefore contracted
not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their wills (which make
the essence of all Covenants) were before the Contract involved in the will of
Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawfull power, to make them
perform all that he covenanted for them. According whereunto (Gen 18.18, 19.)
God saith, "All the Nations of the Earth shall be blessed in him, For I know him
that he will command his children and his houshold after him, and they shall
keep the way of the Lord." From whence may be concluded this first point, that
they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive
commandements of God, from their Soveraign; as the family and seed of Abraham
did from Abraham their Father, and Lord, and Civill Soveraign. And Consequently
in every Common-wealth, they who have no supernaturall Revelation to the
contrary, ought to obey the laws of their own Soveraign, in the externall acts
and profession of Religion. As for the inward Thought, and beleef of men, which
humane Governours can take no notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they
are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and
of the power of God; and consequently fall not under obligation.
No Pretence Of Private Spirit Against The Religion Of Abraham
From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawfull for Abraham,
when any of his Subjects should pretend Private Vision, or Spirit, or other
Revelation from God, for the countenancing of any doctrine which Abraham should
forbid, or when they followed, or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them;
and consequently that it is lawfull now for the Soveraign to punish any man that
shall oppose his Private Spirit against the Laws: For hee hath the same place in
the Common-wealth, that Abraham had in his own Family.
Abraham Sole Judge, And Interpreter Of What God Spake
There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but Abraham in
his family, so none but the Soveraign in a Christian Common-wealth, can take
notice what is, or what is not the Word of God. For God spake onely to Abraham;
and it was he onely, that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the
same to his family: And therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a
Common-wealth, are the onely Interpreters of what God hath spoken.
The Authority Of Moses Whereon Grounded
The same Covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but
afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians, and
arrived at the Foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses (as I have
said before, chap. 35.) in such manner, as they became from that time forward
the Peculiar Kingdome of God; whose Lieutenant was Moses, for his owne time; and
the succession to that office was setled upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to
bee to God a Sacerdotall Kingdome for ever.
By this constitution, a Kingdome is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no
authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of Abraham,
because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as yet, that the
people were obliged to take him for Gods Lieutenant, longer than they beleeved
that God spake unto him. And therefore his authority (notwithstanding the
Covenant they made with God) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of
his Sanctity, and of the reality of his Conferences with God, and the verity of
his Miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take
any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to them in Gods name. We are
therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey
him. For it could not be the commandement of God that could oblige them; because
God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses Himself; And
our Saviour saith of himself, (John 5. 31.) "If I bear witnesse of my self, my
witnesse is not true," much lesse if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe,
(especially in a claim of Kingly power over Gods people) ought his testimony to
be received. His authority therefore, as the authority of all other Princes,
must be grounded on the Consent of the People, and their Promise to obey him.
And so it was: for "the people" (Exod. 20.18.) "when they saw the Thunderings,
and the Lightnings, and the noyse of the Trumpet, and the mountaine smoaking,
removed, and stood a far off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and
we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die." Here was their promise
of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he
should deliver unto them for the Commandement of God.
Moses Was (Under God) Soveraign Of The Jews, All His Own Time,
Though Aaron Had The Priesthood
And notwithstanding the Covenant constituted a Sacerdotall Kingdome, that is
to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood of the
succession, after Moses should bee dead. For whosoever ordereth, and
establisheth the Policy, as first founder of a Common-wealth (be it Monarchy,
Aristocracy, or Democracy) must needs have Soveraign Power over the people all
the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that power all his own time, is
evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the text last before cited,
because the people promised obedience, not to Aaron but to him. Secondly, (Exod.
24.1, 2.) "And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron,
Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come
neer the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up
with him." By which it is plain, that Moses who was alone called up to God, (and
not Aaron, nor the other Priests, nor the Seventy Elders, nor the People who
were forbidden to come up) was alone he, that represented to the Israelites the
Person of God; that is to say, was their sole Soveraign under God. And though
afterwards it be said (verse 9.) "Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and
Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and
there was under his feet, as it were a paved work of a saphire stone," &c. yet
this was not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the
people the words which God had said to him. He onely went for the businesse of
the people; the others, as the Nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour
to that speciall grace, which was not allowed to the people; which was, (as in
the verse after appeareth) to see God and live. "God laid not his hand upon
them, they saw God and did eat and drink" (that is, did live), but did not carry
any commandement from him to the people. Again, it is every where said, "The
Lord spake unto Moses," as in all other occasions of Government; so also in the
ordering of the Ceremonies of Religion, contained in the 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
and 31 Chapters of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus: to Aaron seldome. The Calfe
that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of the
Authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriams mutiny against Moses, was
(Numbers 12.) judged by God himself for Moses. So also in the question between
Moses, and the People, when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty
Princes of the Assembly "gathered themselves together" (Numbers 16. 3) "against
Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, 'Ye take too much upon you, seeing
all the congregation are Holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them,
why lift you up your selves above the congregation of the Lord?'" God caused the
Earth to swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram with their wives and children alive,
and consumed those two hundred and fifty Princes with fire. Therefore neither
Aaron, nor the People, nor any Aristocracy of the chief Princes of the People,
but Moses alone had next under God the Soveraignty over the Israelites: And that
not onely in causes of Civill Policy, but also of Religion; For Moses onely
spake with God, and therefore onely could tell the People, what it was that God
required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as
to approach the Mountain where God talked with Moses. "Thou shalt set bounds"
(saith the Lord, Exod 19. 12.) "to the people round about, and say, Take heed to
your selves that you goe not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it;
whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death." and again (verse
21.) "Get down, charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to
gaze." Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth
holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his
Commandements. And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the
Scripture to proceed further then the bounds which are set by their severall
Soveraigns. For the Scriptures since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount
Sinai; the bounds whereof are the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on
Earth. To look upon them and therein to behold the wondrous works of God, and
learn to fear him is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into what
God saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves
Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or not, is to transgresse the
bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God irreverently.
All Spirits Were Subordinate To The Spirit Of Moses
There was no Prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the Spirit of
God, but such as Moses had approved, and Authorized. For there were in his time
but Seventy men, that are said to Prophecy by the Spirit of God, and these were
of all Moses his election; concerning whom God saith to Moses (Numb. 11.16.)
"Gather to mee Seventy of the Elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the
Elders of the People." To these God imparted his Spirit; but it was not a
different Spirit from that of Moses; for it is said (verse 25.) "God came down
in a cloud, and took of the Spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the
Seventy Elders." But as I have shewn before (chap. 36.) by Spirit, is understood
the Mind; so that the sense of the place is no other than this, that God endued
them with a mind conformable, and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might
Prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in Gods name, in such manner, as
to set forward (as Ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as
was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For they were but Ministers; and when two
of them Prophecyed in the Camp, it was thought a new and unlawfull thing; and as
it is in the 27. and 28. verses of the same Chapter, they were accused of it,
and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his
Spirit that they Prophecyed. By which it is manifest, that no Subject ought to
pretend to Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established
by him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses.
After Moses The Soveraignty Was In The High Priest
Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the Kingdome, as being a
Sacerdotall Kingdome, descended by vertue of the Covenant, to Aarons Son,
Eleazar the High Priest: And God declared him (next under himself) for
Soveraign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the Generall of their
Army. For thus God saith expressely (Numb. 27.21.) concerning Joshua; "He shall
stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall ask counsell for him, before the
Lord, at his word shall they goe out, and at his word they shall come in, both
he, and all the Children of Israel with him:" Therefore the Supreme Power of
making War and Peace, was in the Priest. The Supreme Power of Judicature
belonged also to the High Priest: For the Book of the Law was in their keeping;
and the Priests and Levites onely were the subordinate Judges in causes Civill,
as appears in Deut. 17.8, 9, 10. And for the manner of Gods worship, there was
never doubt made, but that the High Priest till the time of Saul, had the
Supreme Authority. Therefore the Civill and Ecclesiasticall Power were both
joined together in one and the same person, the High Priest; and ought to bee
so, in whosoever governeth by Divine Right; that is, by Authority immediate from
God.
Of The Soveraign Power Between The Time Of Joshua And Of Saul
After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is noted
frequently in the Book of Judges, "that there was in those dayes no Kin
